

**THE SOLDIER AS EMPLOYEE:
THE COMPATIBILITY OF LABOUR RIGHTS WITH
MILITARY SERVICE**

by

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ABSTRACT

A review of literature reveals, that three key issues underlie the debate on whether soldiers may have labour rights. The first suggests that it is socially unjust, or undemocratic, to deny soldiers the right to belong to a labour union to advance their interests as employees. The second, is that the constitutional rights of soldiers to belong to trade unions must yield to the unique nature of military service, given the need for discipline, obedience and cohesion. For the sake of national security, these rights must be curtailed. The third area of concern, is the effect of military unionisation upon the political control of the armed forces.

This study sets out to analyse whether labour rights, such as the right to belong to a trade union for the purpose of collective bargaining, as well as the right to strike, can be extended to soldiers without undermining national security. The suggestion is made that the unique nature of the military profession, the ethical requirements of the profession, as well as the potential consequences of the abuse of the monopoly over the means of mass destruction, complicates the acceptance of a more pluralist approach to labour relations. The drift towards occupationalism, as well as the impact of certain societal trends on the military organisation, nevertheless compels the armed forces to adapt their unitarist approach to labour relations, and accept a more pluralist dispensation. The unique nature of military service complicates the acceptance of pluralist labour relations practices, and even where labour rights have been extended to soldiers, the activities of the unions or associations representing soldiers are curtailed. Against this background an assessment is made whether labour rights can be extended to soldiers in South Africa.

The research methodology is as follows. The theoretical frame of reference for this study emerges from the literature on the military profession and the manpower challenges of armed forces in recent times. The literature describing the features of the unitarist and pluralist perspectives to labour relations, explained the various managerial approaches to labour relations within the armed forces. The South African case study relied on primary and survey data. Two closed-ended survey questionnaires were conducted to establish the views of officers towards their employment in the military. A synthesis of the facts obtained, led to certain suggestions on how the present unitarist labour relations dispensation can be improved to accommodate the needs and aspirations of the soldiers serving in the South African National Defence Force.

The main findings of this study can be summarised as follows.

The unique nature of the military profession has led to labour relations being managed from a typically unitarist perspective. This approach to labour relations is accepted by soldiers given the shared value system that exists. Where the value system of the soldier changes, from traditional professional/institutional values to a more occupational orientation, the pressure to accept a more pluralist approach to labour relations is enhanced.

No labour relationship functions in a vacuum. Ultimately it is societal forces that determine whether or not armed forces will be pressurised to extend labour rights to soldiers.

Where labour rights have been extended to the armed forces, certain limitations have been placed on the activities of the associations representing military personnel. The limitations consist of ones that are considered detrimental to organisational or combat effectiveness, as well as civilian control over the armed forces.

In South Africa, the weakening of professional values, the ascendancy in occupationalism as well as certain societal forces, indicate that the SANDF will have to cope with the prospect of unionisation.

The conclusion is reached that the SANDF will need to create the necessary mechanisms through which the needs and aspirations of soldiers can be addressed. It is considered far better to institutionalise labour relations, than to be forced to concede to the demands by disgruntled soldiers at gun point.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Since 1993, just prior to the shift to an all-volunteer force, the former South African Defence Force (SADF) felt the first rumblings of possible unionisation within its ranks. Civilians, employed in the Department of Defence, had already begun to join trade unions, and sporadic incidences of labour unrest had occurred. The prospect of such trade union activity spilling over the uniformed military personnel, evoked concern, especially as members *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, the armed wing of the African National Congress, soon to be integrated in the new Defence Force, were seen to publicly support and participate in demonstrations with the Police and Civil Rights Union (Popcru).

The response to the prospect of unionisation among military personnel by the SADF was swift. Just six months before the formation of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in April 1994, the Defence Act was amended to prohibit any form of trade union activity, or public protest by members of the armed forces. This controversial amendment would become a topic of much debate, as both the Interim Constitution and later the new Constitution of South Africa, entrenched both the freedom of association and labour rights. The question arose, whose rights are paramount? The soldier's¹ right to have the freedom of association to belong to a trade union, or the right of the military to restrict trade union activity for the sake of national security?

This legal vacuum opened up the opportunity for unionisation and within a matter of months, the South African National Defence Union (SANDU) was formed to represent uniformed personnel on the premise, that it is the constitutional right of members to belong to trade unions, despite the restrictions in the Defence Act. For the first time, the SANDF began to think seriously about the prospects and dilemmas of unions within its ranks. Labour relations was identified as a "*strategic issue*", and soon internal regulations and procedures were upgraded in an attempt to address the grievances of military personnel and to pre-empt trade unionism. Internal SANDF Communication Bulletins were circulated to explain these

1. "Soldiers" is used as a universal term to include uniformed military personnel of all arms of service, irrespective of rank and gender.

procedures to military personnel and to draw attention to the fact, that in terms of the Defence Act, it is illegal for soldiers to belong to trade unions.

While the SANDF attempted to curtail trade unionism within its ranks, the external labour relations climate appeared to stimulate the desire for unions. First the Public Service Labour Relations Act, 1993, extended labour rights to civilians employed in the Department of Defence, and a year later, the Correctional Services and later the Police, permitted their members to join trade unions. The new Labour Relations Act of 1995, which came into effect in 1996, extended labour rights to all employees, with the exception of uniformed members of the SANDF and the Intelligence Services. To add to the labour relations problems of the SANDF, uniformed personnel had begun to experience a rapid decline in their service conditions and tenure, as a result of budgetary constraints and rationalisation, increasing the desire for some means to prevent a future erosion of their service conditions. An anti-military environment was also perceived to exist, as public debate centred on the future size of the defence force and on whether South Africa needs a technologically advanced defence force, in the absence of any immediate external threat.

These are just some of the circumstances, which by 1996, had begun to place pressure on the SANDF to review its present unitarist labour relations practices, and implement more appropriate labour relations mechanisms for its uniformed personnel.

1.2 PROBLEM POSTULATION

Against this background, the research problem that is addressed in this study is whether labour rights, such as the right to belong to a trade union for the purpose of collective bargaining, and to strike, can be extended to the armed forces.

To answer this question, it is necessary to establish why labour rights have traditionally been curtailed for members of the armed forces. What are the unique professional requirements that have led to the restriction on labour rights? How do the armed forces manage labour relations? Should it be shown that military service is no longer viewed as a unique profession, but as an occupation, the question is raised whether this affects the management of labour relations in armed forces? Does the decline in professionalism and the increase in occupationalism enhance the demand for labour rights? Does this demand come merely from a change in attitudes of soldiers (at the micro level), or is it a result of the change in nature of military service and military organisation (meso level factors)? Furthermore, are there

certain societal pressures that either restrain or advance the pressure to extend labour rights to the armed forces, such as the equality of rights? Is it unjust or undemocratic to deny soldiers the right to belong to a labour union formed to advance their interests as employees, especially if other employees have these rights and the dominant industrial and political culture is supportive of unionisation?

The next issue that arises is whether the demand for labour rights can be accommodated within the armed forces? Can a form of group representation, be it a lobby group, a professional association or a trade union be compatible with military service given the need for discipline, obedience and unswerving loyalty to the chain of command for military effectiveness? An additional concern is the effect military unionisation might have upon the political control of the armed forces. Will unionised soldiers not use their strength to influence policy decisions affecting the armed forces, thereby disturbing the fragile balance of civilian control over the armed forces? Finally, if it is proved that labour rights need to be curtailed for members of the armed forces, what are the alternatives? These are the issues that need to be addressed to answer the proposed research problem.

1.3 THE AIM OF THIS STUDY

The aim of this study is to establish whether the extension of labour rights to soldiers can be compatible with military service, given the need for unswerving loyalty to the chain of command for the sake of military effectiveness. By examining the unique nature of the military profession, the impact of occupationalism, the societal forces that influence labour relations and international precedent regarding group representation in armed forces, it is determined whether labour rights can be extended to uniformed members of the SANDF.

1.4 LIMITATIONS

This study does have a number of limitations. Although the concept "*soldier*" is used generally to apply to all military personnel, only officers' options were surveyed and not non-commissioned officers, who may be considered the rank and file in the SANDF. While it is acknowledged that the non-commissioned officers may have different opinions on aspects relating to their employment in the SANDF, it is the officer corps who are the leaders and who are supposedly more committed to professional values. Thus, should officers desire unions, this has a significant impact on traditional institutional values and organisational culture and practices. The opinions of officers are considered decisive in this regard. International trends

seem to indicate that it is the officers, who are the first to indicate the need for unionisation, although the non-commissioned officers are often the most active. Similarly, in South Africa, it was officers who formed the South African National Defence Union (SANDU), but non-commissioned officers who represent the majority in membership².

Although a survey conducted by the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP) measured the differences in attitudes towards unions in the SANDF among the broader population by race, the survey conducted within the SANDF did not use race as an indicator of support for unions. The present sensitivity to race made the inclusion of such a question problematic and even where it was included, many respondents refused to respond to this question. However, what is significant, is that the majority of officers who responded to the survey questionnaire were white, and contrary to popular opinion that only blacks support unions, there was substantial support for a union or some form of association for uniformed personnel by these white officers.

Another possible limitation, is the use of European examples to illustrate the various forms of group representation that have been created to represent the interests of military personnel, with little reference to African militaries. The problem experienced in the course of this research is that none of the African armies have any system of group representation that can serve as any comparative analogue. Many of the African countries have also been subject to military coups, which at present is an unlikely scenario in South Africa, even though the causes of these coups have often been rooted in economic causes. The European social-democratic countries are thus the only case studies that have accommodated labour rights for military personnel. The socio-political circumstances of these countries that eventually led to the acceptance of some form of group representation, are in many respects comparable to South Africa, and thus have some comparative value. Looking at the professionalism of the South African military, their structure and the societal pressures upon the organisation, the European situation is perhaps more relevant than any African comparison.

1.5 THE VALUE OF THE STUDY

This study attempts to provide a balanced and timely assessment of the constitutionality, feasibility and desirability of military unions in South Africa. Concerning the constitutionality of military unionisation, the

2. In an interview with the executive officer of SANDU, Mr Cor van Niekerk, he indicated that approximately 60 percent of the membership of SANDU is non-commissioned officers and 40 percent officers. As the union is still struggling to obtain recognition, given the

SANDF faces the challenge of whether it is reasonable and justifiable to restrict the labour rights of military personnel in a democratic society. The next issue is whether it is feasible to extend these rights to members of the armed forces in South Africa if it could potentially divide the SANDF along racial lines and undermine discipline in the force which is still grappling with the problems of having to integrate seven different armed formations. This desirability is associated not only with the possible impact on military discipline and cohesion, but with the impact unionisation may have on civil supremacy over the military. Although many soldiers appear to have the need for greater representation on pay and service conditions and support the need for a professional association, and even a trade union with collective bargaining rights, the question is whether it is desirable in a fledgling democracy as South Africa. Nonetheless if military leadership appears unable to address the grievances of soldiers and if societal trends tend to promote the inclination to unionisation, it is imperative that the SANDF creates the necessary structures to address the needs of their members. This study hopes to shed some answers to these questions and to provide possible alternatives to unionisation, should the extension of full labour rights to military personnel be limited. Two antithetical schools of thought are integrated, that of military sociology and industrial sociology, to provide a clearer understanding of the management of labour relations within the armed forces.

The review of literature reveals, that no such study has been done in South Africa, as until recently it has not been an issue that has evoked any serious attention. Other than the NATO countries, little research has been conducted on this topic outside these countries.

The scant attention paid to the possible effect of labour unions and collective bargaining with the armed forces in South Africa may be based on the belief that present prohibitory legislation will prevent the development of unionisation. There has also been a tendency to ignore the changing attitudes of soldiers towards their employment in the military. This study attempts to illustrate that the "*legal shield*" the Defence Act has provided to restrain unionisation, may be challenged in the Constitutional Court. Furthermore, that there is a definite shift in the attitude of military personnel towards military service, with a greater priority being placed on self-interest rather than the interests of the employing organisation.

This study is of particular relevance at this stage in the history of the armed forces of South Africa. The SANDF is in a process of transformation and a Defence Review is currently being finalised. Policy is being formulated on almost every facet affecting the armed forces. One such issue under review by the Human

Resources Sub-committee of the Defence Review, is the formulation of labour relations policy for the future armed forces. It is hoped that this study will be able to make a contribution towards this process and assist with the formulation of appropriate labour relations regulations for uniformed personnel serving in the SANDF.

1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The theoretical frame of reference for this study emerged from the existing literature on the military profession, the most noteworthy being, the classic works of Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960) and the new path traced by the institutional/occupational hypothesis of Moskos (1977). The work of these scholars, as well as subsequent contributions by Cotton, (1981,1988), Downes (1985), Segal (1986) Moskos (1983,1986,1988) and the latest work by Nuciari (1994) and Caforio (1994) who have either referred to, expanded or criticised Moskos' I/O theory, helped to contextualise the uniqueness and changing nature of the military profession and military organisation.

The most influential works in the field of labour relations, that explained the typical approach to labour relations within the armed forces, was based on the work by of Fox (1969,1979), Flanders (1979), Farnham and Pimlott (1983), and Salamon (1989), with specific reference to the unitarist and pluralist approach to labour relations.

The work of these scholars, led to a closer analyses of the manpower issues facing the modern military, and in particular those issues associated with the shift to an all-volunteer force. This prompted a review of literature in the field, much of which was written by scholars such as Hauser (1980), Moskos (1983) and Segal and Lengerman (1980). Numerous articles were published in periodicals such as *Armed Forces and Society*, on the challenges posed by the shift to an all-volunteer force, among them, debates on unionisation.

Comparatively, the debate on unionisation spawned little literature. Only a few significant works were published, of which the most noteworthy included those either written or edited by, Taylor *et al* (1977), Krendel and Samoff (1977) and Sabrosky (1977). Numerous authors, however, such as, Harries-Jenkins (1977), Segal (1977, 1978, 1983) and Fleckenstein (1976, 1988) made significant contributions to this debate. The writings of these authors, together with the various reports that were compiled on the issue of

military unions, particularly the CMRI report,³ provided some valuable insights into the compatibility of labour rights with military service.

The South African situation relied more heavily on primary data, as little has been published on the topic of military unionism or other relevant manpower issues in South Africa. Besides the work of Cilliers and Reichardt (1996), Cock and Nathan (1989), Nathan (1994) and the latest work by Seegers (1996), little substantive material is available which can reflect on the soldier as an employee in South Africa. Most of the material explaining the South African position depended on Defence White Papers, Internal Communication Bulletins of the SANDF, internal policy documents, newspaper clippings and correspondence obtained from SANDU.

To supplement information, and to reflect on the attitude of military personnel towards their service in the SANDF, two surveys were conducted among military personnel. The first, comprised of a forty two item questionnaire compiled to determine the commitment to professional values among the officers studying at the SA Military Academy (refer Appendix C). The exact same questionnaire survey, conducted in 1989 as part of a leadership development programme, was repeated.⁴ Unfortunately, the original survey data has not been preserved, although the graphic representation of the data was retained, providing some indication of the shift in I/O trends from 1989 to 1995.

The questionnaire was distributed to the officer student population at the Military Academy consisting of 239 officers in November 1995, of which 183 responses were received. Responses were anonymous and students were assured that their responses would be treated confidentially. Of these students 61.4 percent were in the Army, 22.8 percent in the Air Force, 7.6 percent in the Navy and 7.1 percent in the Medical Services. This profile is in line with the Arm of Service composition. By rank group, 20 percent were 2 Lt/Ens, 51 percent Lt/ S Lt, 25 percent Capt/Lt (SAN) and 3 percent Maj/ Lt Cdr. The value of the Military Academy sample is that it represents an elite group of junior officers, "*the best and the brightest*" who will set the future standardss of professional behaviour and eventually go on to fill the top posts in the SANDF.

3. A special word of appreciation is expressed to Prof Gwyn Harries-Jenkins who on request, forwarded a copy of the CMRI report on "*Group Representation European Armed Forces*" and provided the author with some value information and advice on military unionism within armed forces.

4. In order to draw a longitudinal comparison, the same questionnaire compiled by Col J.S. Kotze, Department Head, Military History at the Military Academy, measuring I/O trends among the student officer corps at the Military Academy was repeated. The questions used in this questionnaire were obtained from the book "*The Military More than just a Job*", Moskos, C. and Wood, R (eds.). The questionnaire used for this survey, including the results obtained are provided in Appendix C.

The questionnaire contained five biographic questions in order to assess if there are any differences between the I/O orientations of students in (1) the different study directions, (2) the various arms of service, (3) the various rank groups (4) year of study and (5) by marital status. Not all this data has been used for the purposes of this study.

The non-biographic questionnaire items included attitudinal and perceptual questions that serve as indicators of I/O trends. Many of the questions were of a general nature reflecting attitudes towards military traditions and norms, to more specific questions on attitudes towards the kind of job they would like to have in the military, reasons for joining the permanent force, personal attitudes towards aspects of military service, the need for a representative association to represent their interests and the view of themselves as military professionals.

In November 1996, a second survey designed to measure attitudes towards specific aspects of military service was conducted among officers attending the different arms of service Junior Staff and Warfare Courses, Senior Command and Staff Courses, and Joint Staff Course. Every officer in the SANDF is obliged to complete these courses at some stage in their career if they wish to be promoted to higher ranks or the command echelon.

The biographic data of the sample is as follows. Of the 188 respondents, 50 percent were officers attending the Junior Staff and Warfare Course (average rank Capt-Maj), 35 percent the Senior Command and Staff Course (Lt Col-Col) and 15 percent the Joint Staff Course (Col-Brig). The sample corresponds roughly with the broader population with the exception that the rank group "*colonel*" is over-represented, while women are slightly under-represented. The value of this sample is that it provides a random cross-section of officer opinion at various strategic points in the officer's career, among all arms of service and rank groups at a specific period in time.

As with the previous questionnaire, certain biographic data were included, and where appropriate cross tabulations were drawn with the questions which could reflect on the current attitudes of officers towards, for example, the need for representation on pay and working conditions, the need for an association to represent their interests; a union with collective bargaining rights; opinion on women in combat positions; the legitimacy of the SANDF; society's views of military service; and the operational competency of the SANDF (see appendix D for a copy of the questionnaire)

Both these surveys provided some valuable insights into the perceptions and attitudes of officers towards their employment in the SANDF. A number of interviews were conducted with the executive officer of SANDU, Mr Cor van Niekerk, who throughout the period of the study forwarded any relevant information.

1.7 CHAPTER PROFILE

The first introductory chapter traces the development of the military-union debate; defines the problem to be researched; outlines the aim of the study; the value of the study; the research methodology and the profile of the study.

Chapter two defines the characteristics of a profession and the unique features of the military profession, such as, the high degree of generalised and systematic knowledge which makes military personnel specialists in the management of violence, the institutional autonomy of the military and the constraints imposed on this aspect of the military profession; the sense of corporatism required of the profession; the internal controls regulating the behaviour of members; and the professional social ethics of the profession. After verifying that the profession of arms is indeed a unique profession, and discussing some of the anomalies of the military profession, it is explained why the armed forces have managed labour relations from a unitarist perspective. This perspective is defined and its applicability to the management of labour relations within the military explained.

Chapter Three indicates that the military profession is experiencing an ascendancy in occupationalism, which is associated with a change in value orientations of military professionals who seem to be turning away from reference patterns based on altruistic values, to individualistic patterns grounded in self-interest. This change can be defined as a shift from an institutional/professional orientation to an occupational orientation. The I/O theory as proposed by Moskos is explained, as well as those factors which tend to promote occupationalism, such as the civilianisation of the military profession, the shift to an all-volunteer force, the changing profile of recruits and the erosion of the unique compensation system of the military. The consequences of occupationalism is discussed, and it is suggested that where there is an ascendancy in occupationalism, it may require the acceptance of a more pluralist approach to labour relations. This approach to labour relations is defined, and the difficulties associated with the acceptance of pluralist labour relations practices are highlighted.

In Chapter Four it is argued that the pressure to accept a more pluralist labour relations is not purely the result of occupationalism, but of societal forces which influence the management of labour relations in the armed forces. The most decisive societal trend is where labour rights are constitutionally entrenched. Other societal pressures include the influence of the dominant political and trade union culture on the military, whether other public sector employees have labour rights.

Chapter Five sets out to determine whether labour rights, such as the right to belong to a trade union for the purposes of collective bargaining, as well as the right to strike, can be compatible with military service. The six most diverse and frequently quoted European case studies namely France, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden are discussed. The legislative position and the various forms of group representation that have been created to accommodate the labour rights for military personnel are evaluated, and it is determined whether the extension of these rights to soldiers has had any negative effect on organisational effectiveness, or civilian control over the armed forces.

Chapter Six provides a historical overview of the South African armed forces. The aim of the chapter is to sketch a background that will place the forthcoming chapters into perspective. The British influence on the future armed forces in South Africa is discussed. Hereafter, the major mission definition, the force structure and manpower procurement systems of the SADF and SANDF, the organisational structure of the SANDF (as it existed at the end of 1996), as well as the mission, structure and manpower problems of the four arms of service, are outlined.

Chapter Seven focuses on the professionalism of the South African armed forces. An assessment is made whether the South African Armed forces conform to the principles of professionalism, as outlined in chapter two of this study. After establishing that the SANDF complies with the principles of professionalism, it is explained why labour relations has been managed from a typically unitarist perspective. This is achieved by examining the mechanisms that have been implemented to deal with grievances, complaints and dissatisfactions of members, as well as the response of the SANDF to the possible emergence of trade unionism.

Chapter Eight sets out to illustrate that, despite the commitment to professionalism, that there is an ascendancy in occupationalism within the SANDF according to the variables listed by Moskos as I/O indicators. Furthermore, that this ascendancy in occupationalism is facilitated by the civilianisation of the military profession; the recent shift to an all-volunteer force; the changing profile of recruits; and the erosion

of unique institutional compensation system of military personnel. The consequence of occupationalism, is that there is a growing priority with self-interest, which stimulates the need for some form of representation, association or trade union. This is placing increasing pressure on the SANDF to accept a more pluralist labour relations dispensation for its members.

Chapter Nine emphasises that it is not merely the ascendancy of occupationalism, but societal forces that may eventually pressurise the SANDF to accept a more pluralist labour relations dispensation for uniformed personnel. The fact that labour rights are enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, and have not been specifically curtailed for the military; the influence of the dominant trade union culture and the receptiveness towards unions; the impact of labour rights of the public service and police on the SANDF, and the perceived decline in the status and relevance of the military in society, were all identified as forces that promote unionisation.

Chapter Ten attempts to determine whether labour rights can be compatible with military service in South Africa. Suggestions are made whereby the present grievance procedures for both individual and collective grievances, could be improved. The value of a Military Ombudsperson and the possible role and functions of such an institution is discussed. Should members of the SANDF desire some form of group representation, the possible structure and function, scope of activities and process of representation and joint consultation is delineated.

Chapter Eleven provides a brief summary of the findings, as well as a conclusive comment on each of the chapters, ending with a final remark on the need to institutionalise labour relations mechanisms that are compatible with military service.

CHAPTER TWO

MILITARY SERVICE AS A PROFESSION

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The uniqueness of the profession of arms, lies in the function the military is called upon to fulfil within society, the protection of the nation through what Harold Lasswell terms the "*legitimate management of violence*" (Huntington, 1957:11). Fighting wars or maintaining readiness to fight wars, is the purpose of employment in the military. The product of military labour, is the defence of the nation.

To be trained for mass destruction or to kill does not appear to be an activity that one would classify as a profession. As Sarkesian (1981:5) aptly states, "*[k]illing even when ordered by the state, is hardly a goal or mission that engenders high ideals of professionalism or is necessarily associated with the public good*". Yet, the status of the military as a profession is largely accepted, as it embodies the principle characteristics of an ideal-type profession, namely a body of theoretical and practical knowledge; a high degree of autonomy; a sense of corporateness; a system of internal controls regulating the behaviour of its members; and a professional social ethic which ensures that members of the profession use their skill to be benefit of broader society.

The intention of this chapter is not to dwell on the various interpretations of military professionalism, but rather, to identify the uniqueness of the profession of arms. After discussing the features of the military profession, as well as some of the anomalies of the profession, it will be explained why the armed forces have sought to adopt a unitarist approach to the management of labour relations. It is concluded that this managerial approach to labour relations is accepted by military personnel only as long as there is a common value system.

2.2 THE DIMENSIONS OF A PROFESSION

The definition provided by McKinlay (1971:250-251) which encompasses the features most frequently quoted by scholars of the military profession, will serve as the theoretical foundation to define the features

of the “*ideal type*” profession, as well as the military profession (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; Sarkesian, 1981; Downes, 1985).

According to McKinlay, the first essential element of a profession is that it must encompass a “*high degree of generalised and systematic knowledge*” based on a complex of intellectual advancements. The professional man is an expert with specialised knowledge and skill in a significant field of endeavour, who has acquired this expertise through prolonged education and training.

The second criteria of a profession is the “*institutional autonomy*” conferred upon the profession by society to manage their own affairs within their sphere of activity or competence. Autonomy is associated with two fundamental principles, firstly the control over the practices of recruitment and selection, and secondly, the establishment and maintenance of standards of the profession.

“*Corporatism*” is the third essential element of a profession, and reflects a collective sense of unity and consciousness that differentiates them from laymen or other professions. Corporatism is measured in terms of loyalty of the members to the profession, to the evolution of egalitarian means of interaction, and the absence of any conflicts and cleavages within the profession.

The fourth dimension of professionalism refers to the development of “*internal controls and internal affective neutrality*”. This entails the internalisation and development of self-controls regulating the behaviour of members, and certain internal impartial criteria that regulate the appointment, promotion and standards of the profession.

The fifth dimension of professionalism concerns the development of a “*professional social ethic and external affective neutrality*”. This requires that the knowledge and skills associated with the profession be applied to societal, rather than personal, group or organisational interests. Because the profession has virtual monopoly of power over the profession, it has a responsibility to use this power in the best interest of the community. This is one of the most distinguishing features of a profession (McKinlay, 1971:250-251).

2.3 THE DIMENSIONS OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION

Measured against McKinlay's five dimensions of professionalism, an attempt will now be made to define the ideal-type military profession, as applicable to the officer corps. Mention should be made that while the focus is on the professional soldier, there are also those who can be classified as praetorian or revolutionary soldiers (Perlmutter & Bennet, 1980). Brief mention will be made, where appropriate, to the characteristics of these soldiers in relation to the professional soldier.

2.3.1 A high degree of generalised and systematic knowledge

Samuel Huntington (1957:11) states that the military profession differs from other occupations as it monopolises the knowledge and skills related to *"the management of violence"*. The duties of the military officer include the organising, equipping and training; the planning of the activities; and the direction and operation of the military force in and out of combat. These peculiar skills are *generalised*, as the principles of military science apply to all professional armed forces. Huntington (1957:13) for example, states that *"... the same standards of professional military competence apply in Russia as in America. The possession of a common professional skill is a bond among military officers occurring across other differences"*. Although there may be differences in weaponry, training doctrine and tactics, there is universally applicable body of knowledge within the field of military science.

The expertise of the military officer is acquired through their mastery of a lengthy period of theoretical and practical training. To become an expert in the management of violence, the officer is required to undergo lengthy training and education in the complexities of modern warfare. Huntington (1957:11) claims that *"[t]he intellectual content of the military profession requires the modern officer to devote about one-third of his professional life to formal schooling, probably a higher ratio of educational time to practice time than in any other profession."* Although this may be a little exaggerated, the professional officer must graduate in a succession of specialist courses in order to be promoted to higher ranks and levels of command.

2.3.2 Institutional autonomy

As the military profession is seen to be performing a vital service to society and claims a monopoly of the skills associated with their profession, it possesses the power to determine how the service is provided. Hence, the military has the institutional autonomy to make decisions regarding membership, organisation,

recruitment, education and qualification standards, and the equipment needs of the profession (Downes, 1985:160). The deed of commission conferred upon officers by the state provides clear guidelines as to the nature and standard of occupational behaviour expected of the officer.

However, the military profession may only exercise control over such matters as recruitment, training, deployment of forces and the procurement of armaments and equipment within the confines of state policy and legislation. This does not mean that the military is not granted the opportunity to influence and participate in the formulation of defence policy but that ultimately the decisive powers lie with the government. Given the dire consequences of possible abuse by the armed forces of their monopoly over the skills of organised violence, this subordination to higher political authority by the military is considered a *sui generis* of the military profession (Downes, 1985:160, 161).

The professional soldier does not intervene in politics to advance the interests of the military establishment. Should the military intervene in the sphere of politics sacrificing professionalism for political expediency, it can no longer be classified as a professional force, but one guilty of praetorianism¹ (Perlmutter & Bennet, 1980:203-207). The professional soldier accepts civil supremacy over the armed forces, unlike the praetorian soldier, who intervenes or may even dominate the political process.

2.3.3 Corporateness

A unique feature of the military profession is its heightened sense of corporateness.² For the military profession, group solidarity, interdependence and teamwork are embraced as functional requirements for combat effectiveness (Downes, 1985:161). This corporateness in the military is bound by the loyalty of the soldier to the Constitution, to the goals of the organisation and towards those serving in the military. Loyalty is both professional and bureaucratic by virtue of the bureaucratic/professional nature of military organisation. In fact the military can be considered an ideal-type bureaucratic profession.³

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1. Praetorianism is a word frequently used to characterise a situation where the military class of a given society exercises independent political power by means of actual or threatened use of military force. Within a praetorian state the military plays a dominant role in political structures and institutions (Perlmutter & Bennet, 1980:200).
 2. Corporateness refers to the cohesion of the professional community derived from the combat training experience, bond of work and the shared social responsibility of the occupational group.
 3. See Weber's definition of the features of an ideal type bureaucracy in relation to the features of an ideal-type military profession (Haralambos & Holborn, 1991:406).

One of the main features that distinguish the military profession from other professions and occupations, is the requirement for absolute loyalty towards the goals of the organisation. All armed forces function according to the principle of loyalty and obedience to the chain of command. As Hauser (1980:188) states, *"[t]he first rule of the soldier, 'dinned' into him, from the first day of his service, is to obey. If this conditioning process has been effective, the soldiers will continue to submit to the orders of legitimate authority, even though the orders may be contrary to his fundamental instincts of self-preservation."* Orders must be executed to the best of one's abilities, completely, conscientiously and immediately. Only when there is loyalty to the chain of command and a high level of cohesion cultivated by a corporate identity, can the military be successful in accomplishing its mission in the face of danger, even if this may entail the loss of the members own life.

2.3.4 Internal control and internal affective neutrality

The behaviour of the officer is governed by an inculcated set of ethics and values that form part of the military culture. These codes of conduct are acquired through a process of occupational socialisation, and are policed and enforced by the officer corps itself, to ensure compliance to the behavioural standards of the profession. Where members violate the behavioural standards which are normally contained in a code of conduct, they will be subject to the purview of the military justice system and disciplinary codes (Malan, 1994a:32).

Internal affective neutrality is manifested through standardised and documented norms for appointment and promotion. The established criteria for appointment and promotion are applied in an impartial manner by senior officers based on professional performance, and not on subjective criteria or personal preference. Nepotism and appointments and promotions based on political affiliations of the officer are not accepted in a professional military, but are typical in militaries displaying praetorian tendencies (Perlmutter & Bennet, 1980:205).

2.3.5 A professional social ethic and external affective neutrality

The image of the military professional is that soldiers have a deep sense of responsibility to use their skill to the benefit of broader society, to which they has been commissioned to defend (Huntington, 1957:13). According to Downes (1985:159) *"... the military profession, perhaps more than any other profession must seek to convince society and those elected to govern on societies behalf that the profession is motivated*

by the ethic of self-sacrificing and selfless service". Without this commitment, she claims, society would be loath to allow the military profession to retain its monopoly over the profession. The orientation of the military profession towards societal rather than personal or organisational goals is inherent in the nature and purpose of the military organisation.

A further requirement of a professional military is the commitment to external affective neutrality, which implies that they adopt a non-partisan stance to party politics. In most countries, officers are legally prohibited from becoming involved in partisan politics or other activities that could erode the impartiality of their service to society. In this regard, it is of interest to note that one of the main dilemmas facing countries having to integrate revolutionary soldiers in post-revolutionary times, into a professional military, is how to disarm these soldiers politically and re-arm them professionally⁴ (Perlmutter & Bennet, 1980:23).

2.4 THE ANOMALIES OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION

It is appropriate at this point to highlight some of the anomalies in the ideal-type military profession, which have been subject to many debates among scholars of the military profession.

The military profession claims to be distinguished from other occupations on the basis that it possesses a distinct body of theoretical knowledge and skills related to the "*management of violence*" (Huntington, 1957:11). However, Downes (1985:155) illustrates that this is an inadequate definition of the sphere of competence and tasks of the military profession, as it fails to take into account the diversity of tasks which are carried out by the armed forces in contemporary times, such as deterrence, peacekeeping, nation-building and disaster relief.

There are also many officers employed by the armed forces who are not "*military professionals*" trained for combat, but are merely "*professionals in uniform*", for example, dentists, doctors, nurses, accountants and so forth. This implies that the definition of military professional as applied to the officer corps, (involved in the management of violence) is limited to only a comparatively small core with basic operational skills and knowledge. A possible justification of the retention of the military profession, as applied to the officer corps, is that all serving in the armed forces partake in the same overall mission, and it can thus not be said that only combat officers are involved in the management of violence (Böene, 1990:8).

Most social scientists tend to agree that the professional group is limited to the officer corps of the armed forces. Non-commissioned officers are considered craftsmen or skilled workers rather than professionals, who are responsible for the *"application of violence"*, the task of the officer being the *"management of violence"* (Huntington, 1957:18). Others such as Moskos (1977) avoid using the concept professionalism as limited to the officer corps and prefer to use the term institution to describe the traditional image of the military, here understood to include all ranks. Downes (1985:158) holds a similar view and states that *"[w]hile society is prepared to accept, and even expect, differing standards of moral and social conduct from officers and other ranks, it demands that the armed forces as a whole, demonstrate a high standard of patriotism, discipline, courage and self-sacrifice in the performance of their duties"*. Unlimited liability inherent in military service is also not limited to the officer corps as *"... bullet and bombs do not differentiate between ranks"*. The professional soldier (officers and non-commissioned officers) are *all* seen to be committed to altruistic values, to military competence, and to maintaining behavioural standards that are essential to safeguard the integrity of the military profession (Nuciani, 1994:8). In fact, Lengerman and Segal (1980:181) claim that in recent times the officer corps has undergone a deprofessionalisation, while the non-commissioned officers show an increase in professionalism, particularly those in combat specialities. The same does not apply to "conscripts", who are not professionals or those who only serve in the military for a short-term, performing relatively unskilled tasks.

Despite the controversy that exists over the exact definition of the profession of arms, most agree that it displays many of the features of a profession. Furthermore, that it is and remains a unique profession, not only with respect to the task they may be called upon to fulfil, but also due to the normative requirements placed upon the profession.

2.5 THE UNITARIST APPROACH TO LABOUR RELATIONS

Taking into consideration these unique features of military profession, it will be explained why the armed forces have sought to adopt a *"unitarist"* managerial approach to labour relations. The essence of the unitary perspective of labour relations is that each employee identifies with the aims of the enterprise and with its methods of operation. All members of the organisation work together as part of the same *"team"*. This implies that all persons serving in the organisation are an integrated group, with a single authority/loyalty structure and a common set of values. Everyone employed in the organisation, strive

4. The political motivation of the revolutionary soldier is integrated with the revolutionary movement. Successful revolutionary soldiers are not necessarily trained to be professional soldiers but have a high status in society given their role in bringing about a new order

towards the shared organisational goals and are committed to the leadership of the organisation. This loyalty is reciprocated, as it is the duty of the leader to inspire loyalty by caring for subordinates, by promoting harmony and by building up *esprit de corps* in the work-place (Fox, 1979:301; Farnham & Pimlott, 1983:53).

From this it follows, that within the unitarist perspective there is no inherent conflict between the main parties in the employment relationship. Conflict, when it does arise, is believed to be primarily frictional, due to incompatible personalities, due to misunderstandings as a result of faulty communication, a lack of understanding, or the cause of agitators inciting the majority. The immediate reaction to any form of employee dissatisfaction is to improve interpersonal relations by creating the necessary structures to address employee grievances, and by ensuring that communication systems within the organisation are adequate. This is coupled to appeals for loyalty from management to employees (Salamon, 1987:27).

Within this perspective, the presence of trade unions as well as collective bargaining, are usually seen as an intrusion into the unified structure of the organisation. Unions are seen to compete illegitimately for control over the loyalty of the employees. What is especially resented, is the horizontal links that trade unions form with employees of other establishments, as this is viewed as an additional intrusion into the affairs of the company. Indications of the functioning of these assumptions are, for example, abrupt refusal by management to negotiate, sudden assertions of managerial prerogative, and moral outbursts against unions. Attempts may even be made to introduce legislation to prevent or reduce the incidence of trade unionism. Fox quoted in Salamon (1987:27) argues, that managers who adopt this perspective believe that *"... increased legal intervention can and should take the form of regulating men's behaviour directly, and enforcing this regulation by direct punitive legal sanctions"*.

If the employer is pressured to accept trade unions, they are reluctant to concede any decision-making role within the organisation to trade unions. In management's view trade unions are seen as little more than political power vehicles used by a militant minority in order to subvert the existing and legitimate political, social and economic structure of society. The presence of trade unions representing the collective interests of their employees, is suffered rather than welcomed and is resisted wherever possible (Salamon, 1987:27). Generally, management's under this system will try to prevent or subvert trade unions by allowing the establishment of *"sweet-heart"* unions which act more like benefit societies, or will try to keep unions out by upgrading internal structures to address working conditions.

Employees themselves may have a unitary perspective of work, and of labour relations. This is often the case where internal social structures are supportive of the individuals needs and where the predominant value systems are accepted by all employed by the organisation. According to Farnham and Pimlott (1983:54), the armed forces have traditionally tended towards unitary structures and consensus values, which have generally been accepted by managerial cadres and subordinates alike.

To summarise, the unitary perspective in its "*ideal form*" stresses the harmonious nature of both industrial organisations and of industrial relations. The acceptance of this managerial approach to labour relations depends on the internal social structures within the organisation, and whether subordinate personnel accept the predominant value system. In fact, the "*linchpin*" around which the unitary perspective of labour relations is either accepted or rejected is a "*common value system*" (Farnham & Pimlott, 1983: 56).

2.6 UNITARIST LABOUR RELATIONS PRACTICES AND THE MILITARY

Given the heightened sense of corporateness of the military profession and the necessity for loyalty and obedience towards the chain of command, conflict, in the form of the expression of overt employee dissatisfaction and differences, is not tolerated. Typical of the unitarist perspective, the military often resorts to legal punitive measures if the military leadership cannot manage employee dissatisfaction. Members of the armed forces can for example be charged, within the parameters of the military justice system if they do not lodge their complaints via the channel of command, or if involved in collective actions, will be guilty of mutiny.⁵

Should conflict arise within the employment relationship, this is addressed through the chain of command, preferably on a one-to-one basis. Where these structures fail to address the conflict, attempts are made to improve interpersonal relations by upgrading communication structures, or by creating internal structures to address the grievances of soldiers. These internal measures, to address collective grievances, are seen as sufficient to protect the well-being and individual rights of military personnel (Phillips, 1977:57).

Characteristic of the unitarist approach, the emergence of a trade union within the armed forces is seen as an intrusion into the unified structure of the military organisation. Malan (1994a:43) professes that

5. Mutiny is a term used to describe an act of collective military insubordination or a revolt by troops against lawfully constituted military authority (Rose, 1982:561).

because unions exist [solely] for the promotion of issues related to the self-interest of the soldier they would "... *have a potentially destructive effect on military cohesion, and would reinforce other tendencies towards disintegration.*" Preselay (1977:180) too holds the view, that one of the most serious consequences of unionisation in the armed forces is that "... *it could lead to the degrading of military readiness by lessening the individual's commitment to combat effectiveness or by dividing this loyalty between the military unit and the union.*" Hallenbeck (1977:239) concurs with this opinion that, and claims that one of the most debilitary impacts of a unionised military is that a disrupted chain of command authority would impair combat effectiveness. The main concern is that a military union would subvert military discipline and obedience, the fundamental base on which the corporate culture of the military is based.

The principle objection to military unions, is the fear that the loyalty of the soldier will be divided between the union and the military organisation, the former providing a second formal organisational parallel with the "*parent union*", the military support structure. Such duality it is believed, would drive a wedge in the chain of command, creating a "*we they*", relationship, that will erode an essential element of combat effectiveness, that of *unit esprit de corps* (Taylor & Arango, 1977:261). The fact that a union might sell itself as the protector of the soldier, claiming to be the only one that can truly represent the interests of members, is in total conflict with the military traditions that an "*officer's first duty is to take care of his men*" (Delholm & Humes, 1977:72). This signifies an erosion of the institutional autonomy of the military leadership, as once a union is established, the military leadership will have to consult with the representatives of the union on matters concerning personnel policies, practices and working conditions, before decisions can be made.

Given the commitment to the social ethic of self-less service it is considered contrary to the professional ethics and standards of the professional soldier, to join interest groups such as a trade union to advance their own interests, or that of the military organisation. As trade unions are seen as political power vehicles, it is feared that they will not only promote self-interest behaviour, but also erode the external affective neutrality of the military. Well-organised military union promoting institutional goals, a kind of "*military qua military*" may be a powerful political force, designed not only to negotiate with the military command structure, but directed toward placing pressure on government. One of the main arguments against military unionisation as a form of self-interest articulation is that it would strengthen the political influence of the military in policy formation, undermining the principle of civilian control over the armed forces.

In many respects the soldier has willingly accepted this paternalistic approach to labour relations due to the professional/organisational duality that exists. Because there has been the belief that the institutional leadership is devoted to their members, soldiers have been willing to accept certain difficulties and sacrifices intrinsic to military service. Whether this willingness to accept the authority of the military leadership to decide over the conditions of employment of the soldier will continue, depends upon how the soldier views his employment in the armed forces. According to Fox (1979:304) some of the main forces propelling organisations towards the acceptance a new ideology is amongst others, a change in the values of employees, rising aspirations, and the weakening of traditional attitudes towards officially constituted governance. One of the questions that are raised, is whether military unionism is symptomatic of a move away from the professional model of military organisation, towards an occupational model (Harries-Jenkins & Moskos, 1981:37).

2.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The kind of activity, performed by those who practice the management of organised violence, embodies a number of characteristics of an ideal-type profession. The military officer is competent in military expertise, is obedient and loyal to the authority of the state, is dedicated to using his/her skill only in the interests of society and not in self-interest, and is politically and morally impartial. While there is many debates over the exact definition of the military profession, it does embody most of the features associated with a profession.

As a profession, and because of the corporate need for a high degree of personal commitment to the goals of the military organisation, the military as employer has traditionally approached the management of labour relations from a unitarist perspective. This perspective is based on the premise that there is no room for opposing groups or factions within the organisation, that everyone is loyal towards the leadership of the organisation, that conflict is not inherent in the employment relationship and that the intervention of a trade union into the unified structure of the organisation will undermine the goals of the organisation.

Apart from the fact that this paternalistic approach to labour relations corresponds with the leadership style of the armed forces, the main reason armed forces have adopted this approach to labour relations, is primarily, out of concern over the impact on the service ethic of soldiers and the potential impact on organisational goals of the military. There is the belief that trade unions will institutionalise interest group

behaviour, which would not only undermine the social ethic associated with selfless service, but would erode the institutional autonomy and corporateness of the military profession/organisation. The implication is that this will breakdown military cohesion, which in turn will affect combat effectiveness. A further concern is the impact on external affective neutrality exercised by the state over the armed forces. Here the primary concern is not only the possible politicisation of the armed forces, but also the potential impact of a military union upon the political control of the armed forces.

Despite these reasons which are used to justify a unitarist approach to labour relations, there appears to be indications that the military profession is experiencing a deprofessionalisation or occupationalisation as a result of the changing nature of the military, task as well as a decline in the relevance, legitimacy and prestige afforded to this profession in contemporary society. The consequence of this decline in the occupational status of the military profession, is a shift in value orientations of military professionals, who seem to be turning from reference patterns based on altruistic values, to patterns of self interest, where employment in the military is viewed as a job like any other. As the acceptance of a common value system is the "*linchpin*", around which the unitarist perspective of labour relations is accepted or rejected by employees, a shift towards occupationalism by military personnel necessitates a revision of labour relations practices within the armed forces.

CHAPTER THREE

THE MILITARY PROFESSION AND THE ASCENDANCY OF OCCUPATIONALISM

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Technological advance and the broadening of military tasks to include functions such as deterrence, peacekeeping and disaster relief required that the professional officer develop more and more skills common to other non-military bureaucracies. Sociologists such as Janowitz (1960) suggested that a process of civilianisation of the military profession was taking place, affecting not only the nature of military service, but also the attitude of military personnel toward their employment in the military. He claimed that the military professional, seen in terms of a *"heroic warrior"*, dedicated to a professional service ethic and performing work activities closely related to the management of violence, was being replaced by that of a military manager. The military manager pursued activities similar to those in a non-military environment, and particularly valued those that were applicable to a possible second career (Segal & Lengerman, 1980:163). Janowitz (1960:117) also observed that *"... those who see the military profession as a calling or a unique profession are outnumbered by a far greater concentration of individuals for whom the military is just another job"*.

In the wake of the Vietnam war and drawing heavily on the American experience, Charles Moskos, too, noted that associated with the shift to an all-volunteer force *"... that the military was undergoing a strange sort of crisis ... that officers were driven by careerism¹, and that reasons for military service had become obscured"*. He concluded that not only the military profession, but the whole military social organisation was undergoing a shift from a predominantly institutional format (legitimised by normative values) to one resembling that of an occupation (akin to civilian marketplace standards). At first Moskos' institutional/occupational (I/O) thesis, referred only to changes taking place in the nature of military organisation, rather than the nature of military service, but it soon became apparent that it focused on both levels (Segal & Lengerman, 1980:163). The potential outcomes of the move away from the professional/institutional model of military organisation towards an occupational model, was the need to bring about changes in the

1. The term careerism developed in the sixties as a term to describe officers who strive to get through the various stages of career training as fast as possible in order to take up desired command assignments. This was often referred to as *"ticket punching"* (Janowitz, 1975:125).

compensation system of military personnel, a growing interest in military unions and the increase in the employment of civilians in the military (Harries-Jenkins & Moskos, 1981:37).

Against this background, the aim of this chapter is to explain with reference to the Moskos' I/O thesis, that the ascendancy of occupationalism has certain implications for the management of labour relations within armed forces. The ideal-type institutional and occupational models are defined and the two types of military social organisations compared. It is illustrated that the drift towards occupationalism has been exacerbated by the civilianisation of the military profession; the move to an all-volunteer force; the changing profile of recruits; and the decline in the institutional compensation system of the military.

The outcome of the occupational model is, that the *"soldier as an employee"*, comes to seek the same qualities from their work environments as civilians, including the right to participate in decisions affecting their working lives. Where military service as a calling is replaced with military service as a job, indicating a fundamental shift in value orientation, the pressure to accept a more pluralist approach to labour relations is increased. This approach to labour relations is defined, whereafter the implications for the management of labour relations within the armed forces is discussed.

3.2 FROM INSTITUTION TO OCCUPATION

Moskos developed the *"institutional"* and *"occupational"* model to represent two ideal types of armed forces, of the institutional military, highly divergent from civilian society, and the occupational military, highly convergent with civilian structures. These two positions are not viewed as polar opposites. What Moskos suggested, was that a particular military organisation at a given point in time, could be placed somewhere on an institutional/occupational continuum, depending on the modality assumed by specific variables (see Table 3.1). He also acknowledged, that while one must deal with pure types for analytical purposes, that *"... I/O modalities will interface in different ways even within the same national military system. There will be differences between military service and between branches within them. I/O modalities may also vary along internal distinctions, such as those between officers, non-commissioned officers, and lower ranks; between draftees and volunteers"* (Moskos, 1986:381). This implies that the military is not a homogeneous organisation, and that a shift in occupationalism in one sector, cannot necessarily be generalised to the entire military organisation.

3.2.1 Definitions

The two ideal-types of military organisations can be defined as follows. Moskos terms "*institutional*", a specific military organisation legitimated in terms of values and norms that transcend individual self-interest, in favour of a presumed higher good. The institutional model identifies closely with the professional image of the soldier. Members of an institution are seen to be following a "*calling*"², are viewed as being different from broader society, identify closely with the institutional role of the military, and are ordinarily held in high esteem by larger society (Moskos, 1988:16). Although Moskos agrees that only officers can be viewed as following a calling, he avoids using the term military profession as synonymous with institution. As the I/O thesis relates to changes in both the nature of military service and the military organisation, it is seen as a whole, including all ranks and not merely the officer corps (Sorensen, 1994:600; Nuciani, 1994:9).

The occupational model is legitimated in terms of the marketplace and supply and demand, rather than normative considerations. The more occupational a military, the greater the demand by members for approximately the same salary and working conditions, as civilian employees, and the more employment in the military is seen as "*just another job*". The occupational model implies a priority of self-interest, rather than the interest of the employing organisation. A common form of self-interest articulation, is the trade union (Moskos, 1988:17; Nuciani, 1994:9).

3.2.2 Institutional and occupational militaries compared

A specific military organisation can be placed on an institutional/occupational continuum, depending on the modality assumed by each of the variables³ (see Table 3.1).

3.2.2.1 Legitimacy and societal regard

In an institutional military, the legitimacy⁴ afforded the armed forces relates to the unique role the military fulfils in society. Where military service is associated with notions of self-sacrifice and commitment to the

2. A calling usually enjoys high esteem in the larger community as it is associated with notions of self-sacrifice and complete dedication to one's role (Krendel, 1977d:162).

3. The I/O model was subject to much debate and critique, especially by Janowitz who claimed that Moskos had "*changed the rules of the game*". This critique by Janowitz and others, led Moskos to review his model and the above version is the most updated version of the original I/O thesis (Sorensen, 1994:599-603).

4. Within this context, legitimacy refers to the social prestige given to a specific military organisation on the basis of the recognised service they render; and their monopoly of theoretical and technical knowledge associated with their profession.

goal of the institution, it is ordinarily held in high esteem by society. One of the most significant signs of altruism, is the subordination of individual financial rewards to the goal of serving society. Military personnel must therefore be prepared to make certain personal sacrifices in the course of their duties, accept liability for 24 hour service, frequent relocations, and the inability to resign, strike or negotiate working conditions. Although such sacrifices may be made by other groups within society, only military service involves an unlimited liability⁵, which may result in the sacrifice of the members own life in the course of duty (Moskos, 1977:42).

The occupational military on the other hand, is legitimated in terms of the marketplace. The underlying premise is that all employees with equivalent skill should receive the same remuneration, whatever the employing organisation, be that civilian or military (Moskos, 1988:17).

Table 3.1: Military Social Organisation: Institutional versus Occupational

Variable	Institutional	Occupational
Legitimacy	Normative values	Marketplace economy
Societal regard	Esteem based on notions of service	Prestige based on level of compensation
Role commitments	Diffuse; generalist	Specific; specialist
Reference groups	"Vertical" within the armed forces	"Horizontal" with occupations outside military
Recruitment appeals	Character qualities; life-style orientation	High recruit pay; technical training
Evaluation of performance	Holistic and qualitative	Segmented and quantitative
Basis of compensation	Rank and seniority; decompressed by rank	Skill level and manpower shortages; compressed by rank
Mode of compensation	Much in non cash form or deferred	Salary and bonuses
Legal system	Military justice; broad purview over member	Civilian jurisprudence; limited purview over member
Female roles	Limited employment; restricted career pattern	Wide employment; open career pattern
Spouse	Integral part of military community	Removed from military community
Residence	Work and residence adjacency; military housing; relocation	Work and residence separation; civilian housing permanence
Post-service status	Veterans' benefits and preferences	Same as non-server

Source: Moskos, 1988:16.

3.2.2.2 Role commitment, reference group and recruitment

The more institutional the military, the more dispersed and diverse the tasks of those employed in the military. Members have to perform an array of tasks not necessarily related to their military specialisation. Their main frame of reference is their own collegial group within the military. Even recruitment is based on

5. Unlimited liability implies that members of the military may have to give up their "right to life" in the course of duty.

institutional features such as the individuals disposition towards military service, leadership characteristics and liking for the "*military way of life*".⁶

The more occupational the military, the more specific the tasks and the more members see themselves not as military professionals, but as professionals with specialist skills employed by the military. The reference group, is not the collegial equivalent in the military, but like occupational groups outside the military. Recruitment to the military tends to reinforce this, especially as the compensation for the required skill is compared to marketplace criteria.

3.2.2.3 Compensation

In the institutional military, the system of remuneration is unique, with compensation being based on rank and seniority and not on skill or educational requirements. Payment is often made in non-monetary forms, such as uniform allowances, subsidised consumer facilities, low cost military accommodation, subsidised mortgage premiums, medical and dental benefits, and unique pensions on termination of service (Moskos, 1977:42,43; Downes, 1985:161). Another feature of the institutional compensation system is that the level of compensation is decompressed, with many different pay scales.

In the occupational military, compensation structures contain wage differentials based on different skill and educational levels, other than rank and seniority. There is a preference that compensation be in cash, rather than in benefits and that remuneration is market related. Pay scales are more condensed, and promotion to a following scale is often linked not only to rank, but also too specific qualification requirements.

3.2.2.4 Evaluation of performance

The evaluation of performance in the institutional military is holistic and qualitative, taking into consideration a whole diversity of factors such as work performance, relationship with subordinates, and personality traits. The system rests on the theory of the "*whole man*" rather than on attributes related to skill, or qualifications, or productivity. In the occupational military on the other hand, evaluation is quantitative and is based on performance or productivity.

6. This refers to features such as a liking for discipline, orderliness, conformity, and fraternity.

3.2.2.5 Women service members

Women serving in institutional military careers are limited to support roles, and often serve in separate female corps. The more occupational the military, the more women serve in the same corps as men, undergo the same training, and may even take up combat roles. There is no discrimination in pay and women are promoted on the same basis as men. There are no restrictions curtailing the career advancement of women, based on gender in the occupational military (Moskos, 1988:18).

3.2.2.6 Military Justice

The more institutional the military, the wider the span of military justice. Members are under the purview of the military organisation, whether they are on or off duty, or whether on or off base. If redress is sought, this is channelled through the chain of command. The more occupational the military, the more likely offenders will be treated by civilian courts, or soldiers will be permitted representation by independent civilian lawyers or representatives (Levitan & Alderman, 1977:160-161). There is also less concern with the members' behaviour away from work, providing it does not affect work performance (Moskos, 1986: 381).

3.2.2.7 Spouse

Another unique feature of military service is that institutional membership extends to the military spouse who is expected to initiate and take part in social functions, and volunteer for activities in the military community. Wives are socialised into their military role through various means, such as ladies courses and through other social structures, such as the military ladies club, which wives are expected to join. Informally too, spouses carry the rank of their husbands and behavioural prescriptions and expectations are judged accordingly. A great deal of social pressure is exerted on the military wife, particularly the officer's wife, to play an active role in the military community (Segal, 1988:88).

In the occupational military, there is a growing reluctance of wives at both non-commissioned and junior officer levels to take part in customary base social functions (Moskos, 1986:381). This could be due to the increase in the separation of work and residence, but also because there is a breakdown in the loyalty of the military family to the military institution as a whole, especially if the latter is seen to compete for the loyalty, time and energy of the service member (Segal, 1988:82).

3.2.2.8 Residence

Typical of the institutional military is that the place of work and home are adjacent. Military personnel reside in a military base, forming their own close community, generally removed from the civilian community. One of the facets of occupationalism in the armed forces, is the disintegration of the institutional military community, with the separation of residence and workplace.

3.2.2.9 Veterans

In a society where the military profession is held in high esteem, veterans normally enjoy preferences over non-veterans, especially in government employment entitlements (Moskos, 1988:19). In societies where military personnel are viewed as no different from other civil servants, veterans are treated the same as other pensioners.

3.3 **TRENDS PROMOTING OCCUPATIONALISM**

Referring to Moskos' list of variables, it is apparent that the I/O thesis refers to a number of changes taking place at different levels. On one level it refers to changes that are taking place in the attitudes and behaviour of those employed in the military. These attitudes are in turn influenced by changes taking place within the military social organisation itself, which are often dictated to by broader societal trends affecting civil-military relations (Moskos & Wood, 1988:6). All these levels interact and influence each other. This is clearly illustrated in the following section which focuses on the effect of civilianisation of the military profession; the shift to an all-volunteer force; the change in the profile of the recruits; and the decline in the service conditions and tenure of military personnel.

Traditionally the military have sought to curtail the drift towards occupationalism, primarily because it is believed that it would give rise to an employee-employer relationship which is at variance with the military culture and traditions. The aim of this section is to illustrate how this shift to occupationalism affects this relationship, and in effect promotes the need for a more pluralist approach to labour relations.

3.3.1 The effect of civilianisation

Prior to World War II, there were important differences between military and civilian work forces, as well as crucial technological differences between the two spheres, rooted in the fact that military personnel spent their time doing different things than civilians. Warfare was primarily a land-based phenomenon with the infantry and armour at the core of the army. The typical soldier was male, young and unmarried. The military workforce was flexible, expanding rapidly in times of war and demobilising quickly thereafter, with soldiers returning to civilian life (Segal & Segal, 1983:160).

With the increase in the use of airpower between the two world wars, and the advent of nuclear technology in World War II, warfare became more capital intensive in the middle part of the twentieth century, which meant that military personnel had to acquire more and more skills common to the civilian sector. Many jobs in the military come to resemble jobs performed in other civilian enterprises, decreasing the uniqueness of the military profession.

Technological advancement also increased the reliance of the military on non-military civilian experts for the development and operation of complex weapon systems (Wood, 1988:83). Commenting on the impact of these civilians on the United States armed forces, Moskos (1979:22) remarked that: *"... it is difficult to overstate the extent to which the operational side of the military system relies on civilian technicians... [for example] the large warships of the US Navy are combat ineffective without the technical skills of contract civilians"*. Wakin (1979:219) reiterates similar concerns *"[o]ne of the alarming signs of the occupational model is increased military pay within the structure of the all-volunteer force, another is the increasing use of civilian technicians to perform military functions. Possible consequences of these trends are the unionisation of the military and the ultimate loss of military legitimacy"*. The fact that civilians work alongside uniformed personnel, often in the same post structure has increased the trend to equalise military and civilian pay scales. These civilians are in most cases, public servants, and have the right to belong to trade unions to advance their interests.

In this regard, it is of interest to note that while Moskos sees this trend towards unionisation as one of the consequences of occupationalism within armed forces, Janowitz viewed trade unions as just another example of the civilianisation (Sorensen, 1994:601).

3.3.2 The effect of the all-volunteer force

Another trend believed to influence the ascendancy of occupationalism, is the shift in the manpower procurement system from conscription to voluntarism. Where the military must rely to a large extent on individuals to join the military voluntarily, this has significant implications for the military "*employer*". Under conscription, military service was regarded, at least in part as an obligation of citizenship, and the military did not have to be concerned about the attractiveness of military service as a form of employment.

The volunteer system compels the military to take marketplace criteria into consideration if quality staff is to be recruited. Obvious factors, which influence the relative attractiveness of enrolment in the military on a voluntary basis, are pay, service benefits and the availability of alternative employment opportunities (Downes, 1988:16). Wages and service benefits in this contract are assumed to be the critical enlistment motivators. Under a volunteer manpower procurement system, the soldier is seen to become a rational employee who chooses the military occupation to maximise long-term earnings. According to Cortright (1977:216) where armed forces recruit rather than conscript personnel, a new contractual basis for military employment comes into being, which is associated with a decline in the notion of service as a calling. Many join not because of the uniqueness of the military service, but for other reasons such as tertiary education or job opportunities, that provide the financial and promotion prospects needed to attain material success.

The military, itself, has exacerbated this trend by not emphasising the unique features of military service during recruitment drives. Advertisements often paint a rosy and misleading picture of military service, creating the impression that military life and working conditions are, or can be, similar to those of the civilian world (Cortright, 1977:219).

However, Lengerman and Segal (1980:166) are not convinced that the trend towards occupationalism as proposed by Moskos is necessarily linked to a shift to an all-volunteer force. Even under a conscript system, full-time force members listed both material and altruistic reasons for joining and remaining in the military. However, the difference is that under an all-volunteer system the military can no longer rely on high quality recruits to supplement its personnel shortages. There is thus more pressure on the "*military employer*" to take marketplace criteria into consideration, when competing for scarce and highly skilled manpower. This forces the military to deviate from its previous institutional compensation system, based on rank and seniority and to a compensation system based on occupational values.

3.3.3 Changing profile of recruits

Another important factor with respect to recruitment in the volunteer force, is the shift in the profile of recruits from elites, to being more representative of the broader population (Janowitz, 1975:120). In an extensive study by Caforio and Nuciari (1994:54) amongst European nations, it was found that occupational officers more frequently come from lower status groups, and that their reasons for joining the military were motivated primarily by a desire for job security and by opportunities for education, which could ensure future material success. A civilian type union is also preferred on average by occupational officers, while those officers showing a high commitment to professional/institutional values, were more inclined to support some form of internal representation.

Pro-union attitudes too, were strongly linked to social origin. Officers from underprivileged backgrounds were more supportive of civilian type unions. This was even more so, if prior to employment in the military the soldier had benefited from being a member of a union, and/or either parents were perceived to have benefited from union membership (Caforio & Nuciari, 1994:49).

3.3.4 Erosion of service benefits and tenure

In the past the economic disadvantages of military service were partially offset by the extensive fringe benefits that formed part of the compensation package of the implied service contract of the soldier. Associated with this paternalistic remuneration system, was the support of the military occupation as a calling, the maintenance of the military as a separate community that takes care of its own, and the legitimisation of the military as a social institution by society (Segal, 1978:228).

With the move to equalise civilian and military pay levels, there have been changes in the structure of military benefits that have traditionally been associated with military service. Benefits that have historically enhanced the image of the military as a fraternal community that looks after its members, its past members and its dependants, have begun to decline. Commenting on the decline in service conditions, Segal and Lengermann (1980:170) observed that in the United States armed forces, there has been a decrease in the availability of medical care to military dependants and retirees, reduction in travel and relocation allowances and cuts in post graduate and veteran education benefits. The entire traditional military retirement system has furthermore been revised or brought in line with the retirement packages of other

civilian organisations. This has meant that the conditions of employment in the armed forces have come to resemble, at least in terms of employment incentives, the conditions of employment in civilian occupations.

Many serving in the military, resent measures attacking the benefits, which have long been considered protected rights. Especially for members with many years of service, whose careers and family futures have been based upon expected levels of pay and benefits, there is a mounting sense of insecurity and frustration. Fringe benefits are just as important to military personnel as to their counterparts in the civilian sector (Perselay, 1977:177). In this regard Lane (1977:104) states that "... *perhaps the major incentive for unionisation amongst an all-volunteer force would be the perception of an erosion of self-related benefits and a certain frustration and helplessness to do anything about it*".

It was precisely this "*inability of the system*" to protect the interests of service members in the Australian Defence Force, which contributed to the formation of the Armed Forces Federation of Australia. Even though most Australian officers felt that unionism and the military did not mix, they nevertheless believed that it was the only effective means to prevent a further decline in their service conditions (Jans, 1988: 216). This is substantiated by Moskos and Wood (1988:288) where they state that "[t]o the degree that *military members perceive senior military leaders as ineffective defenders of an institutional compensation system, creeping occupationalism will appear in the rank and file*".

Another feature of military employment in recent years has been the reduction in manpower levels or downsizing of the armed forces. The possibility of being retrenched has a significant impact on the commitment to military service, especially by those who viewed it as a long-term career. Wrong and McNally (1994:209) found that there was a "... *significant decrease in organizational commitment after the downsizing began, which is noteworthy because the sample reflects those in the army who supposedly had made it, and were not vulnerable to future layoffs*." This downsizing also stems from society itself as government seeks to control expenditure.

The decrease in commitment of the survivors is important for several reasons. On an organisational level, a decrease in commitment may present a leadership problem, as members are no longer committed to altruistic values or to *the service*. Should this organisational commitment continue to decline due to downsizing, it has the potential to threaten military effectiveness, as the military often loses its top soldiers due an associated lack of job security or promotional prospects. The most serious concern, is if the soldiers become so disillusioned with the conditions in the military, they may develop hostility towards the state.

They feel "... *abandoned by a society, which in its pursuit of a new world order sacrificed the job security, career progression, combat readiness, and the quality of life of its military* (Wrong & McNally, 1994:213). Traditionally, the military member has looked to government to serve as its advocate to protect their service conditions, and has not felt the need to form unions to protect their interests. Should government divest itself from its paternal obligation to the military, it may well see its soldiers investing in self-interest groups, such as unions to do it on their behalf.

3.4 CONSEQUENCES OF OCCUPATIONALISM

From the preceding discussion, it is apparent that the change in the function and structure of the military has affected the professional identity of military members and their commitment to military service. Instead of being motivated by a desire to serve the country, the trend towards occupationalism has meant that servicemen have become more concerned with pay, benefits and the quality of their working lives.

In a study by Segal (1983:231) measuring certain preferred job characteristics between army, navy and civilian personnel, in all three work environments, personnel wanted good pay, good fringe benefits, an opportunity to control their personal lives and avoidance of bureaucracy. Factors such as prestige, job cleanliness, availability of free time, not being "bossed" and opportunity to serve the country were relatively less important in all three environments. From this survey, both military and civilian personnel valued personnel independence (controlling one's personal life and avoiding entangling bureaucracy) and economic success (good pay and fringe benefits) as most important. Job characteristics that least concerned them were cleanliness, prestige, free time, absence of a boss, and most significantly for the military, an opportunity to serve one's country (see Table 3.2). Although there was very little variance in preferred job characteristics, the military samples indicated "*greater dissatisfaction with the pay and prestige of their jobs*" (Segal, 1978:232-3).

The fact that military personnel are in general very similar to their civilian counterparts in what they would like from their jobs, signals a change in the value orientations of military professionals, who seem to be turning away from reference patterns based on "*common good*" to individualistic patterns in career and job security, like any other occupation (Nuciari, 1994:8-9). The nature of the individual's relationship to the organisation is transformed where the "... *implied contract between the service person and the service is replaced by an explicit contract in which work and time are exchanged for economic remuneration*" (Segal & Lengermann, 1980:171).

This is particularly so, where there is no longer a good fit between preferred and perceived job characteristics. In a social system where money and power are seen as the indicators of success, and where society no longer holds the military profession in high esteem, despite their commitment to serve society, one cannot expect otherwise. Such a value system, based on material incentives, is almost totally at odds with the values that have traditionally been regarded by the military as imperative to their operational efficiency (Downes, 1988:163).

Table 3.2: Most and least important features of a preferred job

Army	Civilian men	Navy
Most important Good pay Fringe benefits Opportunity to control personal life Avoiding bureaucracy Steady work	Opportunity to control personal life Good pay Friendly people Fringe benefits Avoiding bureaucracy	Opportunity to control personal life Good pay Avoiding bureaucracy Fringe benefits Challenging work
Least important Opportunity to serve my country Prestigious job No one to boss me Lots of free time Clean job	Opportunity to serve my country No one to boss me Clean job Lots of free time Prestigious job	Opportunity to serve my country Lots of free time No one to boss me Prestigious job Clean job

Source: Segal, 1978:230.

Where the soldier views himself as simply another category of worker, it can be expected that they would seek some control over the nature of their work lives (Segal & Lengermann, 1980:171). One of the consequences of military service being equated with employment in the civilian labour force, is the desire to have input or say in matters that affect their working lives. The lack of effective participative mechanisms or channels to address military policies and practices affecting the soldier's working environment, has meant that even those in the military have begun to question seemingly arbitrary decisions affecting their service conditions. The basic purpose of a union is to give employees a voice in influencing their conditions of employment. This becomes even more important where the commitment of individuals to the organisational goals are no longer complementary. As Segal (1977:28) states: *"[t]o the degree to which individuals, by behaving in ways supportive of an organisation fulfil their own needs, their commitment to the organization will be increased; where this complementary does not exist, their commitment will be minimized"*.

However in reality, this is not a cause and effect relationship. While soldiers may display a concern with their material conditions, in most instances they view their employment in the military as a mixture of profession and a job. Cotton (1981) defined three role orientations, the institutional (the soldier), the

occupational (the employee) and the ambivalent. Individuals have been known to score high on both institutional and occupational values, belying the notion that there is an inverse relationship between the two positions. Segal (1986:351-76) refers to this category as “pragmatic professionals”, who maintain both traditional and ideal professional values, but at the same time stress a strong interest in aspects such as pay, job security, transferability of skills and the public image of the profession. This, in fact, concurs with Herzberg’s “two factors theory” ⁷ which shows that pragmatic professionalism, is the norm in most work situations and seems to be the rule within the modern military profession.

In more recent research Caforio and Nuciani (1994:36-56) identified four “officer ideal types”. There are those that are “indifferent” to both professional and occupational positions, other officers who are clearly “occupational”, officers who have both professional and occupational characteristics, “pragmatic professionals” ⁸ and officers who clearly belong to the professional group “radical professionals”. Of interest are the results obtained from a survey measuring these four ideal-types in eight European countries (see Diagram 3.1).⁹




Diagram 3.1: Professional/Occupational attitude by country
Source: Caforio & Nuciani, 1994:37.

7. Herzberg's two-factor theory maintains that in any work situation there will be those factors that dissatisfy and those that satisfy. These factors referred to as "hygiene or "motivators" are not polar opposites. (Handy 1982:33)

8. According to Caforio and Nuciani's definition of the pragmatic professional officer combines professional and occupational attitudes since the profession outlines the general reference values but actual work conditions are at stake when job satisfaction is evaluated.

9. The survey was conducted by the Working Group on the Military profession of the European Research Group on the Military and Society (Ergomas) in 1991-2 among 4 659 active military officers in eight European countries, the former Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

Another finding revealed by Caforio and Nuciari, concerns attitude towards unionisation by country. If the results in Diagram 3.1 are compared with those in Diagram 3.2, some questions can be raised over the validity of the I/O thesis regarding unionisation.




Diagram 3.2: Attitude towards unionisation by country

Source: Caforio & Nuciari, 1994:49.

Although the institutional situation of each country differs greatly, there is no conclusive proof that officers who are occupational, necessarily support either unions or even some form of internal representation in the military. Nor is there any proof that officers, who are radical professionals, reject a civilian type trade union in the military. A good example to substantiate this is Germany and to some extent Sweden, whose officers are both predominantly radical professionals but they are also the most supportive of unions in the military. However, it does appear, that on average a civilian-type union is preferred by occupational officers, and that radical professionals are more inclined to support some form of internal representation (Caforio & Nuciari, 1994:49).

3.5 PLURALIST APPROACH TO LABOUR RELATIONS

The pluralist perspective of labour relations is based on the premise that the goals of employees may be in conflict with those of the organisation. The underlying assumption of the pluralist approach is that the organisation is in a permanent state of tension resulting from the conflict of interests between the various

sectional groups within the organisation. This is not necessarily seen as negative, as both parties have a common interest in the future survival of the organisation (Fox, 1969:394). There is a willingness to reach a compromise and to the rules that regulate the conduct of their employment relationship. Should conflict erupt, both parties are expected to use the mutually accepted systems for conflict regulation to resolve the dispute. Where conflict has become uncontrollable, the ground rules are seen to be in need of change or adjustment (Salamon, 1987:28).

This view of the nature of conflict and the role of trade unions is thus fundamentally different to that of the unitary approach. The pluralist perspective accepts that it is legitimate for employees to combine in formal organisations. The principle of "*freedom of association*", the process of collective bargaining, the right to strike and participation in decision-making is accepted and seen as necessary to balance the power between employer and employee (Fox, 1969:397). By means of collective bargaining, employees organised into unions can challenge management prerogatives regarding wages, and working conditions and can represent members' interests in grievance, disciplinary and dispute procedures. It is also accepted that the respective trade union will link up with outside organisations to promote their interests.

3.6 PLURALIST LABOUR RELATIONS PRACTICES AND THE MILITARY

The shift towards a more pluralist approach to labour relations within the armed forces, implies that soldiers reject the unitarist view that their interests as employees necessarily coincide with the interests of the military as employer, and that there is only one source of authority and one focus of loyalty. An important feature of this change in value orientation, is the demand for the creation within the armed forces for some form of group representation.

This mood to unionise in the armed forces is attributed to a number of factors. The most obvious being conflict arising from dissatisfaction with pay and conditions of service. Other reasons include dissatisfaction with existing procedures for the redress of complaints; a wish to improve the existing status of military personnel; a desire to participate in decisions affecting their working lives; and the belief that by organising into a collective, their needs can be more effectively met (CMRI, 1980:67). There is the belief that a military trade union, will create the necessary structures for soldiers to address poor working conditions, help maintain military benefits, eliminate violations of basic human rights and even safeguard the interests of the military establishment (Taylor & Arango, 1977:245).

Given the structure and function of the armed forces, the transition to a pluralist approach to labour relations which implies the support for principles of freedom of association, collective bargaining and the right to strike, is fraught with difficulties. As a function of a union is to present an interest group (the bargaining unit) in competition with the established authority (management), it poses a problem to military leadership which requires cohesion amongst all levels within the armed forces. Union membership also entails intent to challenge the decisions of management and to challenge the authority of management to make those decisions (Hallenbeck, 1977:239). Yet, one of the fundamental requirements of the military profession is the need for discipline, unquestioning obedience and the acceptance of authority.

A logical question is whether a military trade union can become fully involved in collective bargaining, which implies the need for negotiation with the military command structure for improved terms and conditions of employment and the settlement of procedural and substantive grievances. Once the right to negotiate has been conceded to the military union, it gives the military as a purposive organisation *ipso facto*, significant powers. A question that is often raised is what action, if any, can be taken against a highly unionised military force, that irrespective of any legal prohibition against striking, exerts pressure upon the government in power. A well-organised military union promoting not only its own but also institutional goals, a kind of "*military qua military*", may be a powerful political force designed not only to negotiate with the military command structure, but directed toward placing pressure on government (Morehouse, 1977:210). This naturally poses a potential problem for civil military relations, particularly where these self-preservation instincts run counter to public interest. Taken to the extreme, should the military trade union press to be the ultimate judge on all matters affecting the armed forces, this would disturb the equilibrium between the military and society. A nation committed to democratic accountability and civilian control over the military could be destroyed in the process.

These are some of the associated concerns raised with the shift towards occupationalism, and the possibility of having to accept a more pluralist labour relations dispensation for members of the armed forces.

3.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A consequence of the occupational model is that it results in a priority in self-interest, rather than that of the employing organisation. Whereas the institutional military is highly divergent from civilian society and is legitimated by values, norms and purposes that transcend self-interest, the more occupational the military, the more military service is legitimated in terms of the marketplace. This implies, that instead of the soldier

being motivated by a desire to serve the common good, there is a greater concern with pay, benefits and the quality of working life. When this occurs the existing patterns of authority within the armed forces, based on leadership and discipline are challenged. This is especially evident where institutional goals are no longer seen to be totally compatible with the individual's needs, resulting in the demand for increased rank and file input in military management.

The increase in occupationalism in modern times has largely been associated with the civilianisation of the military profession. This refers to civilianisation in both the content of military work and the increase in the number of civilians employed by the military. As these civilians work alongside military personnel, often in the same post class, the inclination to draw comparisons with civilian employment norms and practices is increased. The shift to an all-volunteer force where the military must take market forces into consideration in recruitment, training and remuneration forces the military to accept a more occupational approach to employment in the military. Another important feature of the all-volunteer force is the change in the profile of recruits from elites to a broader base, more representative of the wider population. It was found that occupational officers more frequently come from lower status groups and that their reasons for joining the military are motivated primarily by a desire for job security and material benefits. If material benefits and job security serve as motivators for joining the military, it also implies that any erosion of service benefits and tenure would promote self-interest behaviour. While occupationalism need not necessarily be equated with unionisation, research does seem to indicate that occupational officers are more supportive of a civilian-type trade union within the military.

Needless to say, this would require a more pluralist approach to labour relations. Should trade unionism emerge as a form of self-interest articulation, the military as employer must accept that members may challenge managerial prerogative in decision-making on matters that affect employees. But as armed forces demand high levels of cohesion, discipline and obedience, the transition to a more pluralist labour relations dispensation is fraught with difficulties. An additional concern is the potential power and influence such a union could wield over the state as employer, and the potential impact this could have on civilian control over the armed forces, especially if the union serves to promote not only sectional but institutional interests. One of the potential challenges facing many armed forces is how to accommodate the democratic rights of members to belong to trade unions, without undermining the need for discipline, obedience and unswerving loyalty, seen as essential for organisational and combat effectiveness.

CHAPTER FOUR

SOCIETAL FORCES INFLUENCING THE MANAGEMENT OF LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE ARMED FORCES

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The institutional/occupational thesis focuses on the changing nature of military service and military organisation, without due recognition of societal forces that may influence the development and role of unions in the armed forces. This can be considered a shortcoming in Moskos' I/O thesis, specifically with respect to the unionisation debate. Research reveals that officers may show a strong commitment to professional/institutional values, but at the same time be supportive of a civilian type trade union, while others who clearly belong to the occupational group, do not support any form of group representation within the military (Caforio & Nuciari, 1994:37). The I/O thesis may thus not be sufficient to explain the development or acceptance of unionism within the armed forces. There are other factors that may be as decisive, if not more so, when it comes to whether soldiers may want or may be granted labour rights.

The aim of this chapter is to discuss some of the environmental influences, or societal forces that may either retard or promote the acceptance of labour rights within the armed forces. One of the key issues is whether soldiers have equal or the same rights as any other employee to belong to a trade union, especially if such membership carries the constitutionally protected right of freedom of association. Another is where the dominant political and trade union culture of the parent society is receptive towards trade unions, and where other employees, especially public servants and the police have these rights. Where the status of the military in society is seen to have declined and where soldiers experience a measure of deprivation, this too seems to promote the need for some form of professional association or union. It is often these trends and not only the drift towards occupationalism that has led to the acceptance of employee rights for soldiers in some European nations.

4.2 SOCIETAL FORCES INFLUENCING LABOUR RELATIONS

The following section addresses some of the judicial, socio-political and military factors that appear to either promote or retard the development of some form of group representation for military personnel within armed forces. The first, and possibly the most important is the debate over the equality of rights.

4.2.1 Equality of rights

In countries where soldiers have employee rights, these rights were not secured through collective bargaining with the military employer, but by government initiated legislation that guaranteed certain inalienable rights to individuals irrespective of employment.¹ Such rights, include for example, *civil and political rights* such as the right to freedom of association, right to assembly, demonstrate and petition, equality, access to courts, and access to information as well as *socio-economic rights*, which include labour rights such as the right to join trade unions for the purpose of collective bargaining.

The extension of these rights to soldiers is based on the premise that certain fundamental rights cannot be withheld from any citizen in a democratic society. In the words of Chief Justice Earl Warren, “[i]mplicit in the term ‘national defense’ is the notion of defending those values and ideals which set this nation apart.. It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties, the freedom of association, which makes the defense of the nation worthwhile” (Phillips & Crosby, 1977:103). The underlying premise is that it is socially *unjust* or *undemocratic* to deny members of the military the rights necessary to protect their interests, which are guaranteed to other citizens (CMRI, 1980:2). Should soldiers be denied the freedom of association to join trade unions, it in fact suggests that the soldier as employee does not have the opportunity to decide how his interests can be protected or advanced. As Harries-Jenkins (1977:55) states, since the soldier’s “... status is one of dependency on earnings with little or no individual power of direct decision and since the individual contract between employee and his employer does not reflect a position of equal strength on the two sides, then the individual has certain fundamental rights and needs deriving from the nature of the employment relations”.

The recognition that soldiers are also citizens and should be granted the same basic fundamental rights and responsibilities as any other citizen, eventually culminated in the extension of these rights to military

1. For purposes of clarity, the rights referred to are those fundamental human rights and freedoms of the subjects of the state, which are protected against infringement and can be protected and enforced by a court of law (Basson, 1995:13).

personnel in some European countries. While the rights of the individual soldier have been recognised, so has the uniqueness of the armed forces. Almost all democracies have a limitation clause that enables the state to limit a fundamental right if it can be declared legitimate and valid. For example, in the United States, the court held that “[w]hile the members of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by the First Amendment, the different character of the military community and military mission requires a different application of those prohibitions. The fundamental necessity for obedience and consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside” (Krendel, 1977b: 15). This implies that the rights of soldiers may be restricted where deterioration in discipline could be demonstrated. In this regard, it is of interest to note that even the International Labour Organisation, Convention no 87 of 1948 (Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise), Article 9 (1) acknowledges that “*the extent to which this right can be extended to the security forces and police be subject to national legislation and regulations*”. According to the ILO provision, it is left to the individual state's discretion as to whether to allow the armed forces or police to join trade unions.

Most countries have required their soldiers to renounce certain political and socio-economic rights. This does not mean that the rights of soldiers are obviated, but that they should yield to accommodate the unique function of the military. Where soldiers have been granted the rights such as the freedom of association to join a trade union, they have in most cases restricted the *activities* of such an association for the sake of military effectiveness and national security.

The most important lesson from the European experience is that the right to form military unions in whatever form, was not won by collective bargaining with the military employer, but through government initiated legislation that respected the rights of the individual (Ballantyne, 1983:6). While the rights of the soldier have been acknowledged, so too has the uniqueness of the military, which has led to an accommodation of employee rights for soldiers. In many countries this issue still remains unresolved, as it is a matter of whose rights are paramount, the rights of the military to restrict military personnel, or the rights of military personnel (Phillips & Crosby, 1977:90).

4.2.2 Influence of dominant political and trade union culture

Although the acceptance of basic fundamental rights for all citizens of the state, including soldiers, is perhaps the single most important variable influencing labour relations within the armed forces, the histori-

cal and traditional relations between the labour movement and their respective government has a considerable influence on the development and character of military unions.

In all the European nations that have military unions, these rights were extended to soldiers only after a long period of social democratic government, which came to power largely on the strength marshalled by the civilian trade union movement (Taylor, Arango & Lockwood, 1977:52). In fact, the labour movement and the governments that they dominate, is the establishment. Military unions developed as part of the social norm of active support and promotion of government and can thus be considered reflective of the social trends within those countries (Ballantyne, 1983:9).

The opposite is true where the trade union movement is seen to be in conflict with government, and unionism is associated with industrial and political activism. In France, for example, even though there has been pressure to create unions for soldiers, the government has refused to extend these rights to soldiers because of the level of politicisation and confrontation between labour and government (Krendel, 1977c: 155). Premier Jacques Chirac, for example, accused the Socialists of "*undermining national security by encouraging the formation of military unions*" (Krendel, 1977a: 110). Under such circumstances the rights of soldiers are curtailed.

On the other side of the spectrum is the United States. Although there was much debate surrounding the possibility of military unionism in the 1970's when the American Federation of Government Employees wanted to recruit military personnel, military unions never got off the ground. Despite the fact that the public service and police in the United States are unionised, and the rights of soldiers have not been constitutionally curtailed, the trade union culture in America has not been conducive to unionisation as a means to fight for the rights of military personnel. Unlike the European unions, which evolved from a Marxist tradition, the American labour unions focus primarily on bread and butter issues rather than on ideological concerns and have seldom formed constituent parts of government or political parties. They operate rather as pressure groups in pursuit of their own pragmatic goals, shifting allegiance to the political party that assists them towards the attainment of these goals (Wyatt, 1977:130). Another factor that has retarded the development of military unions in the United States is that soldiers themselves have not felt a need to unionise because their aspirations have been accommodated within the chain of command.

From the above it can be concluded, that in countries where the governments came to power on the strength marshalled by the trade union movement, and where they form a constituent part of government,

the inclination to extend employee rights to soldiers will be enhanced. However, where the trade union movement is in conflict with government, or where the political influence of the labour movement is weak, the inclination to extend employee rights to soldiers is reduced.

4.2.3 Influence of public sector labour rights

Another important factor facilitating the emergence of unions within the armed forces, is where the rest of society, and particularly other sensitive occupations such as the police, have labour rights (Cortright, 1977:220). Once government conceded to grant state employees labour rights (comparable to those granted to other employees), these rights transferred to the police and lastly to the military, the argument being that *"... what applies to other civil servants, postal, health railway, emergency services and the police, cannot be withheld from the armed forces under peaceful conditions, since they are all important elements of the welfare state"* (Fleckenstein, 1988:182). This trend is facilitated where military personnel are treated as, or see themselves merely as public service employees who wear uniform, rather than a unique occupational community.

Where the police have labour rights, the pressure to extend these rights too on the armed forces is greater. In many respects the police resemble the military in the nature of their work, traditions and discipline. As with the military, the police too have a military command structure which demands unquestioning obedience and rigid discipline. Fradin (1977:118) expresses the reasons for unionisation amongst police as follows: *"The decades of the sixties brought with it the realisation that the prestige and status that went with the badge and the blue uniform were no longer there. Declining working conditions, a failure of police agencies themselves to professionalize, often unfair liberal criticism of the police, an increased desire of the rank and file to have a voice in management and the policemen's fear that American morality and patriotism was deteriorating all added to police dissatisfaction and caused them to organize."* The underlying reasons for the need for unions can therefore be ascribed to a decline in their status, coupled to a hostile external environment, and low economic benefits.

The European experience indicates that the impetus towards military unions in European nations can be traced back to developments in the trade union movement, particularly among public service unions. The extension of labour rights to the military, in most cases only occurred after these rights were granted to other state employers, from here these rights transferred to the police and lastly to the military. The sequence of events in the public sector, and more specifically the police, indicate that the potential for

collective action among any group of employees can emerge where individuals experience a decline in their working conditions and status, compared to other groups in society.

4.2.4 Decline in status of the military

Status is not concerned with power per se, but with a sense of deprivation associated with the decline in the importance and job status of members of the armed forces within modern society.

In this regard, Harries-Jenkins (1977:61) claims that one of the most important factors that predispose soldiers to form unions or professional military organisations, is the feeling that the armed forces in comparison with other institutions in society, have lost their previously held status, and have suffered an undue amount of deprivation. He states that *"[w]hen there is a significant loss of privilege and status of the military in society, trade unions are then formed as a pressure group to re-establish the privileges formerly held by the armed forces."* Taylor (1977:34) too claims that, *"[a]nxiety to preserve its autonomy provides one of the most widespread and powerful of motives for intervention (in politics). In its defensive form it can lead to military syndicalism - an insistence that the military and only the military is entitled to determine on such matters as recruitment training, numbers, and equipment. In its more aggressive form it can lead to the military demand to be the ultimate judge on all other matters affecting the armed forces....such claims are bound to bring the military into conflict with the civilian government which traditionally occupies itself with such matters"*. Where the government is seen to have divested itself from its paternal obligation to the military, the tendency to form pressure groups to influence those areas of decision-making which affect the armed forces, is enhanced.

Where the military is held in high esteem, this inclination is restrained. In Britain for example, which has a highly unionised public service, a respect for human rights as well as a strong trade union culture, (listed as preconditions for military unionism) there are no military unions. This is possibly due to the fact that the British armed forces enjoy a high degree of status within society, given their alliance with the institutions of monarchy, parliament, the church and other lesser ruling institutions. Their status, together with the fact that the salary scales for military personnel in Britain are responsive to adjustments in the civilian marketplace, has lessened the need for unions in the military (Downes, 1988:154, 174). The British armed forces, in terms of international trends, are still very much an institutional military. Should there be a

decline in the status of the British armed forces, coupled with an increase in occupationalism associated with a decline in service conditions, the possibility of unions may well be enhanced² (CMRI, 1980:13).

What this suggests, is that where government has divested its interest in security in favour of social welfare objectives, and where the perception exists that government has let the military down by not affording it the resources or recognition necessary to secure their task attainment, the inclination to form pressure groups to enhance this status, may be increased (CMRI, 1980:83,84).

4.53 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The institutional/occupational thesis is an inadequate explanation of the unionisation in armed forces, as it fails to take into account the societal forces that may either advance or retard the development of military unions. International experience reveals that one of the most important factors influencing the emergence of unions is where this right is constitutionally entrenched. These rights are also most frequently extended to the military under social democratic governments in countries that have strong links with the trade union movement. The pressure to extend employee rights to soldiers is enhanced where other public servants, particularly the police, have these rights and where soldiers experience a relative decline in their conditions of employment and status compared to other groups in society. The deterioration in the material benefits coupled with the decrease in relative importance of the military in society increased the need to form pressure groups to re-establish these privileges.

However, in all instances, these rights are balanced against the needs of the military organisation, taking into consideration the unique social and military context in which the military is required to fulfil its mission. Where, for example, the trade union movement is in an adversarial relationship with government, and where union activity is associated with political and industrial activism, the rights of soldiers are often restrained. The emergence of unionisation is not merely an outcome of occupationalism, but is linked to broader societal trends that influence labour relations. While it is true that the cultural and political differences between nations weaken the applicability of the European analogue, the experience does highlight certain general trends that may be of comparative value.

2. In the Bett report, which focused on the British armed forces' manpower, career and remuneration structures, 66 percent of servicemen agreed that the time had come for some form of collective representation on issues relevant to members of the armed forces. These sentiments were expressed at a time of pending rationalisation and retrenchment in the absence of any perceived conventional threat to Britain and Europe (Bett, 1995:65-66).

CHAPTER FIVE

THE COMPATIBILITY OF LABOUR RIGHTS WITH MILITARY SERVICE: THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Armed forces are “*Janus faced*” organisations. On the one hand, they have to build and maintain an effective military organisation that can respond to the changing strategic environment, and on the other, they have to be responsive to wider social values and to the demands of society (Dandeker, 1994:639). The same applies to the management of labour relations in the armed forces. The dilemma faced by the military, is how to balance the needs of society to have an effective organisation, subordinate to its needs versus the needs of the “*soldier as an employee*”, to exert some influence over their service conditions.

This chapter looks at the experiences of six European countries that have addressed this challenge. By analysing the legislative position and type of group representation that has emerged in these countries, it is determined whether labour rights can be compatible with military service. Three main areas of concern underlie the debate over the compatibility of labour rights with military service. The first is whether the rights of soldiers to belong to unions, for the purpose of collective bargaining, can be justifiably withheld from military personnel in a democratic society. Secondly, whether the above mentioned labour rights can be extended to soldiers without undermining either the combat or organisational effectiveness of the armed forces. Thirdly, what impact the activities of military associations or unions may have upon civilian control of the armed forces.

5.2 ACCOMMODATING THE SOLDIER AS EMPLOYEE

Three major forms of group representation have been established within the armed forces: trade unions, professional associations and representative committees. Each of these categories can be divided further on the basis of their structural variations and differences of purpose (CMRI, 1980:110).

For purpose of clarity, a distinction needs to be made between military unions (which are akin to trade unions in their philosophy, goals and strategies) and professional associations, which formally represent

military personnel, but are not part of a trade union tradition. *“Trade unions”* differ from other organisations with respect to the nature of their membership, their purpose, and the means they employ to achieve their objectives. According to Salamon (1987:58) a trade union can be defined as “... *any organisation, whose membership consists of employees, which seeks to organise and represent their interests both in the workplace and society and, in particular, seeks to regulate their employment relationship through the direct process of collective bargaining with management*”. This definition highlights that a union requires organisation and that it seeks to improve the position of its members in the workplace and in society at large. This implies that a union has an implicit social and political role.

Often the military professional associations are erroneously referred to as unions, while very few resemble a trade union in structure, practice or objectives. *“Professional associations”* are generally distinguished from unions in that they seek to maintain the status of the profession as a whole. Their degree of unionateness is low, given their reluctance, whether because of professionalism or other reasons, to undertake industrial action in support of their sectional interests. By publicly projecting an image of responsibility and professionalism, organisations seek to enhance the status of their occupation in the eyes of employers, government and the public (Salamon, 1987:129).

“Representative committees” are structures created, which exist within the organisation to facilitate communication and the resolution of grievances. There are two categories of representative committees, those which form part of the formal managerial structure, and which strive to present a form of participation in decision-making, and those that oppose the military organisation and favour freedom from organisational controls, rather than an extensive share in decision-making (CMRI, 1980:51).

For the purpose of this discussion, the term *“group representation”* will be used to refer to the different forms of collective representation that can be identified with any activity that strives to protect or further the collective interests of soldiers as employees of the state (CMRI, 1980:19). This general definition recognises that there is a multiplicity of representational models.

5.2.1 France

Although the French system makes no provision for any form of group representation, it has been included as a relevant case study given the internal forms of military personnel representation that have been created as an alternative to trade unions.

5.2.1.1 Legislative position

The official doctrine on group representation is outlined in Article 10 of the Military Disciplinary regulations, which prohibits any syndicalist activities for regular soldiers and conscripts. This includes those associations aimed at protecting professional interests, in other words, professional associations. The attitude of the French military towards unionism is reflected in the following statement made by the former Chief of Naval Operations in 1973: “[I] am a union leader of the Navy, a union without affiliates, a permanent shop steward” (Mandeville, 1976:541). This view fits the traditional belief that it is part of the duty of those who are in command to protect the financial and moral interests of subordinates and to inform the political authorities of the latter's expectations (Caforio & Nuciari, 1994:37; Böene, 1988:208; CMRI, 1980:60).

However, the inability of the military establishment in the seventies to effectively protect the interests of soldiers, gave rise to the need for some form of representation. In an attempt to pre-empt trade union development, the French government authorised the military to create a system of representation within the chain of command. This system facilitated the consultation between regular military personnel and political authorities on matters relating to the organisation of military careers, their status and their financial positions (Mandeville, 1976:541; Böene, 1988:204).

5.2.1.2 Structures for group representation

In December 1969, an Act creating the Council *superior de la fonction militaire* (CSFM) was passed by parliament. The CSFM is an advisory body that represents both officers and non-commissioned officers who have been appointed to the CSFM by the drawing of lots. The Minister of Defence acts as chairman of the CSFM. The initial jurisdiction of the CSFM covered problems of a general nature concerning the standing and statute of military personnel. Changes in the objectives and functions of the CSFM were made in 1975, when the scope of consultation between regular military personnel and political authorities was broadened to make provision for both officers and non-commissioned officers to participate in any study or decision relating to the organisation of their careers, their status and their financial positions. To achieve this objective, consultative committees, the Commissions consultatives, were set up under Army Regulations Article 72, of 1975 within every military unit. This created a structure at both local and central level through which military personnel could express their difficulties, aspirations and concerns (CMRI, 1980:61; Mandeville, 1976:546). However, the effectiveness and representivity of these structures have

been questioned, given the fact that at central level the Minister of Defence is the chairman of the CSFM and at local level, the Officer Commanding is the chairman of the commissions consultives.

During 1974-5, conscripts who were excluded from participation in the above structures created informal and illegal soldiers' committees, the *comites de soldats* to advance their interests. These committees actively sought to secure improvements in pay and conditions of service, to protect individuals against the arbitrary power of the established hierarchy, to create associations for soldiers and to promote links between soldiers and other workers. By means of street demonstrations and go-slows the *syndicat des soldats* wanted to indicate that "... they were opposed to the maintenance of the managerial prerogative on the grounds that as an interest group of workers, they were in conflict with a military hierarchy which represented a bourgeois society" (CMRI, 1980:63). The militant behaviour of these conscript committees was met with harsh resistance by the government and the public. In response, the then Premier Jacques Chirac in his speech in the National Assembly in 1975 declared that any union for military personnel is a "... mortal danger to both military institutions and democracy itself" (Krendel, 1977a:110). The tradition of union politicisation and confrontation between unions and government, underlines this response. The radical extremism of the *comites de soldats*, together with the fact that they were locally organised and were not focused in their objectives eventually led to their disintegration.

In 1969, the *Conseil Permanent Du Service Militaire* (CPSM), the French equivalent of a military ombudsman was created to give conscripts a chance to voice their grievances. The CPSM consist of two Senators, two Deputies, four military members and four other suitable persons (CMRI, 1980:76). Of interest is that all these bodies, the CSFM, the *commissions consultives* and the CPSM are located neither within the established authority structure, nor within an alternative trade union structure.

By the mid to late seventies the union debate ceased to be an issue when the pay and prestige of military service members increased significantly. Granted the unusual demands and control of military personnel (24 hours liability for service, frequent relocations, and so forth) legislators ruled that military personnel must be adequately compensated for their services. Today, military personnel are better paid than most other civil servants (Böene, 1988:198-199).

Even though the public sector is highly unionised, there have been no further attempts to form syndicates in the military. Law forbids unions and even the national union federations, though urged on by extreme left-wing activists in the seventies, have rejected the idea of unions for military personnel. Even the fairly

paternalistic official system of representation and consultation has been met with some degree of uneasiness; for fear that it may undermine loyalty towards the chain of command (Böene, 1988:203-4).

The French experience is of value for the following reasons. Firstly, it indicates that where the labour movement does not have the support of government and where union activities are associated with industrial activism, there will be resistance to accept any form of group representation within the armed forces. Secondly, where members of the armed forces are committed to institutional values and where these values are re-enforced and held in high regard by society, the inclination to unionise is reduced.

5.2.2 Netherlands

While soldiers only received consultative rights much later in their development, the Dutch Armed Forces have a lengthy experience of collectivism starting in 1883.

5.2.2.1 Legislative position

The right to form associations or other professional organisations to protect and *support* the economic, social and cultural interests of soldiers in the Dutch Armed Forces is guaranteed by national and international law. The Constitutional Law (Section 9), the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Section 11) and the Military Public Servant Act (Section 12), form the legal basis for group representation in the Netherlands (CMRI, 1980:114).

5.2.2.2 Structures for group representation

Twelve groupings of military associations based on rank, religion, branch of service and status represent military personnel. It is interesting to note, that if one views this development chronologically, the first to organise on a collective basis were the non-commissioned officers, whereafter the officers, and only years later, the conscripts developed some form of group representation (refer Table 5.1). Almost 90 percent of military personnel in the Dutch Armed Forces belong to military associations, of which the conscript union, the Organisation of Conscripted Soldiers (VVDM), is the largest (USA, 1977:5-6).

The goals of the military associations differ accordingly, the conscript unions being concerned primarily with the material well-being of their members, while the other associations focus on professional issues.

Most of the associations resemble professional associations in structure and *modus operandi*, with the exception of the conscript union, which has at times, has been overtly militant in their pursuit for better wages. Because military pay is kept in line with private and public sector wage trends, this has not been a major issue, except for the conscripts where some gains have been made (USA, 1977:6; CMRI, 1980:114). Civilian personnel serving in the Dutch armed forces are not part of the military associations and are represented in the same way as other government employees. They are *public servants* and by virtue of their legal status, *do not have the right to negotiate* their wages in the Netherlands.

The associations represent the interests of their members on a broad range of interests, including issues such as government's plan to reduce the military budget, the possible reduction in military benefits and amendments to the system of military justice, through a complex system of *consultations* and *discussions* with the Ministry of Defence (MoD). By law, the Associations must be consulted on all matters pertaining to judicial conditions and regulations affecting military personnel, otherwise the regulations or decisions taken by the MoD has no judicial validity (CMRI, 1980:119). Promulgation of regulations affecting the social and economic interests of military personnel do not require the Associations' consent (USA, 1977:3). A graphic representation of the consultation process is presented in Diagram 5.1.

Table 5.1: List of recognised military associations in the Netherlands

Organisation	Year of Founding
"Ons Beland" Royal Association of NCO's	1898
Association to Protect and Support the Interests of Naval and Former Naval Personnel for NCO's	1901
Christian Association of Military Personnel	1902
Association of the Military Police	1907
Association of Officers of the Royal Netherlands Army and the Royal Netherlands Air Force	1910
"St Marinus" Roman Catholic Association of Military Personnel	1911
General Association of Netherlands Reserve Officers	1917
General Christian Officers Association	1900/1919
Association of Naval Officers	1947
National Corporals Association	1965
Organization of Conscripted Soldiers (VVDM)	1966
General Association of Netherlands Soldiers	1972

Source: Krendel, 1977a:115.

At the unit level the establishment of consulting committees has ensured a degree of participation in decision making, where the relevant associations meet with the officer commanding to discuss problems relating to local duties and working conditions. These committees address issues such as working hours, in-

dustrial safety and after-duty transportation. The discussions that take place at this level are *apart* from the consultation process between the MoD and the Associations (USA, 1977:8; CMRI, 1980:119).

The Associations mentioned are not trade unions as they have only limited consultative rights, no collective bargaining rights. Nor do they have links with the broader labour movement (Krendel, 1977a:114). Military personnel of the Dutch armed forces do not have the right to strike and provisions exist for the suspension of association activities during wartime (USA, 1977:3).

Although the conscript union has received much negative publicity due to their militant conduct, the MoD Officials are of the opinion that the associations' activities have not negatively affected military discipline or effectiveness (USA, 1977:8). Given the limitations placed on the consultative powers of the associations, the activities of the associations have not posed any threat to civilian control over the armed forces.




Diagram 5.1: Institutionalised consultation process in the Netherlands

Source: USA, 1977:4.

5.2.3 Germany

In an attempt to strengthen democracy within the institutions of the Federal Republic of Germany, and in the military in particular, the German Trade Union Federation (DGB) (the *Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*) pressurised the coalition government of the Social Democrats and Christian democrats to extent all civil liberties, including labour rights to soldiers (Krendel, 1977b:139,154; Fleckenstein, 1976:507).

5.2.3.1 Legislative position

The rights of soldiers as citizens are entrenched in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (paragraph 9). Every citizen has the right to constitute and establish trade unions and other professional associations with the object of developing, protecting and supporting economic, social and cultural interests (CMRI, 1980:110). These rights were reinforced with the establishment of the concept of "*Innere Führung*", which emphasizes that the soldier is a "*citizen in uniform*" and should have the same basic rights as any other individual. The soldier may partake in party politics, vote and run for election and join professional organisations and unions, and work for their goals (Fleckenstein, 1988:182).

Military unions effectively had their beginning with the Defence Ministry Decree which was passed on 1 August 1966, which permitted unions to recruit uniformed military personnel on military bases.¹

5.2.3.2 Structures for group representation

Consequently, group representation in Germany is widespread, but unlike the Netherlands, is not fragmented according to rank, mustering, or arm of service. Four military personnel representation forums represent the interests of *all* military personnel - a military association, military union, unit personnel councils and a military ombudsman. The most influential is the 300 000 strong Federal Armed Forces Association (Deutsche Bundeswehr-Verband: DBwV), established in 1956, a professional organisation open to *all* military personnel, including conscripts and dependents.² (Fleckenstein, 1988:180; CMRI, 1980:110). The DBwV views itself as a lobby or pressure group interested in the economic, social and cultural well-being of its members and adheres to the following principles: that it shall not undermine the combat readiness of the armed forces; that it will support the maintenance of discipline; maintain political impartiality; avoid interference in purely military matters and shall not strike in an attempt to achieve its objectives (USA, 1977:11; CMRI, 1980:110). The DBwV has no formal organisational ties with the rest of the labour movement and strongly resists being labelled a union.

-
1. The Degree of 1966 which gave servicemen the right to practice free coalition, including the right to join and form labour unions, resulted in three high-ranking officers resigning from the Bundeswehr in protest against the presence of labour unions in the barracks. This event was termed the "*generals revolt*", but did not manage to revoke the decision to extend employee rights to soldiers (Fleckenstein, 1976:508).
 2. Different sources quote different percentages with respect to membership to the DBwV. The most recent source, Fleckenstein (1988:180) claims that over 60 percent of all soldiers in the Bundeswehr, including conscripts are represented by this association. According to the DBwV's own statistics claims its membership is around 80 percent.

The only authentic union in the German Bundeswehr is the Public Utilities and Transportation Union (Gewerkschaft Öffentlicher Dienst, Transport und Verkehr: OTV) established in 1964 (Fleckenstein, 1988: 180). This union represents a small group of technicians and is formally linked to the broader labour movement. However, unlike the rest of the union members the OTV are not permitted to strike in the case of a dispute. In comparison with the DBvW, its membership is small.³

Both the DBwV and the OTV are equally recognised by the Federal Ministry of Defence and are consulted in the preparation of regulations that affect conditions of service. Civil service law requires that employee organisations be consulted before introducing legislation that would adjust salaries, or fringe benefits of civilian and military personnel. Military personnel receive basically the same salaries as civilian public servants, but the MoD regulates any special issues peculiar to the military such as hours of work, after consultation with the employee organisations. Typical issues for discussion are pay scales, fringe benefits, training, dress, living conditions and hours of duty. Military command and discipline are excluded from consultation (USA, 1977:11,12).

While it is clear that both the DBwV and the OTV have the right to forward any item for discussion to the MoD or Parliamentary defence committees, they do not negotiate terms and conditions of employment. They only have "*consultative rights*" and "*no collective bargaining authority*" (CMRI, 1980:112). The DBwV and the OTV do not represent soldiers directly in grievances, as by law, this is the function of the personnel councils.

Issues not covered by agreements are advanced through the military personnel councils. These councils exist at the MoD level, regional level and the local unit level. Civilian and uniformed employees elect representatives, called "*trustmen*" from their ranks to represent them in dealings with the officer commanding at unit level. Their primary responsibility is to promote a mood of co-operation between superiors and subordinates and to improve unit *esprit de corps*. Each spokesman is entitled to make proposals with respect to the units internal conditions, welfare, training and social life.

The trustmen also represent servicemen in grievance and disciplinary proceedings. According to military law, no disciplinary action may be taken against anyone until the officer commanding has consulted the

3. According to Fleckenstein (1988:180) the membership figure of the OTV in 1975 was around 1 500, a mere one percent of all military personnel. A more recent figure has not been published. Two prominent generals belong to the OTV, both of whom openly advocate the advantages of union membership.

trustman. At regional level, there are councils of trustmen that meet with the officers commanding of the various units or battalions. If disputes and grievances arise between the councils and military management, it is referred to an arbitration commission at the national level. Decisions of the arbitration commission are binding on both parties (USA, 1977:43). Out of all the trustmen, 35 members are selected to represent to serve on a council at the level of the MoD. Here the spokesmen inform the Minister of Defence of problems and grievances within the ranks and may offer advice to the Minister.⁴

Furthermore, a military ombudsman, a Parliamentary Commissioner of the Federal Armed Forces, attends to the interests of military personnel. The latter is an independent parliamentary institution appointed to safeguard the basic rights of military personnel and to assist the Bundestag in exercising parliamentary control. Every soldier has the right to address the ombudsman if a matter cannot be channelled or resolved through the chain of command.

Outside the military environment, the German Trade Union Federation (DGB), with seven million members is a powerful bargaining force in the public service. As the rights won by the public service are extended to military personnel, the GDB indirectly constitutes an important lobbying body for soldiers' rights, welfare and pay with the government (Krendel, 1977b:142).

Neither civilian officials nor military personnel have the right to strike (Krendel, 1977b:141). Unlike the Netherlands, Germany has no legal provision suspending union activities during wartime. The activities of the OTV and DBwV have not had any negative impact on military readiness or effectiveness. On the contrary, it is held that these practices have improved efficiency, discipline and morale in the German Armed Forces (USA, 1977:14).

Concerning the effect of military unionisation upon the political control of the armed forces, the German military unionists are of the firm opinion that *"... a soldier will be more willing and capable of defending democracy if he has an opportunity to practice democracy in his life"* (CMRI, 1980:3). Unions as democratic institutions are seen as a means to ensure that the military remains committed to democratic principles.

4. The information on the role of the trustman was obtained from Lt Col Helmut Jost, Ministry of Defence, Bonn, Germany in December 1996.

5.2.4 Belgium

In Belgium, the initial demand for the creation of a system of military group representation evolved at the end of the 1950's, after the Second World War, during a period when the Belgium armed forces were experiencing a feeling of deprivation and decline in their status.

5.2.4.1 Legislative position

Under Article 20 of the Belgium Constitution, the right of association is guaranteed to all citizens and no one can be compelled to participate or not participate in any association. However, in the early stages of military union development, Article 276 of the Military Code restricted the type of associations to which military personnel could belong. According to this regulation, soldiers, civil servants or employees of the MoD were forbidden to belong to any secret association or to any group that may have political tendencies or characteristics. Military personnel could only legally belong to scientific or amenity societies with no political characteristics or tendencies (Werner, 1976:481).

These restrictions on the freedom of association of soldiers gave rise to a legal dilemma in 1961, when the Association des Officiers en Service Actif (AOSA) was formed as a charitable organisation, whose objective was to protect the moral and physical interests of its members. This association was neither a scientific or amenity society and from a disciplinary point of view, could have been banned. The issue was never tested in the constitutional court, instead tacit approval was given to the existence of the AOSA, although military regulations were initially used to control the type of articles published in the association's newsletter. As these restrictions on the press were contrary to Article 18 dealing with freedom of speech in the Belgium Constitution, they were soon challenged by the AOSA.

More formal recognition was granted to the associations in October 1964, when a Royal Decree made provision for the establishment of a Consultative Commission. This Commission consists of six members nominated by the Minister of Defence and representatives of the three professional associations. The Minister must consult this *Commission* on all questions of general interest relative to the statutory position of military personnel. While the Minister is not bound by the recommendations of the Commission, should they not be accepted, the reasons must be made known.

Despite the establishment of this consultative Commission, there was dissatisfaction as to the effectiveness of this structure in protecting the interests of military personnel (CMRI, 1980:59,124). In 1975, further regulations were passed which permitted all military personnel, with the exception of members of the gendarmerie, to *affiliate to political parties*. Further regulations were passed permitting all military personnel to join any of the recognised associations or any *trade union recognised as representing personnel in the civil service*. Strike action was forbidden and subject to punishment by the *punition disciplinaire* under the *law Concerning the Regulation of Discipline in the Armed Forces*" (Werner, 1976:484-485).

5.2.4.2 Structures for group representation

Although there was some dispute over whether union membership is contrary to the dignity to officership, the legalisation soon prompted the ASOA to establish the *Syndicat Belge des Officiers* (SBO), whose modus operandi and goals were very similar to a trade union. The *la Royale Alliance Mutuelle des Sous-Officiers de Belgique* (RAMSOB) representing non-commissioned officers set up a similar structure, the *Syndicat National des Sous-Officiers* (SNS) and the *l'Association des Soldats et Caporaux de Carrière de Belgique* (ASCCB), representing corporals and soldiers, created the *Syndicat national des Militaires* (SNM). These three organisations later joined together to form the *Centrale Generale des Syndicats Militaires* (CGSM), a central trade union representing all military personnel.

While the military syndicates closely resemble trade unions in their aims and objectives, they are in many respects closer to staff associations as their demands have been neither confrontational nor excessive. The syndicates negotiate directly with the Minister of Defence and the Secretary of State for the Civil Service on issues relating to pay, conditions of service and remuneration for overtime.

According to Werner (1976:485) the activities of the syndicates have not had a negative impact on military effectiveness, certain concerns are raised with respect to possible budgetary problems for government. As personnel costs exceed half the military budget, the question is posed whether the purchase of military equipment and operational costs will be reduced to the detriment of military efficiency in lieu of *union* demands. Concerning the political impact of the syndicates, one non-commissioned officer's association, the *l'Union Professionnelle des Sous-Officiers Belges* (UPSOB) affiliated to the Liberal Trade Unions, have adopted a political stance, but has consequently been widely ridiculed by the other associations and syndi-

cates in the Belgium Armed Forces. However, it is indicative of a more extreme stance, when compared to the other structures that exist (Werner, 1976:486).

The Belgium case study is an interesting and very relevant case study for two reasons. Firstly it illustrates that where armed forces experience a significant decline in their previously held status in society and as a profession, associations may be formed as pressure groups to re-establish formerly held privileges. Secondly, that if these associations are not successful, they may over time increasingly develop as trade unions or become involved in union activities to advance their interests.

5.2.5 Denmark

As with the Netherlands, group representation in the armed forces have a long history. The early military organisations were merely social clubs which served as discussion forums and it was only in 1919, after state employees were granted the right to form unions and negotiate with the government, that these rights were extended to the military (USA, 1977:16).

5.2.5.1 Legislative position

The system of group representation in the Danish armed forces is similar to the rest of the public service. Members of the military have the same employee rights as other state employees and a high percentage of military personnel other than conscripts have joined the unions. The interests of conscripts are dealt with through a spokesman process with the MoD (CMRI, 1980:132).

5.2.5.2 System of group representation

There are approximately 52 different associations/unions in the Danish armed forces organised into three national military unions. The A-Branch Officer Union represents officers with academic qualifications from lieutenant to general/admiral level and is affiliated to the Union of University Graduates one of the four main public servants unions. The B-Branch officers' Union caters for the lower officer ranks, lieutenant to major and is affiliated to the Central Union of Higher State Functionaries. The Association of Regular Other Ranks represents non-commissioned officers. This association is not affiliated to any "outside" organisation but is the strongest and most active of Denmark's military unions and negotiates directly with the MoD (USA, 1977:17-19; CMRI, 1980:133). These three major associations negotiate through the Central

Unions of public servants with the Ministry of Wages and Budgets. The relationship of the military unions with the Ministries of Finance and Defence and the four main public sector unions is presented in Diagram 5.2.

Apart from these three major associations, there are also a number of other associations representing various rank or interests groups within the Danish Armed forces. Once recognised these unions may negotiate with the Ministries.

The associations may negotiate over most matters affecting wages and conditions of service, except those of an operational nature. However, the implementation of service conditions, does not require the consent of the associations unless such conditions are subject to an agreement between the Association and the Ministry (CMRI, 1980:135).




Diagram 5.2: Collective bargaining process in Denmark
Source: USA, 1977:18.

In addition to the abovementioned associations, a comprehensive system of representative committees have been established at Defence Command, regional and unit level to represent and deal with issues not covered by negotiated agreements. These committees are composed of an equal number of representatives of the military command and representatives of the various associations.

To summarise, the significance of the Danish case study, is that unlike the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium, the Danish armed forces are divided into a number of small associations, which are grouped together on the basis of rank and academic qualifications. The rights of soldiers are quite extensive and the unions function in much the same way as unions in the private sector, with the exception that they do not have the right to strike. As with the Netherlands, provision exists for suspension of military representation arrangements during wartime or national emergency (USA, 1977:20). Although it is reported that the activities of the various associations and unions have not adversely affected military effectiveness or readiness, the Danish armed forces claim that workweek restrictions coupled to budgetary considerations, have had a negative impact on their functioning:

5.2.6 Sweden

Of all the existing systems of group representation among Western European armed forces, those of Sweden are the most advanced and highly organised. Because the military unions are fully integrated into the Swedish collective bargaining system, the rights of soldiers as employees are extensive.

5.2.6.1 Legislative position

Military associations have existed in Sweden since the early 1900s, but it was not until 1965, when other public employees were granted rights of association and collective bargaining under the State Officials Act, that these rights were extended to military personnel. Since then the military unions have been fully integrated into the Swedish collective bargaining system. The collective bargaining rights of private sector employees apply equally to military personnel and cover all aspects of pay and working conditions (USA, 1977:24). Conscripts have not unionised as they are excluded under the State Officials Act of 1965, as they are not considered permanent employees (USA, 1977:24). They are however, represented by means of a variety of committees (Krendel, 1977a:119).

5.2.6.2 Systems of group representation

Membership in the various unions is based on rank, and nearly all eligible military personnel are union members. The Swedish Association of the Army, Navy and Air Force Officers (SOF) formed in 1932 represents officers of the rank of major or lieutenant commander and above. The oldest of the three unions is the Warrant Officers Union (KOF) established in 1907, which represents officers from the rank of

ensign to lieutenant. The most active military union with the largest membership, is the union for Non-Commissioned Officers' Union (POF) founded in 1918 (Taylor, 1977:26). The POF and the KOF are affiliated to the Central Organisation of Salaried Employees (TCO) and the TCO's Civil Servants Section, catering specifically for state employees. The SOF, on the other hand belongs to the Central Organisation of Swedish Professional Workers (Brickmann, 1976:531).

Negotiations take place at national level and union activities at local level are very low key (Taylor, 1977:26). The relationship of the various military unions with the broader labour movement is illustrated in Diagram 5.3. While these military associations have been successful in improving pay levels and conditions of service, this success is largely ascribed to the activities of the major unions with which the POF, KOF and SOF are affiliated (CMRI, 1980:128). The Swedish Trade Union Confederation provides major financial support and membership to the Social Democratic Party and forms a significant component of the ruling establishment (Krendel, 1977b:148).




Diagram 5.3: Swedish collective bargaining process
Source: USA, 1977:24.

Unlike any other country, the Swedish armed forces are permitted to strike and the government or military as employer has the right to a lock-out. So far, no military union has been involved in a strike (USA, 1977:22).

As an advanced social democracy, Sweden has established conditions of employment that reflect specific political and cultural preferences in that society. As with the rest of society, the level of co-determination in the Swedish military is highly developed, even in the military (Brickman, 1976:536). In this regard, some officers have expressed concern that co-determination agreements have resulted in "*their functioning as coordinators rather than commanders*". On the other hand the Swedish armed forces claim that granting soldiers full labour rights has not appeared to have had any influence on military readiness, but then, it must be taken into consideration that Sweden has not been to war for over 150 years (USA, 1977:27; Krendel, 1977b:147).

5.3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The examination of countries with some form of group representative system reveals that there is no single model of military unionisation. The European experience clearly indicates that the origins, structure and function of the type group representation found in a particular country is reflective of the history and societal context within which the military functions.

An important point worth noting with respect to group representation in armed forces, is that although the military organisation has a pluralist structure, in the sense that there are officers who are the managers and non-commissioned officers who can be seen as skilled workers or craftsman, the military union experience in Europe has not been a means whereby the latter group has consolidated its strength against the officer class, although it must be added that they are the most active.

While it is true that the cultural and political differences between nations weaken the applicability of the European analogue, the experience does highlight certain general trends that may be of comparative value. With the exception of Sweden, no country has permitted true labour unions as comparable to civilian economic sector. The dominant model of group representation within the armed forces are the professional associations, which can be differentiated into those who represent all members (Germany) and those who represent a particular rank group or a specific military speciality (Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark). With the exception of Germany, different provisions apply to conscripts.

Although the professional associations aim primarily to protect the professional interests of service members, they have overtime extended these interests to include activities usually associated with unionism. Through their efforts they have made substantial gains in improving the salary and conditions of service of members. The Scandinavian associations and unions in particular have won substantial wage gains and have been able to maintain pay levels equivalent to those of public servants. Generally, the unionised armed forces of Northern Europe have much higher pay scales than the non-organised forces of Southern Europe. Other gain included the right to participate in promotion boards, and compensation for overtime. (Cortright & Watts 1991:71)

As military pay is kept in accord with public sector wage trends, it has effectively removed direct negotiations over wages from the military arena. No country, except Sweden has granted their soldiers the right to strike. Operational matters affecting military command and discipline are excluded from consultation. With the exception of the Netherlands, strong links have been established with the broader public sector labour movement.

In an attempt to enhance participation in decision-making, all the countries studied have created representative committees to supplement the formal grievance and disciplinary procedures within the chain of command. These committees operate according to the politics of co-operation rather than confrontation and provide a forum for joint consultation. In addition, the establishment of a parliamentary military ombudsman to investigate the complaints lodged by soldiers serve as an alternative channel through which soldiers can voice their individual or collective grievances.

It appears as if the different forms of group representation implemented in the countries studied have been accommodated without any apparent adverse effects on military readiness, efficiency or discipline. There has been some concern that the restrictions on overtime have had a negative impact on training, and that the time spent on consultation with the representative associations have slowed down decision-making and reduced management flexibility. On the other hand, communication, general working and living conditions of military personnel and labour relations practices have improved.

The issue of whether group representation has negatively affected organisational or combat effectiveness is difficult to verify. Especially concerning combat effectiveness, the absence of any empirical evidence

means that conclusions on this aspect of military functioning are speculative, as there is no experience of possible differences between unionised or non-unionised forces in actual combat situations.

While some governments, such as France have restricted the employee rights of soldiers out of fear that such activities may politicise the armed forces, the European experience suggests that group representative activities have not had any adverse effect upon the political control of the armed forces. The image of a military union acting as a *praetorian guard*, has not been a feature of the European experience. This could possibly be ascribed to the strict controls imposed upon the activities of these unions and associations both within the chain of command and in their relations with the MoD's.

To conclude, it is clear that the degree to which the rights of soldiers as employees can be accommodated within the armed forces is influenced by, and is dependent upon the societal context within which they function.

CHAPTER SIX

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED FORCES: FROM SADF TO SANDF

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to sketch a profile of the South African armed forces that will place the forthcoming chapters into perspective. A few key features of the Union Defence Force, followed by a discussion on the major threat perception and mission definition of the South African Defence Force (SADF) over the past thirty years is provided. It is illustrated that since the 1960s, the major mission definition of the military in South Africa was the defence of the country against a so-called “*communist inspired threat*” from both outside and within the country. Throughout this period the SADF adapted its force structure and manpower procurement system to counter this threat. In the nineties, in the absence of any clear threat, the entire force structure and manpower procurement system would change, bringing with it new problems and challenges.

Currently, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is undergoing a major transformation, affecting the entire organisational structure. Taking this into consideration, the present command and control structure, the various arms of service, their structure, primary and secondary roles, as well as manpower procurement system and problems, are briefly described.

6.2 THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNION DEFENCE FORCE

Before discussing the mission and force structure of the SADF, a few features of its forerunner, the Union Defence Force (UDF), which would have a lasting effect on the future armed forces of South Africa, are outlined.

The UDF, established in 1912, was an amalgamation of British and Boer forces. As with the SANDF, which came into being some eighty-two years later, the UDF had to integrate former enemies with vastly different political loyalties. From the beginning the need for the defence force to remain politically non-partisan was emphasised. General Lord Methuen expressed the following sentiments “[p]olitics would

have no place in the South African Army and Mr Smuts knows perfectly well the curse this has been in other Colonial Forces" (Williams, 1992:21). From these early beginnings a practice of subservience and loyalty to the state was cultivated. Even though the SADF became increasingly political in the eighties, it never challenged civil authority (Wood, 1995:13). In fact, the deep-rooted culture of bureaucratic submission to civilian control, is what clinched the peaceful transition to a new democratic South Africa, many years later (Shaw, 1996:14; Seegers, 1996:38).

Although the number of Afrikaners serving in the UDF grew steadily over the years, it was British military culture and traditions that shaped the UDF more than anything specifically drawn from the Afrikaner military past. As a member of the British Commonwealth, and with the UDF acting in support of the Allied Forces, Britain remained influential in determining the corporate identity through the standardisation of training, equipment and organisation. UDF officers and troops attended training courses in Britain, and it is this standardisation of training and equipment that made close integration with the British forces during the Second World War possible. One can safely conclude that the military professionalism of the South African armed forces, even today, has its origin in British tradition (RSA, 1977:4; Seegers, 1996:38,68).

Another feature of the South Africa armed forces is the reliance placed on part-time soldiers or militia almost since the beginning of colonisation. Although the Defence Act of 1912 provided for black men to serve in war, only white males were liable to serve, should there be insufficient volunteers (Dorning, 1987:12). In principle, the UDF was a volunteer force, with a provision for a ballot only if insufficient citizens rendered themselves available for military service. The UDF consisted of a professional Permanent Force and the Citizen Force (which formed the bulk of the conventional fighting forces), and the Commandos, a voluntary home guard of infantry units for local defence. South Africa became involved in both World wars using only volunteers, since the Defence Act prohibited the deployment of citizens outside South Africa (Fourie, 1996:152-157).

One more point worth noting, is the command and control structure of the UDF. The UDF comprised of the Commandant General, the Inspector General, an Army, Navy and Air Force Chief of Staff, the Adjutant General, the Quartermaster General and the Surgeon General. The Commandant General, served as chief executive officer responsible to the Minister of Defence for the implementation of ministerial policy with respect to command, control, organisation, discipline and training. The Secretary of Defence was the departmental head and accounting officer, directly responsible to the Minister of Defence for the implementation of ministerial policy with respect to financial administration and control. This division of functions

between the Commandant General and the Secretary of Defence was abolished in May 1967, when the Defence Secretariat was dissolved. The reorganisation of the command and control structure of the SADF would place the Commandant General, as permanent Head of the Department of Defence (RSA, 1971:17-18). Hereafter the Department of Defence became militarised with most of its functions being performed by Defence Headquarters. After 1967 there was, therefore, virtually no civilian, although there was parliamentary oversight over the armed forces. Only years later, with the formation of the SANDF would a civilian Defence Secretariat be re-instituted as a means to entrench civilian control over the military and would the accounting function of the Department of Defence once again reside with the Secretary of Defence. The Secretary of Defence would also be the principal advisor to the Minister of Defence (SANDF, 1996a:13-14).

6.3 MAJOR MISSION DEFINITION

Before South Africa broke away from the British Commonwealth, the former UDF was orientated and structured to act as part of and in support of the British Forces. This role was to change with the formation of the new SADF in 1957.

According to the Defence Act, 44 of 1957 the tasks of the SADF were to defend the Republic of South Africa (RSA) from foreign attack, the prevention and suppression of terrorism and other forms of internal disorder, to act to preserve life, health, property and the maintenance of essential services, and undertake police duties as may be prescribed at any time by the civil authorities (Frankel, 1984:1). In the years that followed, these roles were fulfilled often only too well by the SADF.

6.3.1 The sixties and the "communist threat"

With the proclamation of South Africa as a Republic on 31 May 1961 outside the Commonwealth, the SADF would enter a new era in defence. Reliant upon its own resources, South African defence planners undertook a comprehensive review of the threat environment. According to an official Department Defence Review of this period, the following signs were unmistakable by the sixties. *"Our enemies receive increasing moral and material aid, not merely from the Communist countries, but also from several organisations and some governments in the West. Hostile African states are mainly armed and organised with aid from Communist countries. The presence of the Russians in the Indian Ocean and the Chinese in Zambia and*

Tanzania is now an accomplished fact. Terrorists are active in Angola, Mozambique and along the Rhodesian border, their training, organisation and armament are improving appreciably" (RSA, 1971:26).

This assessment of the threat perception led to a steady expansion of the SADF with respect to its manpower, organisation and equipment. The greatest expansion occurred in the South African Army, with new units being established and the organisation of headquarters elements accordingly modified and enlarged (RSA, 1971:6). A program of armament modernisation was initiated, which entailed purchasing of various types of major equipment such as aircraft, armoured cars and naval elements.¹ As South Africa became increasingly isolated due to the race-based policies of the National Party, so provision was made for manufacturing armaments locally to make South Africa as independent as possible from foreign sources. The expansion of the armaments industry was in fact so successful, that within a decade the Army had been completely re-equipped with clothing, weapons, vehicles and communication equipment from own sources (RSA, 1971:7). By 1988, the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armcor) had grown to the tenth largest exporter of arms in the world (Reichardt & Cilliers, 1996a:249).

Although the focus of the SADF during the sixties remained against an external aggressor in the form of a conventional assault, the military was repeatedly used in support of the police during the states of emergency in 1960, 1976 and during the mid-eighties. But at this stage, operations against both the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC) *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, formed in 1964, and the Pan Africanist Congress' (PAC) Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), who had embarked on a campaign of armed resistance against the state, were the concern of the South African Police (Sass, 1996:124). Later, these organisations were forced into exile and sought bases in friendly countries, the ANC in Zambia and the PAC first in Lesotho and then in Tanzania. During this period both the ANC and PAC, considerably weakened by the arrest of many of their leaders under the Suppression of Communism Act, (1950)² and Terrorism Act (1967) and having to operate in exile, did not pose a threat to the South African government. It was only with the collapse of white rule in Angola (1974), Mozambique in (1975) and Zimbabwe in (1979) that they could consolidate their strength and would become the target of cross-border attacks by the SADF (Worden, 1994:114-5).

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1. With the exception of Centurion tanks and a number of armoured troop carriers procured in the early fifties, all Army equipment dated from World War II (RSA, 1971:7).
 2. The Suppression of Communism Act gave the Minister of Justice the power to ban any person or organisation viewed as "Communist". A broad definition which gave the government the scope to arrest and detain almost anyone who was considered a threat to the "apartheid" state.

6.3.2 The seventies and the total onslaught

The long perceived communist threat assumed greater reality and urgency in the course of the 1970s. The military began talking of a "*total onslaught*" on the Republic both from outside and within the country. Up until then, the SADF's military posture was primarily defensive and not offensive. But this soon changed as passive defence was perceived as inadequate and the need for retaliatory and interdictory capability was deemed necessary (RSA, 1973:3).

The National Party's determination to retain Namibia, possibly as a fifth province, resulted in the SADF's engagement from 1972 in counter-insurgency operations against the *South West African People's Organisation* (Swapo), who were based in Angola and Zambia (Fourie, 1996:160). Initially these operations were classical counter-insurgency operations against rural guerrillas, but in time the scope and intensity of the SADF activities increased. With the outbreak of full-scale civil war in Angola, South Africa lent their support to Unita (*Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola*), one of the most friendly anti-colonial movements in Angola in an attempt to impede Swapo. During this period, the SADF had become involved in an escalating war by proxy, initially in support of the Portuguese colonial power and Renamo (*Resistencia Nacional Mozambicana*) in Mozambique and, then in Rhodesia and former South West Africa. This involvement led to an escalation of conflict in the region and by the mid-seventies, Cuban and Soviet support for the MPLA (*Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola*) increased to halt the advance of the Unita/SADF alliance (Seegers, 1996:210-216; Fourie 1996:160).

The number of armed confrontations between these forces during the seventies and particularly during the eighties in southern Angola increased substantially, until the decisive battle of Cuito Caunavale in 1988, where for the first time since the war the SADF did not reach their objective (Seegers, 1996:256-8).

6.3.3 The eighties and the escalation of internal unrest

During the eighties, internally, South Africa had become engulfed in a rising tide of popular, mass-based resistance to apartheid. The labour unrest of 1973 and subsequent urban unrest caught the government by surprise. Particularly after the Soweto riots in 1976, the spiral of resistance against apartheid intensified, culminating in the state of emergencies in the mid-eighties. In the face of virtual civil war the state retained control merely through military force. The battlefield of the SADF now shifted to within the borders of South Africa. A defence budget which rose steadily during the sixties and seventies, reaching a

peak in 1989 at 3,4 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), most of which went on internal deployment alongside the police (Sass, 1996:134; Worden, 1994:131).

During this period, the SAP and particularly the SADF, began to play an increasingly assertive role through the National Security Management System (NSMS) as part of the "*total strategy*"³ to counter the "*total onslaught*". Through the State Security Council (SSC) and a system of Joint Management Centers (JMC) the government was able to identify sources of unrest and conflict in the early stages, and co-ordinate the functioning of all government departments below cabinet level. The growing political influence of the military in these structures often led to accusations that the SADF was becoming an "*alternative government, with its activities regarded as manifestations of a 'creeping military take over'*"⁴ (Sass, 1996:129). There can be no doubt that during the P.W. Botha era the military had, indeed, become central to state power.⁵

Despite the attempts to step up security, the initiation of the "*winning hearts and minds*"⁶ campaign and the meager attempts at reform by the National Party which attempted to remove some of the grievances revolutionaries could exploit, the country had become ungovernable by the mid-eighties (Wood, 1995:15). The inability of the security forces to contain the internal unrest, the growth of the black resistance movements, the increase in support for the exiled ANC and the infiltration of ANC guerrillas into the country, the growing strength of the trade union movement and their central role in co-ordinating the Mass Democratic Movement's mass civil disobedience campaigns, as well as international sanctions all eventually added up and led to the demise of the apartheid state (Worden, 1994:133).

By the end of the eighties, negotiations and settlements in South-West Africa/Angola, which had been subject to much debate within the United Nations, reached a climax. Hostilities ended with the United

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3. The 1977 Defence White Paper defined the total strategy as "[t]he comprehensive plan to utilize all the means available to a state according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims within the framework of specific policies". The foreign policy, internal policy and defence policy would all be synchronised as a total strategy to counter the total onslaught against the state. A counter-strategy was needed to combat this total onslaught and this paved the way for the military to involve itself with major decision making on both foreign and domestic matters (Geldenhuys, 1984:140).
 4. The SADF can even be accused of praetorianism during this period as the military tended (even though by consent) to dominate National Party politics. Perlmutter (1980:208) defines one of the features of the praetorian army and the praetorian state as one where the army dominates an independent political organisation. They also state that such political involvement will to some extent destroy the professional status and rank of the military profession.
 5. The SADF can even be accused of praetorianism during this period as the military tended (even though by consent) to dominate National Party politics.
 6. In both townships and the rural areas the SADF was deployed in community schemes in a campaign to win the hearts and minds of people, but this scheme soon failed once the security forces started to suppress opposition (Worden, 1994:124). This involvement of the SADF in an internal role also had a very negative affect on the legitimacy of the military in the eyes of the broader populace (Nathan, 1989a:71).

Nations Resolution 435, which set out the eventual withdrawal of both South African and Swapo forces as well as the Cubans from Angola. The Namibian settlement also meant that the ANC lost its base camps in Angola and faced virtually no prospect of re-establishing elsewhere in Southern Africa (Guelke, 1996:89). The independence of Namibia in 1990, together with the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, created the climate for the political reform that was to follow.

6.3.4 The nineties and redefining security

After decades of government pursuit of the policy of preventing at all cost the accession to power of the ANC and the South African Communist Party, the 1990s would see an about turn on previous policy with the unbanning of these organisations in February 1990. Within a matter of a few years, from 1990 to 1994, the mission of the military changed from that of countering a communist threat, and weakening the ability of neighbouring countries to support the low level insurgency campaign of the ANC, to that of a military literally in search of a mission. Massive budgetary cuts followed with the defence budget being slashed from 3,4 percent of the GDP in 1989 to 2,2 percent of GDP by 1995, a reduction of close to 66 percent in real terms in a matter of six years (Sass, 1996:134).

The realisation that there was no conceivable prospect of an external threat led to a total rethink of security. In 1994 with the formation of the SANDF, the tasks of the future defence force as defined in the Interim Constitution included the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the RSA; to fulfil South Africa's international obligations; to preserve life, health and property; to provide to maintain essential services; to uphold law and order in co-operation with the South African Police Service and to support socio-economic upliftment. In the final 1996 Constitution, these tasks are simply defined as follows in Section 200 (2): *"the primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force"*. Section 201 (2) also makes provision for the President may authorise the employment of the defence force *"(a) in co-operation with the police service; (b) in defence of the Republic; or (c) in fulfilment of an international obligation"*. The clauses relating to the preservation of life, health and property and to provide and maintain essential services and support socio-economic upliftment were not included in the final 1996 Constitution.

While the SANDF continues to budget and design its force structure for its primary function, its main use may be in a collateral utility, configured around non-traditional roles and secondary functions. These

include regional security, peace operations, aid to the police, protection of the civil power against unconstitutional action, border and maritime protection and disaster relief. As Fourie (1996:176) states, "[a]t this stage in the history of South Africa the SANDF faces the dilemma not necessarily of justifying its existence, but certainly its expenditure, size, sophistication and significance. While the object proposed for the new constitution is that it 'shall be the defence and protection of the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people ... guided by the principle of non-aggression', there is little reason at present to anticipate the need for such defence". Against this background the SANDF faces the challenge of having to design a force structure, in the absence of any threat against which to plan, and within the confines of a decreasing defence budget.

6.4 FORCE STRUCTURE AND MANPOWER PROCUREMENT SYSTEM

During the period under review, the entire manpower procurement system was adapted to counter the perceived threat of a communist invasion. The combat capacity of the SADF, particularly its part-time component, was either expanded or contracted depending upon the external threat or level of political instability within the country.

The military appreciation in the sixties led to a considerable expansion of the Permanent and Citizen Force. With respect to the Permanent Force, it is of interest to note that throughout the history of the SADF it experienced problems in recruiting and retaining suitably qualified personnel. As indicated in the 1973 Defence White Paper, even though personnel turnover decreased slightly with the improved service conditions and other benefits, "... the loss in certain musterings is still too great ... there is a great drainage towards the private sector. This is of grave concern" (RSA, 1973:20). The low salaries and service conditions of the SADF in comparison to the private sector seemed to be the main problem in recruiting suitable personnel (RSA, 1982:15).

The demands for high quality manpower were partly overcome by the recruitment of white women. Motivated primarily out of need to release white men for operational duties, women were appointed on a permanent basis in supportive musterings such as finance, personnel, logistics, intelligence, medical service and welfare since 1970. Similarly the recruitment of Blacks, Indians and Coloureds into the Permanent Force was motivated by manpower shortages (RSA, 1977:31). Whereas they only initially served in non-combat positions in the early sixties, this changed in the seventies. In 1973 a black combat unit was created and 1979 established a number of ethnic units, attached to the various regional commands. By early 1986, Blacks

represented 12 percent, Coloureds 11 percent, Indians 1 percent and whites 76 percent of the Full-time Force component of the SADF (RSA, 1986:17; Sass, 1996:123). The civilian component also increased during this period in an effort to release regular military personnel for operational service.

Table 6.1: Desired and actual manpower needs of the SADF

	Desired percentage	Actual percentage
<i>In full-time service</i>		
Permanent force	13,5	7,0
National servicemen	12,5	6,6
Civilians	4,5	3,1
Total	30,5	16,7
<i>In part-time service</i>		
Citizen force	34,8	54,9
Commandos	34,7	28,4
Total	69,5	83,3
Grand Total	100	100

Source: RSA, 1977:18.

But it was white male conscription that provided the source of manpower. In 1960 the Citizen Force was supplemented by means of a ballot system applicable to all young white males. Since then, the number of white males called up through the ballot system was increased from 11 759 in 1962 to 19 513 in 1965. With the introduction of compulsory national service for all white males of eighteen years and older in 1968, the annual intake rose to 26 357 in 1970, an annual intake figure that could not be increased without extending conscription to women and other races (RSA, 1971:6). Although the conscription of women was considered at one stage, this never materialised (Cock, 1989:65). Instead, the period of conscription was increased to meet the manpower needs (see Table 6.1). From 1978 to 1989 the period of national service was lengthened to two years. Following the completion of this initial period of service, conscripts were allocated to units in the Citizen Force Reserve or Commandos to serve an additional 720 days over a period of twelve years. By the late eighties, white conscription provided an annual intake of roughly 20 000 conscripts and the estimated number of part-time members available for call-up to be around 500 000 (Sass, 1996:126).

In January 1990, after the unbanning of the ANC and other political organisations, the period of conscription was reduced to twelve months, and finally discontinued at the end of 1993. Mention must be made of the fact that since the mid-seventies and particularly during the eighties with the deployment of troops in the townships, resistance to conscription grew and fewer recruits were reporting for duty (Nathan, 1989b:15-17; Shaw, 1994:230).

With the end of conscription and to bridge manpower shortages, a system of “*term volunteers*” was introduced, where persons could join the SADF for a period of two, four or more years. Just prior to the formation of the SANDF the full-time force consisted of a Permanent Force of about 35 000 (45 percent), an Auxiliary force of around 9000 (12 percent), Term-Volunteers, 3 000 (4 percent) and civilians 29 000 (38 percent) of the Full-time Force (Du Plessis, 1993:19). These figures would swell to around 135 000 with the formation of the SANDF and the integration of former statutory forces of the SADF, Transkei Defence Force (TDF), Bophutatswana Defence Force (BDF), Venda Defence Force (VDF) and the Ciskei Defence Force (CDF), the former non-statutory military forces Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the Azanian Peoples Liberation Army (APLA) (Modise, 1995:49). As the SANDF has become essentially a peacetime military, force numbers are to be reduced to around 90 000 or possibly less, depending on budgetary constraints. Once the process of integration is complete, the process of rationalisation and demobilisation, which is already underway, will be finalised.

The Minister of Defence summarised the envisaged force composition of the SANDF as follows: “... *South Africa's basic defence strategy is to have a relatively small affordable 'core force'* consisting of elements of the full-time and part-time components ... backed by a sufficiently large part-time component” (Modise, 1995:49). The Full-time Force (FTF) and Part-time Force (PTF) component of the SANDF was as at November 1996, is reflected in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2: SANDF Personnel Service System (November 1996)

Personnel Service System	Number	Percentage
Full-time Force		
Long term service	46 516	46
Medium-term service	3 304	3
Short-term service	27 612	27
Auxiliary service	482	-
Civilians	23 151	23
Total Full-time Force	101 066	100
Part-time Force ⁸		
Voluntary military service	2 014	2
Conventional force	9 000	9
Territorial force	85 211	89
Total Part-time Force	96 225	100

Source: Directorate Personnel Planning, Personnel Division SANDF

7. The “*core force*” concept is intended to ensure that the Regular Force and the PTF constitute an integrated Defence Force which is capable of defending the Republic. The Regular Force and the PTF together provide the SANDF’s core capabilities which can be expanded if required by calling the trained part-time volunteers into service (Bakkes ,1997:10).

8. The term “*part-time force*” is a new and inclusive name for previously separate part-time components, namely the Citizen Force (which may be tasked to operate anywhere) and the Commandos (which are usually tasked to operate on an area-bound basis). Although in statute the part-time forces are still called the Citizen and Commando forces, the former Citizen Force is referred to as the Conventional Force and the former Commandos, including some of the Citizen Force Counter-insurgency Citizen Units (COIN), the Territorial Force.

The integration of the TBVC and non-statutory forces brought about a radical change in the racial composition of the SANDF. The racial composition had already changed significantly by 1993, with Blacks making up 35 percent, Asians 1 percent, Coloureds 15 percent and Whites 48 percent (Du Plessis, 1993:16). By November 1996 the racial composition for the FTF uniformed component was Blacks 56 percent, Asians 1 percent, Coloureds 9 percent and Whites 34 percent.⁹

As Constitutional provisions forbid discrimination on the grounds of race and gender, women can now be trained and employed on the same basis as men, and all combat musterings are now accessible to women. However, white males still dominate the senior ranks within the SANDF, with women making up a mere 11 percent (excluding civilians) of the FTF component of the SANDF.

The future all-volunteer SANDF shall consist of a relatively small FTF, backed by sufficiently large voluntary PTF (SANDF, 1996a:34). The full-time component is to maintain the SANDF infrastructure (headquarters, bases, depots, training establishments) and supply the leadership, expertise, planning for operations as well as combat commanders at selected levels. The part-time component is to supply and maintain the SANDF conventional and territorial forces and reserves for full-time deployment.

A voluntary Flexible Service System has been introduced to serve as the future manpower procurement system for the FTF. At present this service system consists of three different manning components. The Long-term Service System (LTS) aims to supply manpower with advanced functional and managerial skills to man the top structure of the SANDF. The member's appointment, unlike the other service systems is of a permanent nature and stretches until retirement age. In future, only those who have served in the Medium-term Service System, former Permanent Force members or members of the part-time component holding the ranks of Staff Sergeant to Sergeant Major, or Major and higher may be admitted to the LTS.¹⁰ This system is available to all classifications in the occupational class, military practitioner¹¹, as well as to professional occupational classes (CSANDF, 1996c:1).

9. See Appendix A-1 for Department of Defence breakdown per rank, race and gender.

10. Upon integration, all former SADF and TBVC forces retained their short or long-term contracts. The former non-statutory force members enter into agreement with the SANDF according to the prevailing measures under the flexible service system. Their situation is basically the same as that of the former SADF with respect to combination of STS, MTS and LTS depending on their age, rank and previous period of proven service in MK or APLA. As is reflected in Appendix A-2 the vast majority of former MK and APLA members as at November 1996 have been integrated into the STS. This in effect means that they could be *technically* discharged by the SANDF by 1998 if their contracts are not renewed.

11. The term military practitioner is used to define all those persons who practice the profession of arms.

small, affordable “core force” consisting of elements of the full-time and part-time components, which could be expanded through the call-up of trained volunteers (Bakkes, 1996:5-6,10). How this will be achieved, is presently a subject of much debate.




Diagram 6.1: Proposed future manpower procurement system of the SANDF
Source: Defence Review Human Resources Sub-Committee, November 1996.

One of the greatest manning challenges of the SANDF under this all-volunteer system, is not attracting sufficient manpower, but the ability to recruit and retain members of the required quality to staff all the different components of a relatively technologically advanced, and sophisticated defence force. An all-volunteer force requires competitive conditions of service if it is to attract high quality recruits and secure a low rate of turn-over (Nathan, 1994:135). This has been a perpetual problem through the years, and is likely to become even more so under an all-volunteer system.

6.5 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

While the Department of Defence, consisting of the Ministry of Defence, Defence Secretariat and the SANDF has and still is undergoing substantial restructuring, the organisational structure of the SANDF,

(with the exception of the creation of the new Communication directorate and the Service Corps), has remained essentially the same as that of the SADF.

At present, the Chief of the SANDF¹³ (CNDF) under the direction of the Minister of Defence in times of peace and under the direction of the President during a state of national defence, exercises executive command and control over the SANDF and the four Arms of Service. The SANDF consists of four Arms of Service, the South African Army (SA Army), the South African Air Force (SAAF), the South African Navy (SAN), and since 1989, the South African Medical Services (SAMS). Defence headquarters as well as all the arms of service headquarters are in Pretoria. Also falling directly under the CNDF is the Chaplain General, Chief Communication Directorate, the Inspector General, Adjutant General and the newly created Service Corps (see Diagram 6.2).




Diagram 6.2: Organigram of the SANDF
Source: SANDF, 1994/5:9.

Defence headquarters are organised into six staff divisions, each being headed by a Chief of Staff, namely: personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics and finance, as well as an Independent Directorate of

13. The new 1996 Constitution, Section 202 (1) stipulates that "(1) The President as head of the national executive is Commander-in Chief of the defence force, and must appoint the Military Command of the defence force". This implies that in future there may not necessarily be a single commander or chief of the SANDF.

Management Services. Until recently, the Chief of Defence Force Staff collectively directed these staff divisions.¹⁴

The headquarters of the Arms of Service and their lower headquarters are organised along similar lines to that of Defence Headquarters. Every Arm of Service Headquarters has a personnel, operations, finance, intelligence, logistics division. All these divisions operate within the policy framework determined by Defence Headquarters and must ensure that the CNDF policies are administered and adhered to by the respective Arms of Service.

6.5.1 South African Army

In South Africa, the Army has always been the dominant and largest service within the SADF. This is because South African defence policy has invariably been orientated towards a landward threat, not a naval invasion. Nor has it been overly concerned with air power, apart from where it serves to supplement ground forces.

The mission of the SA Army has traditionally been defined as the rendering of landward military services to the Republic of South Africa. There are two main types of forces, the conventional and territorial forces. The Army Headquarters exercises direct command over the conventional forces and controls the territorial forces through a decentralised system of regional commands. The main function of the conventional force is to respond to sudden threats. It consists of a rapid deployment force (RDF) of both an airborne and ground component, both of which have the responsibility of neutralising any enemy threat within or outside the country's borders. This force consists of a number of highly mobile formations consisting of a tank and artillery regiment, mechanised infantry and motorised infantry battalions with supporting engineering and technical units.

The territorial force has ten regional commands and these are responsible mainly for rear area defence including border protection, support for the police, disaster relief and emergency deployment within their area. In time of war they are also responsible for rear-area security operations. Each command has a

14. This post, previously filled by Lt Genl Sipiwe Nyanda has been rationalised. A process is also underway to restructure the entire Defence Headquarters, including the headquarters of the Arms of Service in order to do away with the duplication of functions. This process is due to be completed in the course of 1997.

number of light-infantry battalions, especially geared for counter-insurgency type of warfare (SANDF, 1996a:2-8; Romer-Heitman, 1994:34).

The personnel composition of the SA Army is reflected in Table 6.3. Presently, the SA Army is experiencing a high level of resignations among its members, particularly at the junior leader and middle management levels. According to Fourie (1996:171) *"the most serious effect has been the loss of instructors who would have been able to raise the professional levels of the newcomers"*. The full-time component of the SA Army has also been subject to the loss of various skills through resignations and retirements, which in turn has had a negative effect on morale (SANDF, 1994/4:68).

While the SA Army is experiencing a rapid loss of skilled personnel, there is an oversupply of members for the STS, a relatively unskilled manpower component. The refusal of the SANDF to renew the contract period of many black short-term soldiers has led to strikes, and demonstrations by these members. The non-renewal of contracts is largely due to the integration of former non-statutory force members into the lower skilled STS (Fourie, 1996:171). Actual rationalisation can only commence after the integration process is complete, and this is one of the main reasons why present contracts are not being renewed.

Table 6.3: Personnel Service Systems per Arm of Service (November 1996)

	Army		Air Force		Navy		SAMS	
	N	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Full-time force								
Long-term service	28 791	44	7 433	53	3 543	39	4 928	55
Medium-term service	1 293	2	717	5	748	8	465	5
Short-term service	23 176	35	2 389	17	1 161	14	713	8
Auxiliary service	356	-	15	-	31	-	60	1
Civilians	12 317	19	3 419	25	3 536	39	2 753	31
Total full-time force	65 933	100	13 973	100	9 019	100	8 919	100
Part-time force								
Voluntary Military Service	1 937	2	-	-	74	10	1	-
Conventional force	6 591	7	481	100	662	90	1 264	100
Territorial force	84 896	91	-	-	0	-	0	-
Total part-time force	93 424	100	481	100	736	100	1 265	100

Source: Directorate Personnel Planning, Personnel Division SANDF.

As reflected in Table 6.3, the largest part of the SA Army consists of the conventional and territorial units with a substantial portion of the conventional warfare capability residing in the PTF. These units are also trained in secondary roles. The territorial units form the largest part of the operational forces of the regional commands and consist mainly of light infantry elements. In peace-time these units may perform

secondary role in co-operation with the local community, local authorities, and the South African Police Service (Bakkes, 1997:7).

With respect to both uniformed and civilian employees the SA Army has experienced increasing pressure in the field of labour relations, which is being exacerbated by the incorporation of civilians under the New Labour Relations Act as well as the impact of the Constitution, that guarantees certain fundamental rights to every citizen (SANDF, 1994/5: 70-71). The fact that the SA Army will be most affected by future rationalisation adds to the labour relations challenges of the future. As Seegers (1996:280) highlights “... *the SANDF has encountered two big problems simultaneously, integration and a desperate popular need for employment in a local and international context unfavourable to large military forces*”. It is as she states “*the cruelest of dilemmas*” and is a problem that is predominantly one that the SA Army has to manage.

6.5.2 South African Air Force

The South African Air Force (SAAF) is tasked with protecting the air space of the Republic, through the conduct of air operations to prevent an air attack, and to provide air support for ground forces. This was a role the SAAF fulfilled quite extensively in Southern Angola, where the Army, with the support of the Air Force could operate under an almost continual hostile air situation. Its secondary objectives include among others to provide military air transport, to act in support of civil authorities in protecting lives, health and property and to assist and co-operate with other friendly air forces and institutions (SANDF, 1996a:2-9). The SAAF already has a long history of search and rescue missions and of flying relief supplies to neighbouring countries, and this is likely to increase if South Africa takes on a growing regional role.

Unlike the SA Army, the SAAF is run as a centralised organisation, with most of its elements reporting directly to Air Force Headquarters in Pretoria. The exception is that its squadrons fall under the command of their bases for administrative and support purposes. Operationally, all squadrons are controlled by the Air Force Command Post. The Southern Air Force Command Post in Cape Town is responsible for co-ordinating operations with the SA Navy and has particular responsibility for coastal search and rescue. Forward Air Force Command Post is co-located with the SA Army regional commands, to facilitate joint operations.

The SAAF is almost exclusively manned by Permanent Force LTS members, with some contract volunteers and civilian assistance personnel (see Table 6.3). Especially since the formation of the SANDF, the

SAAF has experienced an unacceptably high resignation rate amongst its pilots. This seems to be spilling over to other occupational classes such as aircrew, airspace controllers, engineers, and technicians as well as supporting service groups.

Granted the high cost involved in training airforce flight personnel, the SAAF hopes that the new flexible service system will ensure the required return on investment. It is envisaged that in future the STS will represent 17 percent of the SAAF's human resources, the MTS 73 percent and the LTS 10 percent (SANDF, 1994/5:84).

As reflected in table 6.3 the part-time force component of the SAAF is small. There are nine part-time force volunteer air squadrons in the SAAF, responsible for communication and reconnaissance flight. These volunteers are trained and tested by the SAAF to Air Force standards. Other part-time force pilots and experts in technical and professional disciplines also render support to the regular force (Bakkes, 1997:8).

6.5.3 South African Navy

The South African Navy (SAN) is the smallest of the three combat services. If compared with most foreign navies, the SAN is mainly a coastal force, equipped for close defence of South African territorial waters.

Even though the primary role of the SAN is to conduct naval operations to defend the RSA, it also performs some very important secondary functions including search and rescue, protection of maritime natural resources, monitoring ships around the Cape, sea transportation and diplomatic support. In the last few years, such diplomatic services have included assisting Namibia with fisheries patrols, Zaire with the reconstruction of harbour facilities, Mozambique with coastal surveys and transported relief supplies to both Kenya and Mozambique (Romer-Heitman, 1994:36). The SAN also contributes towards research and development in the maritime field, by providing hydrographic services such as survey and mapping of the almost 3 000 km coastline, navigation publications and oceanographic services (SANDF, 1994/5:93).

The Chief of the Navy is in command of the SA Navy. Ships are grouped in flotillas¹⁵ which, together with bases at Simonstown and Durban and other naval units, are commanded by Chief of Naval Operations at

15. These include a strike craft flotilla, a submarine flotilla, mine countermeasures flotilla, and three independent ships, the hydrographic survey ship, SAS Protea and the combat support ships SAS Drakensberg and SAS Outeniqua.

Naval Headquarters. Chief of Naval Operations is the designated ship operating authority and as such exercises operational command over all operations conducted by Navy ships. Also at Naval Headquarters, is the Chief of Naval Support, responsible for support functions such as personnel, logistics, finance and planning (SANDF, 1996a:2-10).

There are also a number of PTF units trained to supplement the FTFs in time of emergency or conflict. These part-time force members are used to reinforce and sustain the wartime complement of the SAN; staff ships and submarines, SAN shore establishments and to perform tasks such as port and coastal defence, including naval control of shipping and the staffing of harbour and coastal defence vessels (Bakkes, 1997:8).

As with the SAAF, the LTS component of the SAN is almost exclusively composed of uniformed Permanent Force members and civilians (see Table 6.3). Most of the civilians are employed at the Naval Dockyard in Simonstown and are responsible for the repair and maintenance of ships (SANDF, 1994/4:99). Although the SAN did not experience a significant drain in skilled manpower, if compared to the SAAF, shortages have been experienced with respect to operational and technical personnel. The SAN has also experienced labour relations problems among civilian employees in the Naval Dockyard, which has serious implications for the operational effectiveness of the SAN.

6.5.4 South African Medical Services

The South African Medical Services (SAMS) was formed as a separate Arm of Service in 1979, to provide comprehensive medical care for all members of the Defence Force and for the dependants of Permanent Force members. The secondary mission is to provide medical support for other departments, including the Police and the Department of Correctional Services and third mission, to support emergency and disaster-relief operations, and to assist the civil medical authorities where necessary (Romer-Heitman, 1994:36).

Command and control, as with the SA Army, is exercised on a decentralised basis through a system of regional medical commands. Officers commanding the various commands are responsible for the execution of the SAMS mission within their geographical boundaries. Some of the specialist Permanent Force Units that render a country wide service, or that are of specific strategic value such as the SAMS Academy, Medical Base Depot, the SAMS Technical Support Unit and the Institute for Aviation Medicine

and Military Psychological Institute, fall directly under the command of SAMS Headquarters (SANDF, 1994/5:108). So do the three Part-time Force units which are deployed with the operational forces.

Concerning personnel, the biggest problem experienced is that the medium-term system is not yet in place. Many of the SAMS personnel are professionals with marketable skills outside the SANDF. This possibly explains why, during this period of uncertainty with respect to their future careers, why there has been such a high personnel turnover in medical officers and nursing staff, resulting in a turn over of 16 percent and 23,3 percent respectively (SANDF, 1994/5:115). SAMS also employs a large number of civilians in the three Military Hospitals. Many of these civilians now belong to the National Education Health and Allied Workers Union and during the past two years, SAMS has experienced a number of strikes and stayaways, all related to wage disputes, culminating in over 1433 lost man days.

6.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The South African armed forces owe their beginnings, professionalism, culture and traditions to the former Union Defence Force. The SADF developed along British traditions and is comparable to most European armed forces in structure, function and professionalism, even today.

This is particularly true with respect to counterinsurgency and even conventional warfare, in which it gained considerable experience since the sixties. In the past three decades, the entire force structure and manpower procurement system, based on white male conscription was geared to counter a "*communist onslaught*" against the RSA, both from outside and within the country. During this period the SADF enjoyed a privileged position within society, and by the eighties was central to state power.

With the settlement in former South West Africa and the start of negotiations in 1990, which would eventually culminate in the first democratic elections in South Africa, the mission and position of the military in society would change dramatically. The realisation that there was no conceivable prospect of an external threat and with a new political dispensation being forged, the future tasks of the defence force were redefined to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with international principles. Only the President may authorise employment of the SANDF in Cupertino with the police and in the fulfilment of international obligations, such as peacekeeping operations.

With no clear mission and no perceived threat, force levels need to be reduced. With the formation of the SANDF in 1994, a flexible service system was introduced which catered for both a full-time and part-time component. With respect to this manpower procurement system, there are two main future concerns. The first relates to the management and training of the part-time forces who are expected to form the largest component of the new "*core force*". The second, the ability of the SANDF to attract and retain the necessary skilled personnel, while coping with the relative oversupply of unskilled persons, hoping to secure a renewal of their short-term contracts. Although the SANDF is undergoing a major structural transformation, it will no doubt move forward from the foundation created by the former SADF.

The SA Army faces the major challenges. It has the largest component of short-term service personnel, has had to absorb the greatest proportion of former non-statutory force members, and is more reliant on the Part-time Forces than the other Arms of Service. The SAN, SAAF and SAMS are more dependent on long-service (permanent force) members and on civilians. The main manpower problems experienced by these arms of service are the ability to retain and maintain sufficiently high quality manpower. Another is coping with the increase in labour unrest among both uniformed and civilian employees.

CHAPTER SEVEN

MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED FORCES

7.1 INTRODUCTION

Prior to the formation of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), the "*professionalism of the SADF*" was subject to much debate. The South African Defence Force (SADF) considered itself a first rate professional military, and regarded the possibility of integrating "*revolutionary forces*", who lacked the level and type of training required of a professional force, as a threat to the integrity of the future armed forces (Griffiths, 1995:402). They, (the SADF), were after all, "*superior military specialists*" operating sophisticated equipment, not a revolutionary army with no conventional training (Seegers, 1996:271).

The debate surrounding the professionalism of the future South African armed forces raised much concern and centred, not only around the level of expertise, standards and level of training of the former non-statutory forces to be integrated, but also more normative aspects of military professionalism. This led to certain principles being enshrined in both the Interim Constitution, as well as the Defence White Paper.

In this chapter, it will be illustrated that the former SADF conformed to most of the criteria outlined by McKinlay (1971) as characteristics of a professional military. The five dimensions of professionalism, namely, the degree of generalised and systematic knowledge; the institutional autonomy to exercise control over their sphere of activity; corporatism and loyalty to the profession and bureaucracy; the internal controls and internal affective neutrality imposed on members; and the commitment to professional social ethics and external affective neutrality, are discussed with reference to the South African armed forces.

Within this professional/institutional framework, it is explained why labour relations is managed from a typically unitarist perspective. The mechanisms that are in place to resolve grievances, complaints and dissatisfactions, as well as the reaction to the possibility of unionisation is discussed.

7.2 THE DIMENSION OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

This section discusses the dimensions of the military profession as outlined by McKinlay (1971), with reference to the South African Armed forces, in both historic and contemporary times.

7.2.1 A high degree of generalised and systematic knowledge

One of the essential elements of a profession is that it must encompass a "*high degree of generalised and systematic knowledge*", based on a complex of intellectual advancements. Education and training programmes are considered the cardinal means of building and maintaining a high degree of professionalism.

The SADF has always prided itself in its level of expertise and considered itself a first-rate professional military, especially in counterinsurgency (Griffiths, 1995:402). As with the SADF, the responsibility for training in the SANDF resorts with the Chief of the SANDF (CNDF), who may delegate this training to the Chiefs of the various arms of service or Chiefs of Staff Divisions.

According to Rutsch (1996:1), the SANDF in comparison with other state departments has the largest training responsibility. Over 2000 formal courses are presented per annum, ranging from military development courses to courses in war fighting skills. While some of the course content of the various education and training institutions in the SANDF is under revision, the general training and system of education strives to ensure that the defence force has sufficiently trained personnel, with adequate skills to execute the primary and secondary functions.

On joining the Defence Force, all members undergo basic military training, which provides the newly appointed member with basic military skills and an understanding of the military culture and values. Basic military training is applicable to all functional disciplines and to all arms of service. This initial phase of training lasts about three months, and consists of an orientation phase where members are exposed to the unique requirements of the particular arm of service and training in basic military subjects such as military law, security, military culture and traditions. The second phase of basic training is functional in nature, and is given to all newly appointed members at a level corresponding to their initial post appointment. Such training is not related to a specific task but is transferable to a variety of tasks.

After basic training members undergo functional training, equipping them to undertake tasks in a specific area, unit, or for the operation of specific equipment. Functional task training is provided at an operational or supporting unit and includes formal, in-formal and on-the job-training (SANDF, 1996b:4-9). As the members progress through the ranks, all must attend more specialist courses in their respective mustering. This training is normally provided in a functional training unit. In certain areas where training is similar to that provided in the private and public sectors, members are sent to these outside training institutions. These typically, include those providing apprenticeship training. Concerning officer training, all selected for the officer corps have to undergo formative training, prior to attending functional training, more specific to their mustering.

Every arm of service has a number of highly differentiated feeder organisations involved in developing the skills of the military personnel. For example, the SA Army has fourteen Corps Schools training military personnel in different specialist areas or musterings. In addition, courses are presented within the various regional commands and at various specialist units. These units and schools provide training in staff duties, intelligence work, field security and techniques of warfare. The SA Air Force (SAAF) has similar specialist training structures, such as the Air Force Flying Schools that are supplemented by a number of regional flying schools. There are also specialist training schools for air navigators and for those specialising in air control, and radio operators. The South African Navy (SAN) has specific schools to equip its personnel to operate the ships. The South African Medical Services (SAMS) too has a number of specialist courses, most of which are now presented at the centralised SAMS Academy (Frankel, 1984:10-11; Rutsch, 1996: 1-2).

While some of these courses apply to both officers and non-commissioned officers, all officers have to attend the various arms of service staff colleges. The following distinction can be made between officer and non-commissioned officer training. The latter's training is more functional and can be compared to that of a craftsman, or specialist in a specific trade. Officer training includes functional training but is directed towards the development of the leadership skills of the officer, who can be compared to that of a manager within the organisation. After basic training, the officer first undergoes formative training, followed by courses specific to their chosen mustering. Before the officer can be promoted to the rank of Major or equivalent they must complete the Junior Staff Course, and to be promoted to the rank of Colonel, a Senior Command and Staff Course, which lasts approximately a year. Hereafter, selected senior officers who are being prepared for the command echelon and who will be appointed in the command and staff

divisions, attend the Joint Staff Course, where they are taught the principles of national security and military strategy¹ (RSA, 1984:14).

Depending on the needs of the Defence Force, certain selected officers are sent to universities, technical colleges, technicians and other tertiary training institutions. The most outstanding junior officers who have completed their formative training, and who have the academic potential, are sent to the South African Military Academy to obtain a Bachelors degree in Military Science. All officers in the SANDF are encouraged not only to complete their military courses, but to broaden their knowledge by obtaining further tertiary qualifications. In 1994/5 in the SA Army alone, 1101 members attended tertiary education institutions amounting to a cost of 2,4 million² (SANDF, 1994/5:66). It has become almost a prerequisite for those who aspire to the command echelon to have not only a graduate, but post-graduate qualification.

Currently the training and education of members of the SANDF is under revision, due to the changing mission definition, budgetary constraints, the challenges posed by the integration process, and the need to adapt training in order to maintain standards³ (Heinecken & Merts, 1995:32, 35-37).

7.2.2 Institutional Autonomy

Institutional autonomy as criteria for military professionalism refers to the ability of the profession to exercise control over its own sphere of activity or competence. In the past, when the Union Defence Force was established, the Commandant General (chief of the UDF) was the chief executive officer, responsible to the Minister of Defence, for the implementation of ministerial policy with respect to command, control, organisation, discipline and training. A Secretary of Defence acted as accounting officer, directly responsible to the Minister of Defence for the implementation of ministerial policy with respect to financial administration. This division of functions and responsibilities between the Commandant General and the Secretary of Defence was officially dissolved in 1966, when overall control of the Department of Defence

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1. See Appendix B for a summary of an officers career path indicating professional advancement of a typical officer serving in the SANDF. This table was drawn up with the assistance of Lt Col N. Slabbert and Maj J. Moorhouse of the Military Training Branch at the Military Academy, Saldanha.
 2. This includes members studying at the Military Academy, but excludes the attendance of seminars/symposia and short courses attended by members of the SANDF.
 3. The question of standards have raised much debate. In future, standards in training are linked to three criteria: functional competency to perform the work required; international standards as practiced by modern developed military forces; and statutory standards as laid down by statutory bodies, such as medical councils, apprenticeship boards (Rutsch, 1996:3).

was entrusted to the Commandant General as Department Head. One of the main reasons given for this decision was that the division of functions created problems and “... led to a considerable duplication of work with resulting unsuitable employment of manpower” (RSA ,1971:18).

The dissolution of the Defence Secretariat in 1967 led to the re-organisation of the command and control structure of the SADF in 1970. Since the seventies, overall command of the SADF was vested in the Chief of the SADF (CSADF) who was accountable to the Minister of Defence for implementing the defence policy of the government of the day. As the most senior official in the department, the CSADF exercised control over all the Arms of service, directed the work of the divisions at Defence Headquarters, managed the overall functioning and operations of the defence force and was financially accountable for the department. Control of the SADF was exercised through centralised joint control system, the supreme, most authoritative and powerful decision making body being the Defence Command Council (DCC). The DCC was the highest command authority and was subject only to ministerial approval, while the Defence Staff Council (DSC) co-ordinated the defence staff's common and other multifaceted problems (Sass, 1996:132).

While the overall organisation of the Defence Force has remained essentially the same, the recreation of a civilian Defence Secretariat in 1994 places some limitations on the institutional autonomy of the CNDF. As was the case in the sixties, the new Defence Secretary is on equal footing with the CNDF and reports to the Minister of Defence.

Section 228 of the Interim Constitution,⁴ clearly outlines the current hierarchy of authority and control over defence matters since 1994. The executive power of the CNDF is subject to the direction of the Minister of Defence in times of peace, and under the direction of the President, during a state of national defence. The Minister of Defence is in turn, accountable to Parliament and Cabinet for the SANDF. Parliament has a range of significant powers with respect to military affairs, which enables it to assert democratic control over the armed forces and defence policy. The multi-party parliamentary defence committees have oversight over all security issues including the powers of investigation into matters concerning the budget, the functioning, organisation, armaments, policy, morale and state of preparedness of the SANDF (SANDF, 1996a:12). Based on the decisions of the elected officials of the state, serving on the parliamentary

4. Note that this is the current position. Section 202 of the new 1996 Constitution for the Republic of South Africa, states that “(1) [t]he President as head of the national executive is Commander-in-Chief of the defence force, must appoint the Military Command of the defence force. (2) Command of the defence force must be exercised in accordance with the directions of the Cabinet member responsible for defence, under the authority of the President”. The implication of this clause is that there may not be one single Chief of the SANDF as in the past.

defence committees, the Civilian Defence Secretariat formulates defence policy. The CNDF and his staff officers are not precluded from the process of policy formulation and decision-making on defence. Their input is assured through the Council on Defence, which consists of the Minister, the Deputy Minister, the CNDF and the Defence Secretary. This is the forum for institutional decision-making, concerning the entire Department of Defence (DoD). The Defence Staff Council, consisting of the CNDF and his deputy and the Secretary and his deputy, as well as various staff advisers, co-ordinate the staff functions in the DoD.

This system of civilian oversight of the armed forces places extensive limitations on the institutional autonomy of the SANDF. Nathan (1994:83) considers this subservience to civilian control an essential element of military professionalism, and states that “[v]irtually all authorities on civil military relations agree that military professionalism entails a critical element: the subordination and accountability of armed forces to the elected civil power”. This subordination ensures that the skills of the defence force are used only for socially approved purposes.

The Deed of Commission conferred upon the officer serving in the SADF to uphold the Constitution, and “... in the name of the Republic of South Africa, to serve his country as an officer with loyalty, courage, dignity and honour, to discharge his duties and responsibilities with zeal, diligence and to set a good example to those placed under his control” also serves to entrench individual commitment to the principle of civilian control (SANDF, 1994:2).

7.2.3 Corporatism

Corporatism grows from the sharing of unique skills (profession), and from the interest in maintaining high standards of applying these skills, as well as loyalty to the authority structure of the military. Officers are expected to be loyal not only to the nation they have sworn to protect but to their subordinates, their fellow officers, to their unit, and to their arm of service, and to display a commitment to professionalism and the maintenance of high personal standards.

Subordinates are expected to show respect to seniors, to obey all lawful commands and to trust that their leaders will never issue an unlawful command. While all members of the SANDF are obliged to comply with all lawful orders given by their superiors, both the Interim Constitution, Section 226 (7) and the new Constitution, Section 199 (6) states that a member of the SANDF shall have the right to refuse to execute

any order, if the execution of such an order would constitute an offence, or would breach international law on armed conflict on the Republic (RSA, 1996:85).

Some former SADF officers, who in the past have been subject to punishment under the Military Disciplinary Code if they disobeyed any lawful command given by a superior, dispute this provision in the Constitution. The opinion exists that this clause will undermine the soldier's willingness to fight, and will seriously erode military discipline and loyalty towards the chain of command. There are others again who maintain that this provision will reinforce subordination to civilian authority and promote mutual trust between officers and subordinates, built a culture of professionalism and promote respect for human rights among members of the SANDF (Nathan, 1994:89).

7.2.4 Internal control and internal affective neutrality

The notion of internal control and internal affective neutrality refers to the regulations, code of conduct, the set of values, norms and ethics that regulate the behaviour of professional soldiers. It is these regulations and codes of conduct that ensure a commitment to service in the interests of society, rather than in self-interest.

All former SADF as well as current SANDF members are required to adhere to a Code of Conduct.⁵ The military Code of Conduct refers to aspects of self-regulation that govern the professional behaviour of uniformed members to ensure operational effectiveness, as well as the respect and moral support from the society they serve. It includes a set of principles to which all members should aspire in both their official duties, and in their private lives, and includes certain ethical values such as, patriotism as reflected in the devotion to the interests of society; loyalty to one's superiors and subordinates; integrity and moral uprightness; teamwork by co-operation and sharing of common goals and values; discipline and obedience; respect for others; moral courage; dependability; military bearing; sense of responsibility; fair and just practices as well as other values which pertain to the social conduct of members (SANDF, 1996b: 3-5 - 3-13). Such principles are inculcated during training. For example, officers undergoing formative training at the Army Gymnasium take the following pledge. This pledge is as follows:

5. The Code of Conduct discussed in this section is based on the provisions included in the Military Disciplinary Code which is currently under review. The former SADF Code of Conduct and Disciplinary Code remains in effect until amended.

"As an officer I declare my awareness of the worthy tradition of the South African National Defence Force entrusted to uphold the principles embodied in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.

I accept, as a member of the Officers Corps, to live up to this awareness and with the highest standards of integrity, loyalty, obedience and allegiance.

As a member of the SA National Defence Force Officer Corps I promise:

- * never to seek my own advantage, but always to strive for the greatest well-being of my people and my country.*
- * to perform my responsibility and duty with nobility of spirit, conscientiousness, vigilance, fearlessness and determination.*
- * to place the needs of those under my command, above my own and to set a good example.*
- * to maintain service and use with utmost care and precision, the arms and equipment entrusted to me.*

I honour God with the highest praise and accept Him as the highest authority in my life, and His Word is my ultimate code of living.

My word is my trust of bond and will dedicate myself to uphold the spirit of this promise" (Army Gymnasium, 1996:29).

Not only officers, but non-commissioned officers have a similar creed or code of conduct.

Violations of the military Code of Conduct are punishable under the Military Discipline Code, especially where such transgressions affect military discipline. For example, riotous or unseemly behaviour carries a sentence of not exceeding six months imprisonment. False representation concerning rank (dishonesty), using threatening, insubordinate or insulting language, too, carries a sentence of a maximum of six months imprisonment on conviction. Other more serious punishable offences under the Code of Conduct include neglect of duty, assault, disobedience of lawful commands and orders, and damage to equipment (SANDF, 1996b:6-10, 6-13). The military legal system makes it possible for the military to exert internal control over its members, to maintain its own discipline and to solve its problems within a military milieu. To quote an example, in 1994/5, 5908 members were charged with absence without leave, 1411 for absence from duty, 1343 for disobeying orders and commands, 230 for neglect and 955 for drunkenness (SANDF, 1994/5:46).

Internal affective neutrality refers to the system of promotion based primarily on merit. In the former SADF, as well as the present SANDF, promotion and appointment to higher posts in the SANDF occurs according

to certain objective criteria. Promotion in rank is coupled to the member having completed the required service courses, the availability of posts and the suitability of the individual measured against military development requirements, military experience, the potential to exercise authority and to hold the post and qualifications and seniority.

This aspect of military professionalism is somewhat contentious at present, with respect to the political appointments that have been made. Sass (1996:138) for example, claims that former SADF members are leaving the Defence Force *"...as many regard the effects of affirmative action, namely the rapid promotion of unqualified, inexperienced black members (particularly those from the TBVC Defence Forces) as well as the appointment to senior and general officer rank of ex-MK leaders to newly created posts, as a direct threat to their careers"*. By means of *"fast-tracking"*⁶ an attempt is being made to ensure that these members obtain the required course qualifications and expertise to meet their rank and post profiles. In this regard, Nathan (1994:6) warns that should appointments in the future be made on the basis of party affiliation, personal loyalty or ethnic identity, it will *"... undermine any semblance of military professionalism"*.

7.2.5 Professional social ethic and external affective neutrality

Another important facet of professionalism, is the commitment to the social ethic of self-less service and external affective neutrality. Loyalty and commitment to serve, and to the nation, are considered the most desirable qualities of those who join the armed forces (Huntington, 1957:13; Downes, 1985:158).

In an Internal Communication Bulletin, the SANDF stated that members of the SANDF must submit to the basic ethics of soldiering and accept that certain fundamental rights, such as the principle of freedom of association, freedom of assembly, the right to demonstrate or strike and the right to life may have to be sacrificed (CSANDF, 1995:73). This sacrifice is made *"... in the interests of preserving those fundamental rights for all citizens who are not in the service of the military"*. According to the SANDF, the limitations on these fundamental rights are *reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society* as the Defence Force must be ready to serve the nation at any time (SANDF, 1994:15; CSANDF, 1995). Should individual self-interest be placed above duty and service in the SANDF, it is considered *"a misplaced military ethic"* (SANDF, 1994:3). Because employment in the military is considered a profession, members are expected

6. Fast-tracking refers to the priority placement of former non-statutory and TBVC members with potential on qualifying courses to gain the necessary experience. Members selected for fast tracking will, however, be subject to the same course qualifying requirements as any other member. (Rutsch, 1996:4).

not to place emphasis on pay and conditions of employment, as does the person who views his work merely as a job.

Another normative aspect of military professionalism concerns the *external affective neutrality* of the armed forces. This refers to the need to place limitations on the participation of military personnel in the activities or organisation of a political party. The politicisation of the armed forces in South Africa has been a major concern, as every military formation now integrated into the SANDF, carries some political baggage. Even the SADF, which always emphasised and to a great degree maintained political impartiality, was criticised as being an armed wing of the National Party during the P.W.Botha era. MK has close ties with the ANC, and APLA with the PAC, both revolutionary armies motivated by ideological convictions fighting for national liberation. The homeland armies have all been involved in coups, and have displayed distinct praetorian tendencies (Nathan, 1994:96). Section 199 (7) of the 1996 Constitution, however, states that “[n]either the security services, nor any of their members, may in the performance of their functions (a) prejudice a political party interest that is legitimate in terms of the Constitution; or (b) further in a partisan manner, any interest of a political party”. This does not imply that military personnel do not have the right to vote. What this clause does ensure is the political impartiality of the armed forces.

7.3 THE UNITARIST APPROACH TO LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE SANDF

If an assessment is made of the dimensions of military professionalism discussed in the preceding section, one may conclude that the SANDF in principle conforms to the criteria required of a professional military. A characteristic of such professional/institutional militaries, is that they manage labour relations from a typically unitarist perspective, especially where this pertains to the management of conflict within the organisation, the structures created to address grievances, and the reaction to trade unionism amongst their members.

Labour relations problems in the former SADF only really surfaced after the end of conscription with the shift to an all-volunteer force, and in recent years, has been identified as a “*strategic issue*” in the SANDF. In the face of an eroding defence budget, rationalisation of full-time members and restructuring, both Sass (1996:138) and Fourie (1996:178) indicate the possibility of unionisation and the need to create appropriate means to manage future labour relations problems.

This section outlines the current labour relations policy of the SANDF and its response to unionisation.

As mentioned under the discussion on military professionalism, the military has its own mechanisms to maintain discipline and to address offences by military members. Any uniformed member subject to the MDC may be tried by a competent military court for any offence listed under the MDC, (that is the First Schedule together with the Rules made under Section 104 (3) of the Defence Act as well as the principles and guidelines constrained in the judgements of the Supreme Court of the RSA). There are two categories of military courts - a court martial and a summary trial. A court martial is intended for more serious offences, while the summary trial, which can be compared to a disciplinary hearing, is for less serious offences. Typical offences include, the misuse of uniform, unauthorised use of information, illegal disclosure of information, and numerous other offences relating to aspects of military conduct and normal criminal offences (SANDF, 1996b:6:1-13).

Given the emphasis on loyalty and for members to channel grievances through the chain of command, it is obvious that any violation or intrusion into this unified structure from outside parties is met with resistance. A typical reaction of employers who manage labour relations from a unitarist, is to impose legal sanctions on trade union activities, and to improve the communication systems within the organisation, when faced with discontent among their employees. As will be illustrated, this too has been the response of the SANDF.

7.3.2 Communication structures for collective grievances

In 1995, after an increase in labour unrest among soldiers (from both the former statutory and non-statutory forces)⁸ the SANDF created a communication procedure to ensure effective bottom up communication to deal with work-related problems that cannot be channelled through the MDC. The MDC, Redress of Wrongs procedure does not cater for work-related problems of either an individual or collective nature. This communication structure is depicted in Diagram 7.1.

At unit level these forums represent different rank groups for officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers. The aim of these forums are to enable the respective groups to formulate proposals with respect to improvements in their conditions of service, identify problem areas and contribute towards the effectiveness and higher morale in the unit.

8. Labour unrest surfaced among the predominantly Black uniformed members during the integration phase at the Wallmannstal assembly point in 1994 (The Star, 1994b:1). In 1994, in another incident, a group of short term service members from the former APLA, MK and SADF marched up to the Union Buildings in September 1995 against the termination of their contracts and also to bring their grievances to the attention of the President. These soldiers were later charged with mutiny (Citizen, 1995:5).

Provision is also made within this procedure for the creation of a regional forum at command/base level. Officers commanding the respective units must meet at least once a month separately per arm of service/ staff division in a regional forum with the officer commanding of the command/base. The function of this forum is to consolidate proposals for the improvement of conditions of service, as well as, problem areas requiring correction, and that may require onward transmission to the Chief of Arm of Service or CNDF. A further function of the regional forums is to ensure that the unit forums receive feedback on all matters submitted to them within seven days.




Diagram 7.1: Communication structure for collective grievances, complaints and dissatisfaction for uniformed members

Source: Internal Labour Relations Directive.

The next level in this procedure is the Arm of Service Headquarters. An attempt is made at this level to resolve problems arising from the unit or regional forums within fourteen days. Should matters not be resolved, the Arm of Service must refer the issue to the relevant staff division.

The Staff Division must either resolve the matter or forward submissions to external role players such as the Public Service Commission, the Department of State Expenditure, the State Law Advisor or the Minister of Defence, within fourteen days. Hereafter, the relevant staff division will report on the progress made every fourteen days to the unit concerned, the regional headquarters and the Arm of Service Headquarters, until finality has been reached on the matter. A similar procedure exists for handling individual work related problems or dissatisfaction that cannot be lodged in terms of Section 134 of the Military Discipline Code.

While this structure does contribute towards bringing collective grievances and problems to the attention of higher authority, this structure has no dispute resolution mechanism. The lack of any statutory authority to resolve grievances has reduced its effectiveness and has meant that many sources of discontent that the SANDF could have resolved internally go uncorrected due to a lack of faith in the system.⁹ The lack of effective channels to address grievances, coupled with the insecurity felt among members pending the rationalisation of the full-time forces, has resulted in wide scale dissatisfaction and resignation of highly competent personnel in the SANDF (Sass, 1996:138).

7.3.3 Response to trade unionism

As is typical of the unitarist approach to labour relations, the first response of the SADF to the emergence of trade unionism amongst uniformed personnel was to amend the Defence Act, 44 of 1956. In September 1993, just seven months prior to the formation of the SANDF, a provision was passed through Parliament prohibiting uniformed members from joining trade unions and from participating in strikes and protests.¹⁰ Section 126B (1) of the amended Defence Act states that “[a] *member of the Permanent Force shall not be or become a member of any trade union as defined in section 1 of the Labour Relations Act, 1956 : Provided that this provision shall not preclude any member of such a Force from being or becoming a member of any professional or vocational institute, society, association or like body approved by the Minister*”. Section 126 B (2) furthermore states that “*a member of the SANDF who is subject to the said*

9. Because the forums have “*no teeth*” the effectiveness of this structure is questioned by some members. The mere fact that this communication structure was introduced on a trial period, indicates the hesitance to introduce any kind of structure which can challenge the authority structure. Some even consider this structure as “*authorised mutiny*”.

10. Prior to this, there were no regulations in the Defence Act relating to trade union activities. The only regulations were those in the South African Defence Force Personnel Code, SADFPC/E/V/XXIX/2-11 which merely stated that an unacceptable position would arise if members of the full-time forces could belong to personnel associations and that such members must be discouraged from becoming members of personnel associations.

Military Disciplinary Code, shall not strike or perform any act of public protest or participate in any strike or act of public protest or conspire with or incite or encourage, instigate or command any other person (whether not such a person is a member of the SADF or an officer or employee referred to in Section 83A (2) serving in the SADF or a member of any auxiliary or nursing serve established under the Act) to strike or to perform such an act or to participate in a strike or such an act". The aim of these provisions are to ensure that no member of the Permanent Force belongs to a trade union and that no member of the SADF who is subject to the Military Discipline Code, takes part in strikes or actions of public protest. These legal punitive sanctions effectively restrain any member of the Permanent Force from belonging to a trade union, or from participating in any strike action or public protest.

Section 126C of the Defence Act goes on to specify that "[a]ny member of the Permanent Force shall exercise his rights with respect to labour matters in terms of the regulations, and the State as his employer shall handle and administer all such matters, including the resolution of disputes in accordance with the regulations". However, since the promulgation of these regulations by the Defence Act, Second Amendment Act, 1993 on 12 November 1993, no dispute resolution regulations have yet been promulgated.

The restrictions in the Defence Act curtailing trade union membership are perhaps the most important restraining element in the development of military unions. The fact that any uniformed member contravening the provisions in section 126B of the Defence Act commits a criminal offence and could be charged with mutiny, is a serious deterrent. However, the South African National Defence Union (SANDU) plans to challenge the restrictions placed on trade union membership as being unconstitutional, based on Section 18 of the Constitution which states that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of association". Should SANDU win the constitutional case, the most effective impediment to the development of unions will be removed.

The reaction of the SANDF to the formation of SANDU was also typically unitarist. Lt Genl Reg Otto, Chief of the Army commented that "[t]he SANDF and by implication the SA Army, does not recognise any trade union or person claiming to represent leaders of any trade union. The SA Army has very clear command channels to handle grievances. No alternative channel exists. We will not be dictated to by any labour union or any of its officials. Peace and stability are our concern and it cannot be achieved with bad discipline or the interference of outside institutions" (Weekend Argus, 1995:11). Similar sentiments were reiterated by Lt Genl Johan Pretorius, a previous Chief of the SA Army, "[b]ecause of the nature of the trust put in members of the armed forces, it is proper for them to subjugate their personnel interests to the


great task of protecting the sovereignty of the RSA. If they fail to do so, they cannot claim to be military professionals" (Pretorius, 1995:21).

Despite numerous attempts by SANDU to obtain recognition for the union, including a visit to President Mandela on 6 April 1995 to put forward the union's case, there is still no indication that the SANDF or government is willing to allow trade unions within the military. (SANDU 1995:1) In a letter to SANDU from President Mandela, he stated that he is not prepared to lift any restrictions placed on trade union activities in Section 126 B of the Defence Act because "*... the Defence Force is a critically important institution in our country, on whose shoulders the stability and security to the transition to a democracy rests*". Other reasons given by the President is that "*... unlike other employees, the uniformed soldier has access to arms and even sophisticated weapons of mass destruction*" (Mandela, 1995). Trade unions for military personnel are therefore considered counter productive and disruptive, with dire consequences for the national security interests of the country and its inhabitants.

The main fear is that unions will compete illegitimately for the control over the loyalty of soldiers by providing a second formal parallel to the chain of command, which would divide the loyalty of uniformed personnel between the union and the unit. This is particularly so, if the division occurs along racial and institutional lines (former non-statutory *versus* statutory), or creates friction between the officer corps and the non-commissioned officer, creating an "*us and them*" scenario (Pretorius, 1995:21). The concern is that the chain of command and the authority of rank, on which the whole disciplinary structure is based, could be disrupted by the introduction of trade union practices for uniformed members (CSANDF, 1995:1).

Another concern is that a trade union for military personnel could politicise the military or could be used as a political power vehicle to promote self-interest. This is of particular concern, given the past praetorian tendencies of some of the armed forces now integrated into the SANDF. Williams (1995:10) is of the opinion that the development of a praetorian attitude among former MK members within the SANDF, could be a potential problem. He states that "[g]iven MK's well-developed relationship with the current political elite, MK officers could be tempted to use their influence to further their own corporate interests, thereby undermining the values of a South African professional military ethic". The TBVC armies too displayed classical praetorian attributes such as nepotism and corruption. Even the former SADF, which always prided itself in its professionalism, displayed a praetorian disposition, particularly during the Botha era when the military had extensive political influence through the Security Management System (Williams, 1995:10). A factor that cannot be ignored is that the forces now integrated in the SANDF have strong

All arms of service show an increase in occupationalism, if compared with the previous survey conducted in 1989 (see Diagram 8.1). The most remarkable increase is in the SA Army, which in previous years was the most institutional, and is now the most occupational. Only 26 percent of army officers in 1995 indicated their support for traditional institutional values, compared to 52 percent in 1989.



* SAMS: No data available for 1989

Diagram 8.1: Institutional commitment to values by Arm of Service 1989 and 1995

An attempt will be made in the following section, to explain the reasons for this increase in occupationalism, by briefly discussing the variables listed by Moskos (1988) as indicators of an institutional occupational drift, such as the level of legitimacy and societal regard; role commitment; basis, mode and level of compensation; evaluation of performance; the legal system; female roles; the military spouse; residence and post-service status.

8.2.1. Legitimacy and societal regard

According to Moskos (1988:16), an institution is legitimated in terms of values and norms that transcend self-interest in favour of a presumed higher good. In an institutional military, both the military and members of society expect that military service is congruent with notions of self-sacrifice and primary identification with the military's needs. As indicated in the previous chapter, these are the values that the SANDF expect its members to subscribe to. For example, the SANDF considers placing individual self-interest above duty a "*misplaced service ethic*" (SANDF, 1994:3). Those in service of the military must accept that the institution comes first and that they are subject to transfers and frequent relocation of themselves and

their families; are on duty 24 hours a day; often have to work longer than an eight hour day; and are subject to military discipline and law. Even the private lives of members are under the purview of the military and governed by a code of personal conduct (SANDF, 1994:3).

With respect to policy, the SANDF is institutional, but this altruism is not reflected in personal attitude towards military service. Most of the junior officers at the Military Academy for example, were of the opinion that they should be given a choice whether to accept a transfer or not, and should not have to perform operational duties if this has negative personal and family consequences. Nor should their own interests, take second place to those of the organisation (see Table 8.1). With respect to their personal lives, the overwhelming majority were of the opinion that what a member does after hours, is none of the defence force's business, that differences in rank are not important after hours and what a member does in his/her private life should be of no concern to his/her officer commanding.

Table 8.1: Commitment of officers to institutional values*

Variable	Agree	Disagree
	%	%
Not have to take a transfer if not wanted	67	33
Perform operational duty regardless of family consequences	45	55
Personal interests take second place to the Defence Force	32	68
What member does after hours not Defence Force business	80	20
Members private life of no concern to Officer Commanding	79	21
Concept of officer on duty 24 hours a day no longer valid	58	42
Service in the Defence Force is a calling	25	75

* Total number in sample 183

Concerning overtime, or the concept of an officer being on duty for 24 hours a day, more than 58 percent of the junior officers were of the opinion that this is no longer a valid requirement in today's military. Furthermore, only 25 percent considered service in the Defence Force a calling. This could be ascribed to the recent decline in the role of the military in society, and the lack of clarity with respect to the future role and function of the SANDF.

8.2.2 Role commitment

In an institutional military role commitment is diffuse, in other words, members are generalists and are expected to perform an array of tasks not necessarily related to their specialist training. The more occupational the military, the greater the emphasis on specialisation. In the SANDF, this trend is not yet

evident. Everyone in uniform is classified as a “military practitioner”² and may be expected to fulfil many different posts, often unrelated to his/her specific mustering.

Of interest, are the responses of the officers at the Military Academy to this aspect of military service. Just fewer than 60 percent of the officers felt that they are required to participate in too many activities not related to their jobs. When asked “*whether they normally think of themselves as a person with special training and experience working for the Defence Force, rather than as a military career officer*” (military professional), most agreed with this view (see Table 8.2). Furthermore, that military training, qualifications, expertise, and experience acquired during military service is more important than their officership in determining their standing in the Defence Force.

Table 8.2: Attitudes of officers towards aspects of military service*

	Agree	Disagree
Variable	%	%
Compensation based on skills and qualifications and not on post level, rank or seniority	77	23
Think of myself as person with special training working for the Defence Force	71	29
My military training, qualifications, expertise and experience is more important than my officership	71	29
Participate in too many activities not related to job	56	43

* Total number in sample 183

This signifies an overall trend away from those who identify themselves as military professionals, toward those who see themselves as specialists in uniform. A movement away from “military professional” to that of a “professional in uniform”. Concerning basis of compensation, it is of interest that most of the junior officers at the Military Academy felt that compensation should be based on one's skills and qualifications and not on post level, rank and seniority.

8.2.3 Basis, mode and level of compensation

As from 1 July 1996 the SANDF and all those members classified as military practitioners are remunerated on the same salary grading system as the rest of the Public Service. The previous complex remuneration system with its multitude of different salary scales and allowances have been compressed. The new

2. A military practitioner is the functional classification for all uniformed members employed in the profession of arms in the SANDF (SANDF, 1996:4-1).

salary grading system consists of 16 salary ranges, and each salary range consists of three salary notches. Each of the occupational and rank classes has been grouped into six broad bands as reflected in Table 8.3.

Table 8.3: Salary grading system for the Public Service and SANDF³

Salary ranges	Salary scales	Application	Rank
1	17 100 - 18 297	Lower skilled	-
2	20 079 - 21 807		Private
3	23 526 - 25 704	Skilled	Private
4	27 882 - 29 928		L/Cpl
5	32 988 - 35 604		Cpl/ 2Lt
6	40 836 - 45 852	Highly skilled	Sgt/ Lt
7	50 868 - 56 106		SSgt/Lt
8	63 963 - 71 055		WO2/Capt
9	78 141 - 83 949		WO1/Maj
10	98 463 - 106 941	Highly skilled supervisory	WO/AOS/Lt
11	115 413 - 131 152		Col
12	139 578 - 155 370		Col
13	163 260 - 177 486	Management	Brig
14	191 712 - 212 400		Maj Gen
15	233 079 - 256 587	Senior management	Lt Gen
16	303 591 - 322 205		Gen

Where members require specific qualifications to fulfil a post uniformed personnel, as with the rest of the public service are paid according to the salary scale for that specific occupational class. Remuneration in these cases, such as doctors, legal practitioners, military university educators, quantity surveyors and so forth are paid according to skill and qualification, not according to rank. With the move to an all-volunteer force, the pay for recruits has also increased substantially.

Concerning mode of compensation, many of the traditional institutional benefits have been incorporated in the salaries or in some cases, abolished. All salary and cash recognition for certain specialist qualifications unique to the military, previously added to the pay of the military practitioner, has fallen away since 1 July 1996. According to the new dispensation only pilots, navigators and flight technical personnel receive specialist allowances. All other occupational groups which qualify for special allowances, such as danger pay, are compensated in the same way as any other public servant facing the same working conditions (CSANDF, 1996e: 1). In addition, the bonus system for military practitioners and other public servants is identical, although the system of evaluation (at present) differs.

3. The details of the *'New Salary Grading System'* as reflected in Table 8.3 was compiled from an SANDF directive, CSP/DSS/R/104/1/B, dated 6 August 1996.

To summarise, since July 1996 there is a definite shift towards a more occupational dispensation for uniformed members with respect to basis, mode and level of compensation and they are no longer treated as a unique occupational category.⁴ With respect to compensation and the system of remuneration, the new dispensation equates military practitioners with public servants.

8.2.4 Evaluation of performance

However, where it pertains to the evaluation of performance, the SANDF⁵ still evaluates its members in terms of traditional institutional criteria. In an institutional military, according to Moskos' definition, members are evaluated in terms of the total person and on normative criteria. In the occupational military, merit assessment is based on the functional tasks (standards and quality) of his/her work.

The merit or efficiency assessment form, as it is called of the SANDF, clearly demonstrates that the evaluation of member's performance is holistic and qualitative. Three key areas of the members' work are evaluated, namely managerial ability, job ability and adaptability. "*Managerial ability*" is evaluated by assessing the members ability to control his/her flow of work; standard of subordinates' work; ability to determine job priorities; capacity to determine goals/objectives; upholding of standards; coping with difficulties that may occur within the work environment; ability to take timeous decisions; level of self-confidence; judgement; and handling of emergency assignments.

The second category of criteria evaluated pertain to the individual's "*job ability*" and includes questions on the members willingness to proceed at own initiative; compliance with time tables; standard of work; willingness to accept responsibility; contribution to improve work methods; perseverance in long and difficult tasks; ability to cope with various assignments; eagerness to undertake assignments; ability to switch from one task to another and knowledge of the detail of present work.

The final category of questions concerns the individual's "*adaptability*". Under this section the members reaction to suggestions and criticism; co-operation with fellow colleagues; tactfulness and courtesy; ability

4. In discussions Division Service Systems at Chief of Staff Personnel of the SANDF, the view was expressed that this system of remuneration was imposed on the SANDF for its military practitioners. As no consideration was given to the unique institutional needs of military personnel, a submission has been made to the Minister of Public Service and Administration to address present dissatisfaction with the new dispensation.

5. See Appendix E for an example of a "*Efficiency Assessment Form*" used to evaluate uniformed personnel.

to adapt to new methods/procedures; control of temper under normal circumstances; maintenance of discipline; disposition towards the SANDF; willingness to share in unpleasant tasks; self-control under difficult circumstances; attitude towards work; neatness; and general behaviour, are assessed.

Each question is evaluated out of ten, and the result of the assessment is discussed with the member concerned. Should he/she not accept the assessment, provision is made on the form to specify the reasons for the rejection, which will then be subject to review. Merit assessments are taken into consideration for the allocation of service bonuses as well as for promotion or selection to a specific post.

The normative assessment criterion as outlined above is a matter of much deliberation, given the subjectivity of evaluation. Currently the merit assessment is being reviewed and it appears as if more quantitative criteria will be used as a measure of evaluation in the future. While the SANDF is still institutional as regards the method of job evaluation, there is a definite move towards accepting a more occupational system of evaluation.

8.2.5 Legal system

According to the institutional model, the military legal system is broad and exercises extensive control over the member's behaviour. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Defence Act of 1956 and the Military Disciplinary Code makes it possible for the military to maintain its own discipline and in general, to solve military problems within the military milieu. According to the present legal system in the SANDF, a member may not be tried again by any civilian court for the same offence. Members cannot appeal against the finding or sentence of a military court, since a comprehensive internal system of review exists. Only the Supreme Court has powers of review. However, a military court may not try cases of high treason, rape, murder or culpable homicide committed inside the boundaries of the Republic of South Africa. Such cases fall within the jurisdiction of the civilian legal system.

As with the method of evaluation, the whole military disciplinary system is under review. Where before, members were not permitted a civilian or legal representative in the case of a summary trial, this is now permitted. Furthermore, a Commission under the chairmanship of R Adm J.F. Retief has been appointed to revise South African defence legislation and to bring the entire military legal system in line with the new Constitution. For example, Section 24 of the 1996 Constitution states that "[e]veryone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a

court, or where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum". This will have a significant influence on the legal jurisdiction of the military, with the implication that the SANDF will have to accept a more occupational legal dispensation.

8.2.6 Female roles

According to Moskos, the more institutional the military the more restricted the career paths of women, the more occupational, the more open the career paths. In 1994, in line with the Constitutional provisions which forbid discrimination on the grounds of race or gender, military policy guidelines were issued to allow women to be trained and employed on the same basis as men. Consequently, the career path of women in the SANDF is the same as her male counterparts are subject to the same selection and training procedures, and no posts are exclusively reserved for men. In addition to the traditional support mustering, all combat musteringings are now accessible to women.

Table 8.4: Gender profile of SANDF (November 1996)

	Male		Female		Total
	n	%	n	%	n
Army	61304	94	3749	6	66054
Air Force	9826	88	1347	12	11172
Navy	5254	92	440	8	6894
SAMS	3473	55	2892	54	6365
Total	79857	90	8428	10	88285

Source: Directorate Personnel Planning, Personnel Division SANDF.

A concerted effort is currently being made to increase the number of women in combat positions and at decision-making levels throughout the Defence Force. Even so, women are still by far in the minority in all the arms of service, with the exception of the South African Medical Services (SAMS) (see Table 8.4).

While there may be equality among the sexes as regards policy, there is still resistance to women serving in combat positions. In a recent public opinion survey, 59 percent of respondents felt that women should not be allowed to do combat duty or serve in the front line (Schutte & Cilliers, 1995:52). Similar responses were obtained from officers attending the Junior, Senior and Joint Staff Courses to the question "... whether women should be permitted to do combat duty in the front line".⁶

6. Refer to Appendix D for the survey conducted among officers attending the Junior Staff and Warfare Course, the Senior Command and Staff Course and the Joint Staff Course. The total number of officers in the sample were 188.

Table 8.5: SANDF officers attitude towards women in combat positions

	Agree		Unsure		Disagree		Total
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n
Army	25	32	6	7	48	61	79
Air Force	20	43	8	17	19	40	47
Navy	13	54	3	13	8	33	24
SAMS	14	37	6	16	18	47	38
Total	72	38	23	12	93	50	188

Officers in the SA Air Force and SA Navy were the most supportive of women in combat positions, while the SA Army was the least supportive (see Table 8.5). As most of these Army officers have experienced the stress of combat, many still see women as unsuitable to take up positions that may involve risk or danger. Nevertheless, in policy at least, the SANDF has made a dramatic shift towards a more occupational dispensation with respect to women in the military.

8.2.7 Spouse

Traditionally, the (white) military spouse has been expected to play an integral role in the military community and in support of her soldier-husband. The Defence Force Ladies Association, (an association for military wives) in particular, sees it as their mission to render support to wives during times of separation, relocation and when husbands were deployed. As a semi-welfare, social and cultural organisation, the Ladies Association even today, serves to broaden the understanding of military life and plays an important socialisation role. Every military unit has a Defence Force Ladies Association and the chairperson is normally the wife of the Officer Commanding of the unit. The Officer Commanding's wife, together with her committee, arranges visits to military units as well as briefings to incorporate and expose military wives to the military culture and organisation (RSA, 1982:16).

Besides the involvement in the military community, wives are expected to partake in the array of social functions characteristic of military life, such as the attendance of formal functions and parades. As a military wife, she is expected to be fully supportive of her husband in all areas (Cock, 1989:57). Of interest, is that almost 60 percent of junior officers at the Military Academy felt that "[a]n officer's wife is as much a part of the unit as her husband", signifying the support for involvement of the military spouse in unit activities.

In recent years there has, however, been a growing reluctance of wives to take part in the customary military unit functions, largely due to the increase of dual income families but also because many military families now live off-base. The exception being, where members live in isolated areas, (much more prevalent during the Border War) and where work and social life is still centred on the military base. Even with respect to this aspect of military life, there is a trend towards occupationalism.

8.2.8 Residence

Military housing is allocated to members on the basis of income and number of dependants. While single members are still expected to obtain permission to live off base from their officer commanding, more and more married couples prefer to live within the civilian community, especially if they are area bound or are not subject to frequent relocation.

The often poor state and rising cost of military housing has facilitated this trend. Whereas in the past members paid a fixed rate for military accommodation, this rate is now calculated as a percentage (8 %) of a member's salary up to a maximum of R350 00. With the increased rental of military accommodation, most uniformed members prefer to make use of the housing subsidy scheme to purchase their own home. The rising mess fees too, have meant that even single members, prefer to live in private dwellings.

8.2.9 Post-service status

Uniformed personnel in the SANDF receive the same pension benefits as the broader Public Service with the exception that they have the option to retire at the age of 55 years rather than 65 years, as is the norm for the rest of the public service. They also retain certain benefits, such as free military medical care upon retirement, which public servants don't have, and are eligible for disablement pensions if injured during service. While it is true that the SANDF attempts to look after their retired personnel, they are not necessarily held in high esteem by broader society by virtue of their prior standing in the military.

8.3 TRENDS PROMOTING OCCUPATIONALISM

The shift from a predominantly institutional to occupational military has not only been influenced by the changing nature of military service, but by the changes in the structure and operation of SADF itself. These include the increasing civilianisation of the military; the move to an all-volunteer force; cuts in

military budgets resulting in a decline in work and living conditions of service members; and the shift in recruitment from elites to representing the broader population.

8.3.1 Civilianisation

The civilianisation of employment in the military occurs at two levels, firstly, through the civilianisation of military occupations, and secondly, through the increase in the number of civilian personnel employed in the military.

Either civilian or uniformed personnel, indicating that the type of work performed does not require a specific military or combat skill can fill many of the posts in the SANDF. As indicated in Section 8.2.3, where there is a comparison between public servants and uniformed personnel in the level and type of work performed, they are appointed, promoted, remunerated and administered according to so-called transverse principles. In many respects, especially with the new service dispensation, uniformed personnel are treated as than *"public service employees in uniform"* when it comes to their conditions of service.

Another trend that may contribute towards the civilianisation of the military profession, is the accreditation of military courses with some civilian qualification. The SANDF plans to establish a Defence Training Board, which will be affiliated to the South African Qualification Authority in order to gain access to the national qualification framework. The aim is to gain accreditation for military training in order to allow for the transfer of military learning to a later civilian career (Rutsch, 1996:5). To a certain extent this has become a necessity, given the implications of the short and medium service system, as military service is no longer a guaranteed long-term career. Another argument in favour of the collateral utility of military and civilian skills is that public funds spent on training and education in the SANDF are not lost to society.

Besides the civilianisation of the military profession, the SANDF employs a considerable number of civilians. In November 1996, the SANDF Directorate Personnel Planning Division statistics reflected that the actual number of civilians in employment of the SANDF were 23 152 or 23 percent of the total full-time force component of the Defence Force⁷ (see Diagram 8.2). These *civilian* military employees are fully integrated with the uniformed personnel, and perform vital logistical and support functions alongside uniformed personnel. They serve primarily in supportive roles, in the administrative, financial, technical and

7. A complete breakdown of the Department of Defence Personnel Strength per Arm of Service and service system is provided in Appendix A.

medical branches. The increase in the civilian component of the Department of Defence in recent years also reflects the greater sophistication of systems and closer support required from the defence industry. The SA Navy has the largest percentage of civilians, with 50 percent of its full-time component and almost the entire dockyard being manned by civilians. Similar to many other countries, there is a trend towards the employment of civilian contract workers to render specific services, particularly in the Navy and Air Force.




Diagram 8.2: Personnel strength by service system (November 1996)

Although integrated with uniformed personnel functions, civilians and uniformed military personnel are treated as two unique personnel components. Civilians in the SANDF do not fall under the Defence Act. They are public servants and conditions of employment are regulated by the Public Service Act, 1994 and the Labour Relations Act, 42 of 1996. Accordingly, civilians have the right to join trade unions of their choice, and can partake in collective bargaining, but do not have the right to strike, as per definition; they are still classified as rendering an essential service.

Most significantly, the power and influence of senior civilians within the Department of Defence will increase dramatically once the civilian Defence Secretariat is fully established. The Defence Secretary is to act as the accounting officer of the Department of Defence, a function previously performed by the Chief of the SANDF, and is the principal adviser to the Minister of Defence on matters relating to defence policy, human resource policy, fiscal and administrative duties delegated by the Minister. Henceforth, the civilian employees within the Department of Defence will be a major component of the military, both numerically and in terms of power and influence.

8.3.2 The shift from conscription to an all-volunteer force

Another significant structural development that has profound implications for the nature of military service, is the recent shift from a conscript to an all-volunteer force in South Africa. Whereas the conscript system made little demand on the military as an employer, a volunteer system necessitates that marketplace criteria are taken into consideration. Cortright (1977:218) is of the opinion, that where armed forces recruit rather than conscript personnel, a new contractual basis for military employment comes into being, which is associated with a decline in the notion of military service as a calling. Many join not because of the uniqueness of the military service, but for other reasons, such as tertiary education and job opportunities that provide the financial and promotion prospects needed to attain material success. Obvious factors that influence the relative attractiveness of enrolment in the military on a voluntary basis, are pay, service benefits, and the availability of alternative employment opportunities.

This view is supported by a survey conducted amongst the first intake of volunteer recruits at SAS Saldanha Naval Training Base during 1994. The findings revealed that the recruits had little understanding of the career possibilities in the South African Navy (SAN), and out of the 203 recruits, 157 indicated that they joined the Navy due to a lack of employment opportunities (Merts, 1996:41). They joined the Navy not on the premise that it was a calling, but as a job. Similarly, junior officers at the Military Academy in response to the questions pertaining to the reasons for joining the military only 25 percent indicated that they thought military service a calling, while 78 percent indicated that they wanted a secure job with promotion and favourable retirement benefits (see Appendix C).

The failure to emphasise the unique military lifestyle or character of the military during recruitment could be a contributing factor, as is reflected in the following advert designed for the appointment of personnel and logistics officers in the former SADF:

*"The Quarter Master General is interested in people who have recently obtained a three year B degree or National Diploma in the Personnel or Marketing field. If you are looking for a progressive employer where your qualifications and potential will be put to full use, feel free to come and discuss your prospects ... The SA Defence Force offers a comprehensive remuneration package including a competitive salary supplemented by an annual service bonus and a worthwhile fringe benefit range: * service allowance * excellent pension scheme * free medical and dental treatment * ample leave and sick benefits"* (Sunday Times, 1989 as quoted in Malan, 1994b:45). As Malan indicates, as degreed personnel who will serve as officers, one

cannot help but notice the total absence of any reference to the uniqueness of the military profession or military service ethic.

Assumed that traditional military benefits such as housing, pensions, and medical care are major incentives for joining the military, it can be expected that any decline in such perks could propel service members to adopt civilian type labour practices to protect their interests. In this regard Lane (1977:104) states that *"... perhaps the major incentive for unionisation amongst an all-volunteer force would be the perception of an erosion of self-related benefits and a certain frustration and helplessness to do anything about it"*.

8.3.3 Erosion of service benefits

In recent years the Defence Force have observed far-reaching cuts to its defence budget. As a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product, the defence expenditure declined from 4,3 percent in 1989 to an estimated 3,45 percent in 1996. As a percentage of state expenditure this signifies a decline from 15,7 percent in 1989 to an approximate of 5,9 percent in 1996. In the short to medium term, this decline in the defence budget is expected to continue as the national priority shifts away from defence to that of socio-economic development.

The urgent requirement to restrict government spending on defence will inevitably compel a reduction in the full-time component of the Defence Force. With personnel costs making up more than half of the defence budget, the most likely cuts will be on the terrain of manpower. Past cuts in the defence budget have already been associated with large-scale retrenchments, where roughly 18 percent of the total defence force cadre was laid off (Du Plessis, 1993:6). This naturally increases the sense of insecurity amongst uniformed personnel who have little recourse of action should they be retrenched.

With the implementation of the three tier service system in 1994, military service is no longer a guaranteed long-term career.⁸ While the different service systems are more suited to present security needs, the decline in permanence of tenure has several implications. Members are not guaranteed that their contracts will be renewed, and this creates a certain amount of discontent, especially among those who had thought that the military was a long term career or who had hoped to renew their contracts. The demonstrations by members of 21 Battalion at Lenz against the termination of their short-term service

contracts testify to this (Citizen, 1995:5). An additional problem is that particularly the medium-term system poses unique demands with respect to the pension fund, which is not presently catered for by the Government Service Pension Fund.

The perceived decline in permanence of tenure in the SANDF, together with the progressive erosion of service benefits has created the feeling that the chain of command can no longer be relied upon to protect individual interests. For example, since 1994 no SANDF input or comment to the Public Service Commission for uniformed personnel with regard to the division of funds for improving service benefits has been successful. Consequently, the erosion of "*institutional*" benefits over the past few years has been extensive.

To name but a few, free duty buses were discontinued in 1992, and where they have been retained in remote areas, members are charged market-related fees. Other benefits, such as the housing subsidies and study incentive schemes have become taxable, in some cases amounting to a financial loss of up to 40 percent. Military accommodation tariffs, which before were fixed, have been increased substantially and are now calculated as a percentage of a member's salary. Other benefits have not kept up with the rate of inflation, such as the clothing allowance for civilian clothes, which has remained at a fixed rate of R350, 00 since 1986. Service allowances, such as the Staff Qualification Allowance and a service allowance to the members of the management echelon have been totally discontinued. Sport allowances too have been reduced and members are no longer reimbursed for expenses incurred with respect to subsistence and travel.⁹ This has substantially reduced the participation in sport at all levels. The new compensation system that came into effect in 1996 virtually eliminates all unique compensation benefits. As will be illustrated, the present willingness to join a representative association or union is strongly correlated with the erosion of service benefits experienced by military personnel.

The proposed rationalisation of personnel, too, has a significant impact on institutional commitment and loyalty. As Malan (1993:25), states "[m]any [SADF] officers must find it difficult to ascribe to the concept of a calling rather than an occupation in a military, which has recently proved highly vulnerable to the market-place phenomena of redundancy, rationalisation and retrenchment". Rationalisation is already taking place through natural attrition. Since April 1994 until July 1996, the personnel strength of the SANDF has

8. See Section 6.4 for a description of the "force structure".

9. These details were obtained from a letter submitted compiled by the Personnel Division, SANDF to the Minister of Defence dealing with labour relations in the SANDF.

decreased by more than 12 000, largely as a result of retirements, resignations and non-renewal of contract (CSANDF, 1996:1). Some posts have been frozen or abolished, and recruitment to vacant posts is limited to certain specialist musterings. Expired contracts are also only being renewed where absolutely necessary. Voluntary severance packages have been offered to members to encourage resignation, with serious effects on morale of those who have chosen to remain and have to cope with the additional workload and inefficiencies that have arisen.

Actual retrenchment or compulsory severance, scheduled to commence in 1997, constitutes the final stage of the rationalisation process. The following criteria will be taken into consideration - the person's level of expertise, past work performance and potential and productivity, adherence to course requirements, physical and psychological abilities, disciplinary record, domestic circumstances and normal age distribution within the personnel structure.

The proposed rationalisation or downsizing is a cause of great concern to those who wish to remain in the SANDF, regarding their own relationship with the military and their future careers. In a study by Wrong and McNally (1994:209), it was found that there was a significant decrease in organisational commitment after downsizing began among those who remained behind, or had supposedly made it.

8.3.4 Changing racial composition

With the shift to an all-volunteer force, the racial representation of the full-time force changed significantly. At the beginning of the eighties only a third (33,6 percent in 1981) of the full-time forces were other than white (Du Plessis, 1993:16). This figure increased to more than 50 percent by the early nineties and at present, whites represent only 29 percent of those serving in the full-time forces are white (see Diagram 8.3). This trend is likely to increase even further, largely due to demographic trends but also as a result of the integration of the non-statutory and homeland armies into the new National Defence Force.




Diagram 8.3: Racial profile of SANDF (November 1996)¹⁰
Source: Directorate Personnel Planning, Personnel Division, SANDF.

From past actions it appears as if the black recruits entering the security forces have a more positive disposition towards unionisation. This is seen in the support for organisations such as the Police, Prisons and Civil Rights Union (Popcru) amongst black policemen and prisons personnel, even in the absence of any law recognising such rights. Members of the ANC's military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) now integrated in the SANDF too have shown their sympathy with the cause of Popcru. These recruits are less socialised into the traditional military culture and appear to be more critical and less receptive to orders. The actions of the now disbanded National Peacekeeping Force¹¹, who went on strike when they realised they were incorrectly paid and who torched the car of MK Chief of Staff Sipiwe Nyanda when he tried to address them, testify to this (Weekend Argus, 1994; Die Burger, 1994).

Likewise, the predominantly black homeland armies now integrated into the SANDF bring with them a number of legacies. Most of these officers have tasted political power as an effective way of satisfying their demands. The lack of political legitimacy, as well as the inability to deliver on the economic front, caused much of the instability in these former self-governing territories, all of which have succumbed to coups. In fact, the inability to deliver on the economic front has been one of the main causes of *coup d'états* in Africa (Reichardt & Cilliers, 1996b:82).

Many black soldiers have personally experienced the benefits of trade unionism, while in civilian employment, and in some instances have an external reference group to substantiate this. International research

10. Refer to Appendix A for breakdown per Race and Gender for the Full-time Force component. Note that there are 24 missing cases which did not indicate race.

11. The National Peacekeeping Force consisted of member of MK, APLA, the TBVC Defence Forces and the former SADF, was created with the intention to be used in an internal peacekeeping role.

also demonstrates that occupational officers more frequently come from lower-status groups and where they consider themselves as underprivileged, are on average more supportive of a civilian type of union in the military (Cafonio & Nuciani, 1994:49). One of the consequences of occupationalism, is the priority with self-interest and the need to have some voice in the determination of pay and conditions of service. The most common form of self-interest articulation, is a trade union (Moskos, 1988:17).

8.4 CONSEQUENCES OF OCCUPATIONALISM

The shift towards an occupational dispensation has significant implications for the management of labour relations in the SANDF. One of the distinguishing characteristics of a professional/institutional dispensation, compared to that of an occupation is the commitment to selfless service. The most significant sign of altruism, is the subordination of individual financial rewards to the goals of serving society. Yet the attitudes of officers at the Military Academy reflect an almost total priority with self-interest (see Table 8.6).

Table 8.6: Features of a preferred job*

	Important	Unimportant
Variable	%	%
A job with a good salary	97	3
A steady job with good security	85	15
A job with good fringe benefits	95	5
A job where you can make the world a better place	72	22
A job where I can serve my country	57	43

* Total number in sample 183.

Traditional institutional values such as “a job that gives me a chance to make the world a better place to live in” and a “job that gives me a chance to serve my country” rated the least important on this scale. Similar trends were identified in the United States armed forces, in a study by Segal (1978:230), measuring certain preferred job characteristics between army, navy and civilian personnel. In all three work environments, personnel regarded good pay, fringe benefits, and the opportunity to control their personal lives and the avoidance of bureaucracy as the most preferred job characteristics. Factors such as prestige, job cleanliness, availability of free time, not being bossed and an opportunity to serve one’s country were relatively less important.

However, while the marketplace values were the most preferred, institutional values were not unimportant features of a preferred job. A significant proportion still regarded service to the nation as an important

feature of military service, even in the absence of an immediate military threat to the country. This indicates that while there is a high tendency towards occupationalism, the junior officers still displayed a commitment towards traditional institutional values, reflecting a mixture of a sense of calling and a view of soldiering as a job. According to Caforio and Nuciari (1994:37) these responses are typical of the *“pragmatic professional officer”* who maintains traditional and ideal professional values, but at the same time stresses a strong interest in aspects such as job security, transferability of skills and the public image of the profession.

Traditionally, it has been considered contrary to the professional ethics and standards of the professional soldier, to organise into interest groups (such as trade unions) to advance their own financial rewards. Yet, the responses to the questions, relating to the need for some form of organisation to represent the interests of members with respect to pay and promotion, reveal that the majority of junior officers felt that some form of mild collectivism, such as an association (not a trade union), was needed to represent and negotiate on their behalf outside the chain of command. In addition, there appears to be a general feeling that the chain of command can no longer be relied upon to protect the interests of individual members. The mere fact that only 16 percent felt that their interests were well looked after by the respective headquarters and staff divisions, indicates a relatively high level of dissatisfaction with some aspects of the military's ability to handle personnel problems (see Table 8.7). In this regard, Moskos and Wood (1988: 288) state that *“[t]o the degree that military members perceive senior military leaders as ineffective defences of an institutional compensation system, creeping occupationalism will appear in the rank and file”*.

Table 8.7: Need for a representative association*

	Agree	Disagree
Variable	%	%
Need for representation on highest level on pay and promotion.	93	7
Need for a legal representative to take pay problems to court.	82	18
Need for a representative association.	91	9
Opposed to representative association bypassing the existing chain of command to negotiate.	36	64
Interests of members are well looked after by HQ	16	84

* Total number in sample 183

This appears to be a universal trend among all ranks. In a survey conducted among officers attending the various staff colleges of all four arms of service, 85 percent of Junior Staff and Warfare Course officers, 86 percent of Senior Command and Staff Course officers and 77 percent of the Joint Staff Course officers, felt

that there is a need for representation on pay and promotion directly on the highest level. The overwhelming majority, 68 percent supported the idea of an association (not a trade union) to represent their views, while only 43 percent supported the idea that the SANDF needs a more effective collective bargaining structure (such as a military trade union) to protect and advance the interests of members. The higher the rank and the more senior the officers, the less the support for either a professional association or trade union¹² (see Diagram 8.4).




Diagram 8.4: Need among officers for representation, an association or military union*
 * Total in sample 188

Similar results were obtained from an opinion survey conducted by the Military Intelligence Division Effect Analysis throughout the entire Defence Force among all the rank groups. In this survey 50 percent of respondents believed that there is a role for unions in South Africa, and that should there be a union for the SANDF, that they would join. The conclusion can thus be reached that there is a definite need for representation on pay and service conditions, be this by a professional organisation or a trade union.

8.5 PRESSURE FOR A PLURALIST LABOUR RELATIONS DISPENSATION

One of the reasons for the need for some kind of representative structure to place pressure on both the military command structure as well as the political decision-makers is precisely because most sources of grievance cannot readily be addressed within the chain of command. The required decisions are often

12. These results were obtained from a survey conducted during October 1996. The rank profile for the Junior Staff Course ranges on average between Lieutenant to Major, for the Senior Command and Staff Course from Lt Col to Colonel and for the Joint Staff Course from Colonel to Brigadier.

beyond the legal competence of the officer commanding or the internal authority structure of the military. As uniformed personnel are excluded under the Labour Relations Act, 42 of 1996, and therefore from the Public Service Central Bargaining Chamber for the Public Service, this has meant that problems arising from the forum structure or other unique institutional needs, cannot be adequately negotiated by the military leadership. As stipulated in Section 195 of the Constitution of 1996, the SANDF at present has to function as an integral part of the Public Service. The Public Service Commission and the Department of Public Service and Administration, is responsible to give direction and approve all collective aspects with respect to salaries, pay and allowances and other conditions of service of members of the SANDF.

The Central Chamber of the Public Service Bargaining Council, is the formal mechanism, through which public servants, via their respective unions, negotiate with the State as the collective employer. As uniformed members are excluded from the Labour Relations Act, this forum, does not serve the needs of the military *per se*, as the SANDF has to compete with the broader public service for the available funds in a forum in which it is not represented. As a result, the SANDF has to accept without any recourse the results of the agreements reached for the broader Public Service. As indicated in Section 8.3.2 of this chapter, the Public Service Commission has not been sensitive to the unique institutional needs of the military and tends to treat military personnel in the same manner as the rest of the public service. The lack of representation and inability of the system to protect its unique compensation system has resulted in further pressure to have some form of labour union or some para-union structure.

Out of necessity and in attempt to pre-empt trade unionism, the SANDF has approached Cabinet, and obtained approval to investigate an alternative negotiation mechanism, through which the military leadership can bargain for the interests of the military personnel, outside the bargaining structures that are in place for the rest of the Public Service. There is increasing pressure on the SANDF to accept a more pluralist labour relations dispensation, partly due to the inefficiency of the current dispensation, but more importantly, because there is a need for representation by the members themselves. The ever visual presence of the South African National Defence Union (SANDU), is adding to this pressure, and is demanding that soldiers should be granted the same, or similar labour rights as the police, or else face a challenge in the Constitutional Court on this issue.

8.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

If an analysis is made of the variables listed by Moskos, as indicators of a military social organisation moving towards an occupational dispensation, then, this trend is visible in both defence policy and personal attitude towards military service in the SANDF.

This drift towards occupationalism is evident from the attitudes of military personnel, many of whom no longer view service in the military as a calling. The uniqueness of the military compensation system has also been eroded by the marketplace approach in the determination of the basis, mode and level of compensation for military personnel. The present institutional system of evaluation is also under review. So too, is the institutional legal system of the military that has to be brought in line with the Constitution. The equality clause in the Constitution has also meant that women can now serve in any position in the SANDF. Even with respect to military life, there is a trend towards occupationalism as members prefer to live off-base and military wives are less involved in the activities of the military community. Although attention is being paid to the role of veterans in the new SANDF, they are treated as any other public servant and are not necessarily held in high esteem, by society, by virtue of their prior standing in the military. The significance of this shift to a more occupational model, specifically with respect to the variables linked to compensation, the system of evaluation and the legal system, is that the service conditions of the military practitioner have become virtually the same as any other public servant.

Certain trends within the military itself reinforce the ascendancy towards a more occupational dispensation. The increase in the number, and influence of civilians within the Department of Defence, has a certain erosive effect on institutional values. The shift to an all-volunteer force also means that not only institutional but also marketplace criteria are taken into consideration during recruitment, if quality personnel are to be recruited and retained. The increase in the number of persons entering the SANDF from underprivileged backgrounds also tends to promote occupationalism, but these trends are not limited to Blacks. The overwhelming majority of officers at the Military Academy and at the various staff colleges were white, and they supported the need for representation on pay and benefits at the highest level. This support is partly due to the erosion of service benefits that have taken place over the past few years, and the inability of the military leadership to prevent this decline. One of the consequences of the ascendancy of occupationalism within the SANDF, is that the unitarist labour relations practices have come under increasing pressure.

One of the current problems with the existing labour relations dispensation, is that there is no forum where either the military leadership, or a representative association, or union, can negotiate on behalf of uniformed military personnel. The new Labour Relations Act excludes members of the SANDF and is only applicable to personnel employed by the Department of Defence in terms of the Public Service Act. This implies that alternative means for addressing labour matters with respect to uniformed personnel needs to be found, as any other employee, soldiers are entitled to just labour relations channels and other mechanisms to ensure that their aspirations and complaints are addressed.

CHAPTER NINE

SOCIETAL FORCES INFLUENCING THE MANAGEMENT OF LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE SANDF

9.1 INTRODUCTION

No labour relationship exists in a vacuum. While the military may be unique, and have a particular value system, the style and approach to labour relations will to a large extent be circumscribed by influences from society. The military cannot isolate itself from society, as it is from society that it draws its manpower. As stated in an South African National Defence Force (SANDF) Service Guide, *"... the SANDF cannot stress values that are far removed from those of society, for to do so, will result in society forcing changes upon the military ... it is the general spirit of the country which influences the opinions and standards of the military"* (SANDF, 1996b:2-3).

The purpose of this chapter is to highlight some of the most important societal forces that influence the management of labour relations in the SANDF. Many of these forces can be directly linked to the current political dispensation. The fact that certain labour rights are enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa has a significant impact on labour relations policy in the SANDF. While the constitutional provisions are perhaps central to the *"military union"* debate, there are other forces within the socio-political and military environment, such as dominant political and associated trade union culture; the extent of labour rights for the broader public service; and the relative importance and status of the military in society, that impact on the management of labour relations in the SANDF. The entire labour relations force field needs to be taken into consideration if appropriate labour relations mechanisms are to be created for uniformed personnel.

9.2 SOCIETAL FORCES INFLUENCING LABOUR RELATIONS

The following section focuses on those societal forces that exert an influence on the management of labour relations in the SANDF. The first, and possibly the most influential, is the recent trend in the direction of increased egalitarianism, political democracy and the protection of basic human rights in South Africa.

9.2.1 Equality of rights

The central issue in the equality of rights debate is whether the provisions relating to labour relations in the Interim Constitution¹ can be restricted for members of the armed forces. Those who support the idea, claim that it is socially unjust or undemocratic, if members of the armed forces are denied the freedom of association to join a union, for the purpose of collective bargaining to protect their interests, especially if these rights are guaranteed to other employees. Those against, maintain that the rights of soldiers must yield to the unique role of the military in society.

Currently, the labour rights enshrined in the Interim Constitution, Section 17, state that “[e]very person shall have the freedom of association” which implies that membership to a union is a constitutionally protected right. Furthermore, Section 27 guarantees that “every person shall have the right to fair labour practices, workers shall have the right to join trade unions, to participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union and to strike”. Section 16 guarantees “the right to assembly, demonstrate and petition”, and according to this clause, every person shall have the right to assemble and demonstrate with others peacefully, and unarmed, and to present petitions.² While all the above rights have been restricted in the Defence Act, 1957,³ these provisions have not been explicitly curtailed for members of the armed forces in either the Interim Constitution or the new Constitution. The implication is that the SANDF may have to condone, or even protect the rights of its members to demonstrate, to form, or join organisations for the purpose of bargaining with the military command structure on matters related to their terms of service.

Provision is made in the Section 33 of the Interim Constitution as well as in the new 1996 Constitution, Section 39 (1) to limit the above-mentioned rights. However, any limitation on any right, must be “reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors including”(a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose”. Should the SANDF deem it necessary to restrict the rights of soldiers, it will have to justify that such restrictions are warranted in accordance with the requirements in the limitation clause.

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1. The Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 remains in effect until the next elections in 1999. The provisions in this Constitution will be discussed with cross-reference to any amendments made in the new 1996 Constitution that will come into effect after the 1999 elections.
 2. The Freedom of Association clause has been retained virtually unchanged in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill, 1996 under Section 18, the Labour Relations Clauses under Section 23, and the Right to Demonstrate under Section 17.
 3. See Section 6.3.3 for the restrictions on trade unions in the Defence Act.

According to Phillips and Crosby (1977:100), armed forces (such as SANDF) facing a possible constitutional challenge have four options. The first option is to maintain the present status quo, by retaining the prohibition on trade union membership, collective bargaining and the right to strike. In such an event, the Defence Force will have to justify that it is reasonable, and essential to withhold the freedom of association and labour relations rights. As the Defence Force renders an essential service to society, it could argue that a military union would break down loyalty, discipline and morale, thereby affecting the ability of the Defence Force to carry out its mission successfully. According to Delholm and Humes (1977:86), the general opinion exists that the constitutional rights of members of the armed forces might well be restrained, if a deterioration in discipline leading to the compromise of a higher public interest could be demonstrated.

In so far as the right to freedom of association is concerned, the limitation must be reasonable and justifiable. Where this right is restricted, alternative provisions need to be put in place, as the essential content of the right in question may not be negated by the limitation. In this regard, the provision in Section 126B of the Defence Act which allows a member of the permanent force to belong to a professional or vocational institute, society, association, or like body approved by the Minister could be an alternative, but even then, the role and functions of such associations would need to be specified.

The second option is to prohibit collective bargaining and strike action in the military, but authorise the right to join a union under certain conditions. Thus, allowing the freedom of association, but curtailing the right to collective bargaining and strike action. As the armed forces depend for their effectiveness upon cohesion and absolute discipline and obedience to an established chain of command, it could argue that bargaining or even the formation of bargaining units within the armed forces, would seriously inhibit, if not destroy, the combat readiness of the armed forces (Delholm & Humes, 1977:84). Countries such as the Netherlands and Germany have followed this option (USA, 1977:10-11).

The third option is to prohibit striking, while authorising collective bargaining, thereby, allowing the freedom of association to belong to a union, with the purpose to bargain with the military command structure over terms and conditions of service. Such a ruling would give the military the same rights as the rest of the public service, which also does not have the right to strike. This option has been followed by the Danish armed forces and is based on the premise that there is no fundamental difference between the armed

forces and the rest of the public service (USA, 1977:20). This is the option that the South African National Defence Union (SANDU), is pressing for.

The fourth option is to place no restrictions on the rights of military personnel to unionise or to partake in collective bargaining, or to strike. In other words extending all the constitutional and statutory labour rights to soldiers. The only country, which has extended these rights to soldiers, is Sweden (USA, 1977:22).

Currently, the main restraining force prohibiting the development of unions in the SANDF are the restrictions in the Defence Act. However, historical experience with respect to labour relations in South Africa indicates that legal prohibition does not stop demands for unionisation, and might even spur union proponents to press their case even harder. This is indeed the case, as is reflected in the various newsletters of SANDU and "*position papers*"⁴ on labour relations submitted to the Human Resources Sub-Committee of the Defence Review. In a position paper submitted to the latter committee, SANDU proposed that "... *the right to associate (to obtain membership of a trade union) of members of the Permanent Force of the SANDF, be recognised ... for the purpose of collective bargaining*" and it intends challenging the restrictions in the Defence Act placed on trade unions in the Constitutional Court (SANDU, 1996: 65). An application was already submitted to the Constitutional Court in September 1995 to declare the restrictions on trade unions in the Defence Act unconstitutional, but was referred back to the Supreme Court.⁵ The union subsequently postponed its case to see firstly, whether the armed forces would be included under the revised Labour Relations Act which came into effect on 11 November 1996, and secondly, to see what alternative labour regulations will be promulgated in terms of Section 126 C of the Defence Act. Should the rights of soldiers still be restricted, SANDU plans to continue its constitutional challenge.

A key issue, as mentioned earlier, may not necessarily be the legality of such legislation, but its enforceability. The effectiveness of anti-union legislation has slowed or hindered union organisation, but has not been able to prevent it. There are other forces at play that may either restrain or drive the need for unions in the military. These forces are linked to the prevailing socio-political and military climate in the

4. As part of the Defence Review process, all interested parties have the opportunity to put forward their views on specific issues, such as labour relations, which will be taken into consideration in the drafting of final regulations pertaining to the specific issue.

5. The case was referred to the Supreme Court as no reasons were shown why the Supreme Court could not have dealt with the matter in terms of its powers under Section 101(1) or Section 101(3) of the Constitution of 1993. Insufficient special circumstances and urgency were provided to grant direct access to the Constitutional Court. Other reasons provided was that the SANDF is in the process of drafting labour regulations in terms of Section 126 C of the Defence Act, 1957. Source: Case Number: CCT32/95 in the Constitutional Court of South Africa in the matter between the South African National Defence Union (first applicant) and George Vuma (second applicant) and the Minister of Defence (first respondent) and Chief of the National Defence Force (second respondent). Ref:9145/95/p. 39. B.J. de Klerk. (Document obtained from Mr C. van Niekerk, Executive Officer, SANDU)

country, and include factors such as the presence of a strong trade union culture, the extent of labour rights for the rest of the public service and the status of the military in society.

9.2.2 Dominant political and trade union culture

In most countries, where labour rights have been extended to the armed forces, there is a close relationship between labour and government. Military representation in these European countries developed as part of the social norm of active support and promotion of government and was considered reflective of the social trends within those countries.

Here, a crucial point of comparison can be made between the South African and the European situation, especially with respect to the black trade union movement. While black trade unions were never illegal, and in fact existed since the early twenties, the black trade union movement in South Africa became radicalised as a direct response to the inequality experienced on both the industrial and political terrain. The inequality and lack of legal, political, and industrial rights, coupled to state repression, pushed black unions into radical political activities. From the outset, the black trade union movement made overt political demands for the transformation to a more equitable society and it is appropriate at this point, to provide a brief background of the political role of unions (Heinecken & Du Plessis, 1994:34).

The first black trade union federation to have any significant political impact was the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) formed in 1956. From the outset, SACTU saw its task primarily in political, rather than industrial relations terms, and believed that a significant improvement in the conditions of black workers, depended on winning the vote for the whole population. At its inaugural conference, for example, it argued that *"[y]ou cannot separate politics and the way in which people are governed from their bread and butter, or their freedom to move to and from places where they can find the best employment, or the houses they live in, or the type of education their children get"* (Baskin, 1991:13). SACTU cemented its political involvement by immediately joining the ANC and participating in the mass political campaigns. SACTU's aim was to apply pressure on the state, in the form of demonstration strikes or campaigns, to obtain a more favourable dispensation not only for them, but also for the broader populace.

But this brought it into direct confrontation with the state, which was resolute to suppress any upsurge in black militancy (Friedman, 1987:27-30). This was specifically so, after the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 and with the banning of the ANC. Having exhausted all passive means to bring about an improved political

dispensation for Blacks, the ANC formed Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) the "*Spear of the Nation*", and initiated the armed struggle against the apartheid state. Almost the entire SACTU leadership was recruited into MK. However, the government managed to infiltrate MK networks and mass arrests followed (Baskin, 1991:15). The arrests and banning of many of SACTU's leaders coupled to the weak organisational structure of SACTU, led to its eventual disintegration. By the mid sixties, the only Black worker organisation left were those organised in parallel unions by the white dominated Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) (Friedman, 1987:32). Consequently, black trade union activity virtually disappeared, but the lessons learned, laid the foundations for a new form of trade unionism.

The 1970s witnessed the gradual increase in the *de facto* power of black workers. The spontaneous strikes originating in Natal in 1973 and the Soweto riots of 1976 resulted in a dramatic increase in the political awareness among blacks. During this period there were renewed attempts to organise Blacks into independent unions. Having learnt from the experience of SACTU, the unions refrained from becoming overtly involved in politics, but instead, used the existing works committees and to a lesser extent, the liaison committees, established under the Black Labour Relations Regulation Act, to gain access to the factory floor. These structures, were created to serve as an alternative to trade unionism by the state and employers, but instead, were used by workers to build strong factory floor structures (Maree, 1987:4).

Despite initial gains, the union movement soon ran into difficulties when many persons involved in the organisation and promotion of black trade unions were banned. These bannings increased after the Soweto Riots of 1976. But the impetus was not totally lost, as workers were better organised and many multinational companies in South Africa, under international pressure, started to recognise the unregistered black trade unions (Maree, 1987:5). For most of the decade of the seventies, trade union activities centred on obtaining elementary rights - the right to organise, to be recognised and to bargain over wages and working conditions.

In 1979, when far-reaching reforms to labour legislation were introduced on the recommendation of the Wiehahn Commission, blacks were permitted to make use of the statutory labour relations dispensation for the first time. Hereafter, the black trade union movement grew rapidly and as the only legal channel available to blacks⁶, the trade union movement, which initially avoided politics and focused on

6. Blacks only obtained the right to vote in 1994.

strengthening workplace structures, was inevitably, forced to respond to wider political issues. Soon the black trade unions, together with other social movements organised under the banner of the United Democratic Front, engaged in joint campaigns to challenge the rule of the apartheid government. While many of the black trade unions belonging to the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) were initially cautious of becoming overtly involved in politics, they soon realised that unions had a duty to their members to join the political groups in their battles (Friedman, 1987:440). A successful political challenge to the state demanded that alliances be formed with other social groups. Webster (1988:194) refers to the type of unionism that emerged during this time, as not merely political unionism,⁷ but as social movement unionism. This form of unionism is typical in authoritarian countries where workers are excluded from the central political decision-making processes and are forced, to become involved not only in economic, but also social and political issues.

The founding of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) in November 1985, provided renewed impetus for the union movement to take up the political challenge, against the white-dominated political system and against capitalism. According to Baskin (1991:67) *"Cosatu became an outlet for political hopes of far more than its members. It acted as a political centre. Youths and students looked to it for guidance, churches asked it for political direction, ambassadors, foreign visitors and political journalists canvassed its opinions"*. Cosatu was the voice of the black people in South Africa, in the absence of any legal political bargaining channel. Together with other political organisations, Cosatu organised various stayaways and strikes of political significance, such as the protest against the state of emergency and against elections where blacks could not vote. While such activities brought the labour movement in direct confrontation with the state, they were by now well organised, and firmly entrenched in almost every economic sphere in South Africa, making it nearly impossible to crush the unions, despite the bannings and detentions of many of its leaders under the states of emergency in the mid-eighties.

With the unbanning of the black political organisations in 1990, the Black trade unions have formed strong links with the parties, which likewise promote the interests of the working class. Despite some areas of conflict and disagreement, the trade union movement has a close and cordial relationship with the new ANC-led government, with whom the largest trade union federation Cosatu, is in alliance. Since 1990, unions have become more involved in joint decision-making with other key role players, on a vast range of

7. Although the concept political unionism and social movement unionism is often used interchangeably, a clear distinction exists between the two concepts. Political unionism is more closely linked to the SACTU period where union involvement in politics was linked to the struggle for African independence. Social movement unionism is where the union movement plays a more assertive role in community and national politics to bring about change in the social structure (Lambert, 1989:3-5).

socio-economic and political aspects, and can be said to have moved from a position of resistance politics, to an era of "*politics of reconstruction*". Particularly since 1994, labour has become well interpenetrated in state structures, and some have suggested that the labour movement has entered a new era of "*strategic unionism*"⁸ (Patel, 1994:5). This shift in strategy signifies a desire to participate in the formulation of industrial policy and the implementation of such policies that will enhance both wealth creation and the distribution of wealth, the two issues being viewed as inseparable. This signifies a fundamental break from the old adversarial unionism of previous decades.

Given the role played by the trade union movement in obtaining both labour and political rights for the broader populace, it is understandable that the present social democratic ANC-led government will be sensitive to the needs of employees, whether they are policemen or soldiers. To substantiate this, the Minister of Labour, Mr Tito Mboweni, just prior to the promulgation of the new Labour Relations Act stated in a press report, that he was investigating the possibility of including soldiers under the new labour dispensation⁹ (Beeld, 1996:9). The mere fact that President Mandela set aside time to meet with a delegation from SANDU, to discuss the grievances of soldiers who protested outside the Union Buildings, illustrates the sensitivity to labour problems. This, despite the fact, that SANDU is not a recognised union and can even be considered an "*illegal union*", if interpreted against the provisions in the Defence Act.¹⁰

The support for trade unionism is also reflected in the public attitude towards trade unions in the military. Despite the derogatory cartoons and public sentiment expressed in various newspapers when SANDU¹¹ was created in 1994, there is substantial public support for allowing trade unions in the SANDF. In an opinion poll, conducted by the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP) and Human Science Research Council (HSRC) among the broader public, 52 percent Black, 39 percent Coloured, and 51 percent of Asian

8. Strategic unionism is defined by the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) as having the following characteristics: "*a tendency for unions to go beyond a narrow focus on wages and conditions; * the generation and implementation of centrally co-ordinated goals and integrated strategies; e.g. for full employment, labour market programmes, trade and industry policy, productivity, industrial democracy, social welfare, and taxation policies which promote equity and social cohesion; * sophisticated participation in tripartite bodies; * a commitment to growth and wealth creation as well as its equitable distribution; * the active pursuit of these goals and strategies in their own right both inside and outside the arena of industrial relations: with * the emphasis upon strong local and work place organisation: and * the extensive delivery of education and research services ...*" (ACTU/TDC, 1989:289).

9. This announcement was made after SANDU's National Secretary, Mr Cor van Niekerk attended a breakfast with the Minister of Labour, Mr Tito Mboweni on 20 August 1996 (SANDU, 1996:3).

10. The writer was invited to attend this meeting held on 6 April 1995 at Thuynhuys, Cape Town as an academic observer. During the meeting the President stated that he was concerned about the grievances of soldiers as he depends on the SANDF to maintain stability and assist in bringing down the level of crime. After the meeting the President ordered his legal advisers and the Minister of Defence, Mr Joe Modise, also present at the meeting, to investigate the grievances of the soldiers at 21 Battalion who previously demonstrated outside the Union Buildings.

11. See articles among others "War brewing over union for soldiers" (Argus, 1994:1); "A fear that Govt must dispel" (Star, 1994:1); "Whose orders would be obeyed" (Argus, 1994); "Absurd for forces to be able to strike". (Argus, 1994:6); "No unions - we're SANDF" (Pretoria News, 1994:1); "Weermagvakbond will nie staak nie" (Beeld, 1994); "SANDF Declares War" (Weekend Argus, 1995:1).

respondents were in favour of allowing trade unions. In contrast, almost 73 percent of Whites disagreed that members of the SANDF should be allowed to join trade unions (see Diagram 9.1).




Diagram 9.1: People in the SANDF should be allowed to form trade unions by race
Source: Institute for Defence Policy¹²

If an analyses is made according to political party, then the Pan African Congress (PAC) were most supportive at 61 percent, the Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP) at 59 percent and the ANC at 52 percent of trade unions in the SANDF. Respondents supporting the traditionally white parties were against the SANDF allowing unions. (Schutte and Sass 1995a:52) These findings substantiate the view that Blacks, in general, are more supportive of trade unionism.

To the question: *"In view of the fact that they perform an essential service and some people think the service they render should be uninterrupted should members of the SANDF be allowed to strike or demonstrate"*¹³, more than half, 56 percent of the respondents were against allowing strikes and demonstrations in the SANDF (Schutte & Sass, 1995a:53). Naturally, any decision to permit labour unions in the armed forces will be influenced by public sentiment. However, it is unlikely that persons, who have struggled to obtain both labour and political rights, will give up those rights readily under the current dispensation.

The problem the SANDF faces, should it permit members to join trade unions of their choice, is the possibility that unions could be formed along political lines. Members of the ANC's former armed wing Umkhonto

12. The detailed breakdown of the figures quoted in Diagram 9.1 were obtained from the Institute for Defence Policy, Midrand.
13. This can be considered a leading question. The responses may have been different if the question was, for example *"The Constitution grants workers the right to strike, should members of the SANDF have this right"*.

we Sizwe still have strong links with the ANC, which in turn has COSATU as an ally. The PAC's former armed wing APLA is closely aligned to the National Council of Trade Unions, NACTU. There is the real fear, that trade unions in the SANDF could not only undermine the constitutional principle of political impartiality, but civilian control over the Defence Force.

Nevertheless, with the greater degree of acceptance of unions in South Africa, and in light of the history of the labour movement and the close alliance of labour with government, it may be assumed that the probability to accept trade unions in the SANDF will be higher. However, as Ballantyne (1983:9) indicates "[c]ommunity acceptance is unlikely while unionism is associated with political and industrial activism". This view is substantiated by the results of the IDP/HSRC opinion poll among the broader public, where the majority of respondents accepted trade unionism, but rejected strike action and demonstrations by members of the SANDF. Also, (as was the case in France), where the extension of labour rights might politicise the armed forces, the government will be less inclined to extend these rights to soldiers. This could possibly be the reason why President Mandela declined SANDU's request to extend labour rights to soldiers, and why the SANDF has been excluded under the new Labour Relations Act that came into effect in November 1996.

However, if unions have shifted towards a position of strategic unionism, the question could be asked if unions for military personnel would not also adopt a similar stance. In other words, not become involved in the past militant stance associated with the era of social movement unionism and resistance politics, but become more involved in the formulation of defence policy. Such involvement could even enhance the legitimacy of the defence force within society and create greater commitment to the defence force amongst its members.

9.2.3 Influence of public sector labour rights

In the European countries that have extended labour rights to the military, this occurred only after these rights were granted to other state employees. From the public service, these rights transferred to the police and lastly to the military (Fleckenstein, 1988:182).

Until 1993, public service employees were denied the right to join trade unions, to strike or bargain collectively with the State as the employer. The main reasons given for the restrictions placed on the labour rights of state employees, relates not only to the essential nature of the services they render to society, but

due to the implication of collective bargaining and industrial action for the state both financially and politically. For the security forces, these rights were curbed due to the critical role they play in society in maintaining order, stability and national safety (Heinecken, 1993:4).

However, on 2 August 1993, after years of labour unrest among state employees, all public servants with the exception of the services departments¹⁴, were granted basic worker rights, comparable to the private sector with the promulgation of the Public Service Labour Relations Act (PSLRA), 102 of 1993. Shortly afterwards, the Department of Correctional Services that had witnessed an increase in unionisation and labour unrest among prison warders, requested that these rights be extended to its uniformed personnel. Subsequently, they were included when amendments were made to the Public Service Labour Relations Act, 1994.

This step was to have considerable impact on the then South African Police (SAP). The Police and Prisons Civil Right Union (POPCRU) represents both police and prisons personnel, and in 1993, both the SAP and the Correctional Services witnessed an upsurge in trade union activity. The spill over from the prisons department to the SAP was inevitable (Heinecken, 1993:16). Consequently, the SAP (now South African Police Service) amended the Police Act, No 7 of 1958 to include a section on South African Police Labour Regulations in 1993, which permitted policemen to join trade unions for the purpose of collective bargaining, but prohibiting strike action.

In 1995, labour legislation once again underwent change. A new Labour Relations Bill was tabled in February 1995, bringing all employees under one law - the private sector, public service, nurses, teachers, agricultural and domestic employees, but initially *excluded* members of the SANDF, agencies and services established in terms of the Intelligence Services Act, and the South African Police Services (SAPS). This exclusion, flows from the unique functions they perform and followed the International Labour Organisation (ILO) criteria, Convention 87 of 1948 (Freedom of Association and protection of the right to organise, article 9(1)) which stipulates that "[t]he extent to which this right can be extended to the security forces and police be subject to national legislation and regulations".

But shortly afterwards, the SAPS under pressure from the three unions representing policemen, requested that it be included under the new labour dispensation. As a result, the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995

14. The services departments referred to are the South African Police, South African Defence Force and Correctional Services.

(hereafter LRA) which came into effect on 11 November 1996 includes everyone, with the exception of uniformed members in the SANDF, the National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Service. Civilians in the Department of Defence are included under this legislation. This implies that they have the same labour rights as other employees. Civilians in the Department of Defence have the freedom of association to join a trade union and to participate in the activities of such a union, without fear of victimisation. Besides the entrenched organisational rights, the new LRA also provides the framework to promote joint decision-making in the workplace, collective bargaining and specialist labour bodies to help resolve disputes speedily (RSA, 1995:3-8).

Through the establishment of workplace forums, employees can participate in joint decision-making and consultation at the workplace. Forums can only be established in workplaces of more than 100 employees and must be established on the initiative of a representative trade union that has majority membership (RSA, 1995:83-88). Beyond the workplace, these civilian employees are represented through their unions on the Central Public Sector Co-ordinating Bargaining Council which covers issues that affect the whole public sector. Furthermore, civilian employees are represented by their unions on the Sectorial Bargaining Council for the Department of Defence, which deals with issues specific to their employment in the DoD¹⁵ (RSA, 1995:38-39). While the terms and scope of the agreements with the four recognised employee organisations differ, these unions act as the official collective bargaining agent of civilian members; have access to the premises of the Department of Defence upon prior arrangement; may conduct recruiting drives during working hours on condition that employees meet on a voluntary basis; may make use of departmental notice boards after obtaining permission from the Officer Commanding and may not be victimised for trade union activities.

Should there be a dispute, civilian employees may refer such matters to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). The main functions of the CCMA is to resolve workplace disputes by conciliation, mediation and arbitration, to assist in the establishment of workplace forums and statutory councils, as well as give advice and assistance to parties in a dispute. Disputes that the CCMA cannot resolve may be referred to the new Labour Court. Appeals against the rulings of the Labour Court can in turn be referred to the Labour Appeal Court (RSA, 1995:114-124, 150-168).

Another important provision of the new Labour Relations Act, is the protection of legal strikes. Employees

cannot be dismissed or disciplined for a legal strike, while employees who go on an illegal strike may face a court interdict, or a claim against them for losses resulting from the strike and dismissal. (RSA 1995:64-66) Employees classified as rendering and essential service may not strike, but must refer such a dispute to mediation or arbitration. The new LRA only lists the police and parliamentary services and any other service in which the disruption thereof may endanger the lives, personal health and safety of the entire population or part thereof, as essential services. A special, "*essential services committee*" will decide on what other categories of employment can be classified as essential services, and it is yet to be seen whether this will include all, or only certain civilian employees in the DoD (RSA, 1995:76-77). Last, but by no means least, is that an entire chapter of the new LRA is devoted to regulations and procedures dealing with unfair dismissals (RSA, 1995:169-181).

Besides the mechanisms available and protections under the new LRA, the DoD has also created a unit Labour Relations Communication Forum (LRCF) to ensure employee participation at lower levels. The functions of the LRCF are to address matters of mutual interest of concern within the jurisdiction of the unit Officer Commanding; to promote sound communication between Officers Commanding and employees; to submit proposals with respect to labour matters that cannot be solved at unit level and to monitor and supervise the execution of agreements between the SANDF and recognised employee organisations. The LRCF consists of the Officer Commanding of the unit, the Personnel Officer and a committee secretary, representatives of the employee organisations whose recognition agreement provides for representation at unit level, and representatives of unattached employees.¹⁶

Within the DoD, there is thus the situation where civilians working alongside uniformed personnel, often doing the same work, have full labour rights and are represented at various levels, while uniformed personnel have no labour rights under the new dispensation. According to Grobbelaar (1996:15), some of these civilians, such as those working in the naval dockyard, perform tasks more essential to operational effectiveness than uniformed personnel in administrative positions.

This disparity in labour rights has been one of the driving forces behind SANDU's fight for recognition and right to represent uniformed personnel. SANDU's mission statement declares that the union aims "[t]o

15. Currently the DoD has recognition agreements with four employee organisations, the Public Servants Association of South Africa (PSA), the Public Service League of South Africa (PSL), the National Education Health and Allied Workers' Union (NEHAWU) and the South African Health and Public Service Workers Union (SAHPSWU).

16. See the following: CSANDF Internal Communication Bulletins, "The Department of Defence and the SAHPSWU", No. 43/95 "Recognition agreement between the DoD and Nehawu", No. 80/95, "The SANDF and Labour Relations Communication Forums" No. 85/96.

represent the interests of all members, irrespective of rank, race, religion or sex, by means of reasonable and impartial labour relations practices".¹⁷ In doing so, it has declared that it will "... *maintain an apolitical image at all times, and to counter any unlawful interference in the execution of the mission by any person, political party, other organisation or institution*". Furthermore, that it will "... *represent and promote the interests of all persons through a process of active and collective bargaining*" but will at the same time "... *acknowledge and respect the identity, culture and traditions of the individual arms of service*".¹⁸ The fact that SANDU exists and appears to have substantial latent support increases the spill over of labour rights to uniformed personnel.

As almost fifty percent of uniformed members support the idea of a trade union and the DoD has already witnessed incidences of labour unrest among soldiers, the potential for collective action cannot be ignored. According to Perry (1977:98) this is especially so in a society which has given *de facto* and *de jure* recognition to such action as being legitimate in the search for job security and improved working conditions. We see for example, that despite the restrictions placed on trade union activity by the Correctional Services Act, 8 of 1959 and the Police Act, 7 of 1958 these departments were nevertheless subject to incidences of labour unrest and trade union activity, which eventually culminated in the acceptance of trade unionism. As a matter of interest, the restrictions placed on trade union activities in the latter departments were similar to those in Section 126B of the Defence Act, 1956.

Furthermore, Steele and Heineken (1995:85) who analysed the convergence between private and public sector labour relations systems established that in the long run, specialised structures have not been acceptable or successful in the regulation of labour relations. Despite the existence of numerous avenues of appeal, such as individual conflict resolution mechanisms (updating the grievance and disciplinary procedures), the creation of alternative communication structures or discussion forums, full labour rights were only extended to employees after these structures proved ineffective or unable to meet the needs of employees¹⁹. The implication of this finding is that the SANDF cannot assume that an upgrading of the Military Disciplinary Code, or the revitalisation of the forum structure, will automatically preclude the need for collective bargaining or some alternative structure, should there be such a requirement. Should the

17. Information brochure provided by SANDU to the State President at the meeting held at Thuynhuys, Cape Town, 6 April 1995.

18. Of interest, is that SANDU was started by approximately 30 uniformed members who saw a union as the only way to solve their grievances. According to its executive officer Mr Cor van Niekerk, a former major in the South African Airforce, the union has approximately 60 percent non-commissioned officers and 40 percent officers and has slightly more black members (mostly in the lower ranks) than white members.

19. See Heineken (1993) for a comprehensive overview of the labour relations dispensation and development for both uniformed and civilian personnel employed by the Department of Defence as well as the other services departments.

SANDF ignore this need, it will most likely result in a situation where unions (such as SANDU) or associations place pressure on the organisation "outside" the statutory framework of the law, as has been the case in every other public service department in South Africa.

9.2.4 Decline in the status of military profession

The need to have some form of representation is often enhanced where military personnel are treated the same as the rest of the public service and where they have experienced a decline in their relevance and status in society. Harries-Jenkins (1977:61) claims that one of the most important factors motivating the military to unionise, is the feeling that the armed forces, in comparison with other institutions in society, have lost their previously held status, and have suffered an undue amount of deprivation. *"When there is a significant loss of privilege and status of the military in society, trade unions are then formed as a pressure group to re-establish the privileges formerly held by the armed forces"*.

With the focus on social development and upliftment in South Africa, the SANDF does not enjoy the same status within society as it did in previous years. Under the National Party, especially during the PW Botha era, the former SADF played a central role in political decision making through the Joint Security Management System and consumed a growing share of the country's national resources. But with the withdrawal of the SADF from Angola and independence of Namibia, the military since 1990 found itself very rapidly relegated to the fringes of South African power politics. A budget which peaked at 3,4 percent of the Gross Domestic Product in 1989 had been slashed to 2,2 percent by 1995, with massive further budgetary cuts envisaged (Shaw, 1994:229; Wood, 1995: 15).

At this stage in the history of South Africa, the military faces the dilemma not necessarily of justifying its existence, but certainly its expenditure, size and future role within society. According to Fourie (1996:176), there is an anti-military lobby in the ANC for virtual unilateral disarmament of the military, partly because many feel that the SANDF is *"still too white"* (particularly its officer corps), and because it is thought that reconstruction and development requires priority above the military. The ANC feels that defence funding should be cut in favour of social projects (Sunday Times, 1996:7).

To add to this, the SANDF frequently faces demands in the media to motivate the need to upgrade or acquire more technologically advanced equipment. Even though the Interim Constitution, 1993 Section 226 (4) states that the Defence Force must be *"... a balanced, modern and technologically advanced"*

*military force*²⁰ whose primary task is the protection of the Republic, its sovereignty, and territorial integrity, it is unlikely that it will be utilised in this role. There is no conventional military threat to the country. The main task of the SANDF will be to support the police in internal law and border duties, and to prepare for possible involvement in peacekeeping operations in the region. The greatest threat to South Africa at present comes from socio-economic problems like unemployment, poverty, inadequate education, lack of housing and social services, crime and violence - none of which demand a military solution. Reconstruction and development for stability and security has become the national priority, not defence (CSANDF, 1996:1).

The perception that there is decline in the relevance and importance of the military is reflected in the views of officers presently serving in the SANDF. In the survey conducted among officers attending the junior, senior and joint staff courses, it was found that while 60 percent of the officers felt that the Defence Force is more legitimate than a few years ago,²¹ 79 percent were of the opinion that South African society views military service as less important today. So while officers perceive the SANDF to be more legitimate in the eyes of the broader populace, the importance of their role and function in society is seen to have declined.

However, the officers did not agree with society's view that military service is less important and that military issues should receive a lower priority, just because there is no external threat. The overwhelming majority, 88 percent disagreed with the statement that "*[b]ecause of the present absence of an external threat, that South African society must not emphasise military issues*".²² The implications of these findings are that officers feel that society no longer respects their profession and the unique function they fulfil.

Another factor, affecting officers' commitment to serve is the fact that 68 percent felt that operationally, the Defence Force was more competent a few years ago (see Table 9.1). As professionals they themselves feel that they are becoming less capable of fulfilling their primary role in society. The erosion of military

20. This clause has been removed from the Interim Constitution and replaced with Section 200(1) "*[t]he defence force must be structured and managed as a disciplined military force*" whose (2) "*[p]rimary object ... is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people, in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force.*" The removal of the clause relating to "*technologically advanced military force*" possibly relates to the public debate over the purchasing of the corvettes for the SA Navy and other more sophisticated weaponry for the SANDF (Sunday Times, 1996:7).

21. During the apartheid era, the former SADF lacked legitimacy, as many blacks perceived the military as a means to maintain white supremacy. Especially after the troops were used in the townships to curb the rising tide of black resistance in the mid eighties, this resentment grew (Nathan, 1989a:70).

22. In an opinion survey conducted by the Institute for Defence Policy and Human Sciences Research Council it was found that Whites, Asians and Coloureds were significantly more supportive of the need for a strong defence force than Blacks (Schutte & Sass, 1995b: 44-45).

budgets, the cancellation of advanced weapons system and the apparent preference for social projects are seen as symptoms of national neglect. The inability to maintain and acquire new equipment, the integration process, and the perceived lowering of standards of training, the rationalisation and resignation of competent military officers and the impact of affirmative action, all contribute towards the feeling of relative deprivation.

Table 9.1: Perceptions on status and relevance of military service*

	Yes	Unsure	No
<i>Variable</i>	%	%	%
The SANDF is more legitimate than a few years ago.	60	17	30
South African society views military service as less important than a few years ago.	79	12	9
Because of the present absence of an external threat, South African society must not emphasise military issues.	21	17	88
Operationally the South African armed forces were more competent a few years ago than today.	68	12	20

* Total in sample 188

The perceived decline in the relevance and status of their profession, together with the lack of mechanisms to advance their deteriorating conditions of service, underlies much of the present need for some form of collective representation at the highest level.²³

9.3 FORCE FIELD OF MILITARY UNIONISM

This chapter outlines some of the societal forces that influence, either directly or indirectly, the management of labour relations in the SANDF. In this regard, Manley *et al* (1977:107) developed a model illustrating the force field of military unionism. This model has been adapted to the South African situation, and serves as an apt summary of the forces that influence the management of labour relations in the SANDF. Virtually none of the restraining, but all of the driving forces identified by Manley *et al* are evident in South Africa (see Diagram 9.2).

Much of the debate surrounding labour rights for military personnel in South Africa centres on the *constitutionality of prohibiting unions*. Even though the SANDF is excluded from the ambit of the new Labour Relations Act, No 66 of 1995 and the Defence Act, 1956 Section 126 (as amended) limits the

23. See Section 8.4. For a discussion on the need for representation on pay problems and support for a professional association and trade union with collective bargaining rights by officers serving in the SANDF.

labour rights of military personnel, the testing ground for justifying such limitations will no doubt be the Constitutional Court. In this regard, it is debatable to what degree the rights of soldiers as employees, in a democracy, can be reasonably and justifiably curtailed. In all probability, restrictions will not be placed on the freedom of association, but on the activities of any organisation representing the collective interests of military personnel that constitute a clear danger to loyalty, discipline and morale.




Diagram 9.2: The force field of military unionism
Source: As adapted from Manley R. McNichols C. and Saul Young G., 1977:107.

The question may not be the legality of such legislation, but its enforceability. Many of the forces that either drive or restrain the development of some form of group representation within armed forces are linked to the socio-political and military environment. As Manley *et al* (1977) illustrate, where there is private sector opposition or public and parliamentary antipathy, it is unlikely that labour rights will be extended to the armed forces. However, the sensitivity of the present ANC-led government to labour and the support for trade unions among the broader populace, indicates that there is no overwhelming private sector opposition to unions in the military. The support for allowing trade unions in the military also stems from the fact that the rest of the public service as well as the police have labour rights. As indicated in previous chapters, the recent pay stance²⁴ by government where uniformed members are remunerated on the same pay scales as the rest of the public service, reinforce the perception that they are merely *public servants in uniform*. If they are treated no differently from public servants by government, one cannot expect soldiers to behave the same as any other employee if faced with a decline in service benefits and tenure.

The need for representation can also be coupled to the perceived anti-military environment. At this stage

24. See Section 8.2.3 and 8.3.1 for a discussion on the parity in salary scales with the rest of the public service.

in the history of South Africa, the SANDF faces the dilemma not necessarily of justifying its existence, but most certainly of its expenditure, size and future role within society. Even though most officers felt that the military is politically more legitimate, they did not support the idea that just because of the present absence of an external threat, that South African society must under emphasise the role, and importance of the military.

Nearly all the forces outlined by Manley *et al* (1977) indicate that the DoD faces the possibility of unionisation, and it is against this background, that the SANDF is being pressurised to create the necessary mechanisms through which the interests of uniformed members can be articulated and addressed.

9.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A key issue in the military union debate in South Africa is whether the right to belong to a trade union for the purpose of collective bargaining can be reasonably and justifiably curtailed for military personnel. The suggestion is made that in all likelihood the activities of a union, but not the freedom of association to join a trade union could be curtailed, on the basis that it is the activities of unions that constitutes a danger to organisational and combat effectiveness. However, ultimately, it is not the legality of the restrictions on trade unions, but its enforceability that will be the decisive factor.

The dominant political and trade union culture in South Africa is supportive of trade unionism, as is reflected in the results obtained from a public opinion poll measuring the support for unions for military personnel. While some European countries have restricted the rights of military personnel to belong to trade unions, especially where union activity is associated with political and industrial activism, a position was put forward that the recent shift to strategic unionism in South Africa, tends to indicate that a military personnel would be less likely under the new political dispensation to partake in radical political activities, but would most likely, play an influential role in the formulation of defence policy.

Presently, the pressure to extend labour rights to uniformed personnel in the SANDF is enhanced by the fact that the police and civilian employees serving in the Department of Defence have labour rights. The fact that these civilians work alongside military personnel and have mechanisms whereby their needs can be articulated, while uniformed members lack effective structures, increasing the pressure for unionisation. Public sector experience also indicates, that the creation of alternative specialised structures to deal with

labour relations issues have often proved ineffective and have eventually led to the acceptance of unionism.

The inclination of military personnel to form or join a union is enhanced where the military institution, and the military profession, has suffered a significant loss of privilege in society. This perception was verified by a survey conducted among a select group of officers, many of whom felt that military service is considered less important, and that society no longer respects their profession and the unique function they fulfil. These responses could be attributed to government priority with social upliftment, rather than security in the absence of any external threat.

To conclude, it was proposed that the entire industrial relations force field needs to be taken into consideration in the debate on whether military personnel will be likely to join, or form unions, or whether labour rights can be extended to military personnel. Ultimately, as the experience of the public sector and the police indicates, it may be better to create the necessary structures whereby soldiers can negotiate their conditions of service, than for the state to be forced to cope with non-institutionalised labour unrest by “armed” soldiers.

CHAPTER TEN

THE COMPATIBILITY OF LABOUR RIGHTS WITH MILITARY SERVICE IN SOUTH AFRICA

10.1 INTRODUCTION

A position frequently put forward is that soldiers are not workers, and are therefore excluded per definition from having labour rights. While there may be substance to this argument, a contract of employment does exist between members of the armed forces and the State as employer, as regulated by the Defence Act, 1957 and the Public Service Act, 1994.¹ The fact that Section 126C of the Defence Act, 1957 recognises that "[a]ny member of the Permanent Force shall exercise his rights with respect to labour matters in terms of the regulations, and the State as his employer shall handle and administer all such matters, including the resolution of disputes, in accordance with regulations", indicates the acknowledgement of the need for labour relations regulations.

Similar sentiments are expressed in the White Paper on Defence, which states that the Department of Defence (DoD) must create appropriate labour relations mechanisms, through which the interests of SANDF members can be articulated and addressed (SANDF, 1996a:37).

The aim of this chapter is to determine whether labour rights can be extended to soldiers in South Africa. Taking international precedent, the unique nature of the military profession, the recent drift towards occupationalism, as well as the socio-political and military circumstances into consideration, some suggestions are made that could improve the present labour relations dispensation for uniformed personnel.

The shortcomings of the existing individual and collective grievance resolution mechanisms are highlighted, and certain suggestions are made that could improve the efficiency of these structures. The establishment, appointment, role and possible labour relations function of the Military Ombudsperson is discussed. As the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) may have to accommodate either/or professional associations or trade unions, some suggestions are made as to how these organisations

1. The Public Service Act, 1994, Section 8 determines that the public service shall *inter alia* consist of persons who (a) hold posts on the fixed establishment and (ii) *the services*, thus including persons who hold posts in the Permanent Force of the SANDF.

could be accommodated, without undermining the authority structure of the military, or posing a threat to civilian control over the armed forces.

10.2 ACCOMMODATING THE SOLDIER AS EMPLOYEE

This section focuses specifically, on some of the means whereby the present labour relations dispensation for uniformed members of the SANDF, can be improved to accommodate the needs and aspirations of soldiers as employees.

10.2.1 Revision of individual grievance procedures

The Military Disciplinary Code (MDC) (Schedule 1 of the Defence Act) is the structural base of authority whereby the SANDF maintains discipline and resolves military related problems.² Included in the MDC is Section 134 dealing the Redress of Wrongs procedure. This procedure is the means whereby an aggrieved member of the SANDF, can submit a written request for a redress of wrongs right up to the President, should the member be dissatisfied with the decision taken by the command structure.

In principle, the Redress of Wrongs procedure can be compared to a grievance procedure found in any other private organisation, although the issues that can be channelled through this procedure relate more specifically to issues of injustice. For example, a superior may have treated a subordinate with unnecessary harshness, or the member may feel he/she has been unjustifiably disciplined or insulted. Grievances where members have no legal claim, such as transfers, leave nomination for courses and pay fall outside the jurisdiction of the MDC. Such grievances are addressed through the normal chain of command structures or communication "*forum*" structure, which makes provision for both individual and collective grievances.

One of the main problems with the present grievance resolution procedures is that until recently, feedback was not coupled to specific time periods. The procedure only stated that feedback must be given within a "*reasonable time*". Amendments made to the MDC have reviewed this and coupled the resolution of grievances at the various levels to specific time periods. Even so, in practice there is considerable delays given the bureaucratic nature of the military organisation.

Notwithstanding, if any grievance procedure is to function properly, aggrieved members should not only receive feedback within specific time limits, but also be able to appeal against unsatisfactory responses. At present there is no dispute resolution procedure for either disputes of rights³ (those which fall under the jurisdiction of the MDC) or disputes of interests, which are channelled through the normal command structure. Should a member of the SANDF feel dissatisfied with the feedback received from the Chief of the SANDF (CNDF), this may be forwarded to the President, whose answer is final.

Another concern with the present procedure is that it is not considered an impartial channel of restitution. Grobbelaar (1996:15), a senior officer in the SANDF, claims that in practice uniformed members are often reluctant to submit grievances through the Redress of Wrongs procedure, *"... because of a concern of possible victimisation or negative consequences for their future careers"*. A grievance procedure will not be effective if employees fear that they will be victimised or intimidated for lodging a complaint. Recently, a Lieutenant Magama, who wrote a letter to President Mandela complaining about racial discrimination, was court martialed for not channelling his grievance through the MDC. In his defence, he stated the reason for not doing so as *"... they expect us to complain to the very people who are unjustly discriminating against us"* (Mail and Guardian, 1997:6). The conclusion can be reached that due to the shortcomings mentioned that the MDC does not function as an effective grievance mechanism.

10.2.2 Revision of the communication "forum" structure

During 1995, the communication "forum" structure⁴ was introduced, to enable various rank groups to submit proposals with respect to the improvements in their conditions of service, identification of problem areas and means to improve higher morale in the unit. The forum structure is primarily a communication structure, whereby either individual or collective grievances, complaints and suggestions can be brought to the attention of higher authority. While this is a valuable forum, the main shortcoming of this mechanism is that there is no remedial channel, should there be dissatisfaction with the feedback received from higher

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2. A commission under the chairmanship of R Adm J.E. Retief has been tasked to review the entire Defence Act including the MDC to bring it in line with Constitutional requirements. The revisions affecting summary trials, which can be compared to disciplinary hearings as well as court martials may have some impact on labour relations.
 3. A "dispute of right" is that to which a party is entitled by law, by contract, by agreement or by established practice. Most of the complaints that can be channelled through the MDC fall within this category. A dispute of interest is that which a party is not yet entitled. Any matter causing conflict between an employer and employee and not regulated by law, agreement or custom can give rise to a "dispute of interest". It is specifically in this sphere where there is a lack of effective individual and collective procedures with some form of dispute resolution mechanism for uniformed personnel in the SANDF.
 4. See Section 7.3.2 for a discussion of how this structure functions.

authorities. In labour relations terms, grievance, disciplinary and dispute resolution procedures are complementary to one another. The absence of one renders the others less effective.

Most of the grievances channelled through the forum structure concern matters of interest, that relate to the determination of new terms and conditions of employment. Unlike disputes of right which have judicial foundation, the resolution of disputes of interest constitute a more dynamic aspect of labour relations, as the right still needs to be established. The settlement of such disputes may require the establishment of procedures such as conciliation, mediation or arbitration.⁵

A possible means to overcome the shortcomings for resolving both individual and collective disputes, is to utilise a mechanism similar to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) created under the new Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995. The CCMA⁶ is a state funded body, governed by a tripartite board composed of representatives of government, labour and business, designed specifically, to resolve disputes as speedily as possible at local and central level by means of conciliation, mediation and where necessary, arbitration. Only where disputes cannot be resolved, are they referred to the Labour Court for adjudication. These dispute resolution mechanisms are already available to civilian employees in the DoD, but as uniformed members are excluded from the scope of the Labour Relations Act, it is debatable whether the DoD could utilise this structure for uniformed personnel.

Should a similar mechanism be created to resolve disputes for uniformed personnel, criteria will need to be established with respect to the appointment, selection and tenure of such officials. Such a military CCMA could possibly function as follows. After a complaint has been channelled through the forum structure,⁷ and an unsatisfactory response is received from the CNDF, resulting in a dispute, the matter could be referred to the military CCMA. The method of settlement will depend on the seriousness of the dispute. The more critical the issue, the greater the tendency to make use of compulsory arbitration.

A possible problem for the military, is that arbitration does tend to take the initiative out of the hands of the actual participants and means that the selection of the arbitrator, or even mediator must be fully acceptable to all parties involved in the dispute. As military personnel do not have access to the Labour Court due to

5. Conciliation entails bringing together the parties and urging them to continue negotiation until a settlement is reached. Mediation, is where a third party acts as a go between supplying new perspectives and arguments in an attempt to achieve a settlement, whereas in arbitration the third party takes on the role of adjudicator.

6. Refer to Section 9.2.3 for a discussion of this mechanism.

7. Refer to Section 7.3.2 for a discussion of the communication structure for collective grievances.

their exclusion from the Labour Relations Act, a possible option to consider, in the case of fundamental disagreement, is for the MO to investigate and make recommendations on disputes that could not be resolved by the military CCMA. These recommendations are submitted to the Ministry of Defence who must report back to the MO and in severe cases to the President, as Commander in Chief of the Defence Force.

The most obvious value of such a structure is that it may render the present individual and collective grievance procedures for both disputes of rights and interests, more acceptable. As unresolved grievances are one of the main causes of labour unrest, a special CCMA that is compatible with military service, may diffuse potential discontent within the ranks of the SANDF.

10.2.3 The military ombudsperson

The creation of the post of Military Ombudsperson (MO) is one of the most favoured means proposed by Parliament and the DoD to address the problems and grievances of military personnel (Citizen, 1996:11).

10.2.3.1 Establishment and appointment

In terms of the Interim Constitution, Section 110 to 114 and the new 1996 Constitution, Section 182, provision is made for the establishment and appointment of a Public Protector to investigate all complaints over the total spectrum of Government. These include, for example, complaints by the public against maladministration in connection with government affairs; improper conduct by a person performing a public function; improper acts with respect to public money; improper or unlawful enrichment of a person performing a public function resulting in improper prejudice of another person.

The premise of the Public Protector is that there should only be one such institution for the whole of the Republic of South Africa. One means whereby a MO could be accommodated is to appoint such a person as a Deputy Public Protector within the office of the Public Protector. Section 7 (3)(a) of the Public Protector Act, 23 of 1994, also makes provision for the Public Protector to request a department to place a person with specialised knowledge at his disposal to assist with investigations. There is thus scope, within the current dispensation to appoint a person within the office of the Public Protector to attend to complaints brought by SANDF personnel, or which have been lodged against the SANDF, by the public. The location

of a MO in this capacity, within the office of the Public Protector, would also ensure that the institution of MO is seen as independent of the influence of the DoD.

Should a MO be appointed independently, but more or less on the same level as the Public Protector, the matter would have to be negotiated between the Public Protector and the Ministry, Parliament (the Joint Standing Committee and the Portfolio Committee) and the DoD, to avoid duplication of functions. An alternative could also be to create or appoint a Defence or Soldiers Complaints Commissioner, who could perform the same function as that of a MO, but be accountable to the Public Protector.

Whatever the structure, it is imperative that the role and function of the MO be perceived as independent. An investigation of those countries that have provided for a MO shows that it must be totally independent from the military or any other civil institution, if it is to have any legitimacy.⁸ However, the incumbent needs to have a sound knowledge of military values, procedure, administration and functioning.

10.2.3.2 Role and functions

Based on the White Paper on Defence and statements by the Joint Standing Committee of Defence Chairman, Mr Tony Yengeni, it would appear as if the role of the MO is to monitor adherence to democratic civil-military relations; undertake investigations at the request of parliament; investigate complaints against the SANDF by military personnel and investigate complaints against the SANDF by members of the public (SANDF, 1996a:12; Citizen, 1996a:11). The MO as with the Public Protector is appointed by and reports to parliament.⁹ The essence of the MO's role is to ensure the observance of the principles enshrined in the Constitution by military personnel and to investigate any human rights violations. Other typical functions could include oversight of the Legal and Personnel Divisions at DoD headquarters; the procedures followed by the military courts and prisons; and the detention and dismissal of uniformed members.

The right to appeal to a MO to investigate irregularities of court martials, arrests, detentions or dismissals, may also render the disciplinary procedure more congenial. In any such, or related human rights

8. In order to cultivate feeling of mutual trust among servicemen and the public in the military, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Germany, Portugal and Austria have considered it necessary to establish a military ombudsman or a defence ombudsman. In some countries the MO functions separately from the Public Protector and in others, is part of the same department (Watters & Partners, 1994:114; Chapman, 1966:245-259).

9. The role and functions of the Military Ombudsperson could be prescribed in the Defence Act, which is currently undergoing substantial revision to bring it in line with the Constitution, and provisions spelt out in the White Paper on Defence.

violations, members should have the right to submit their complaint directly to the MO, without going through the chain of command. Ironically, in the absence of a MO, this role is currently being fulfilled by SANDU. For example, SANDU recently secured a Supreme Court interdict, that it is unconstitutional for the SANDF to hold persons in detention without the option of applying for bail (Beeld, 1997:4).

Another function of the MO is to conduct tours of inspection. In other countries, such inspections are made at random, or in some cases, may have been initiated by complaints received from the public or members serving in the armed forces themselves. The department or unit receives only a day's notice of inspection visits (Chapman, 1966:251). The MO in South Africa could fulfil a similar function. Even though the MO has only powers of enquiry, the impartiality of the findings and the mere consciousness of the MO, may have a healthy effect on the whole organisation, as well as the leadership behaviour of superiors.

Although the MO can be a valuable institution to investigate irregularities, it is debatable whether it should intervene in the chain of command to resolve grievances or disputes. To do so would require that the powers of the MO be extended to at least those of an arbitrator, to be able to adjudicate and ensure fair labour practices. As suggested, a possible alternative, is for the MO to act as an impartial body in the absence of a Labour Court. The power of the MO to make recommendations to the Minister of Defence, to refer matters to the President as Commander in Chief of the SANDF and to report to Parliament, should ensure sufficient oversight and adherence to just and fair labour practices.

10.2.4 The need for group representation

While the implementation of a CCMA type dispute resolution mechanism for the military, and the establishment of a MO, can improve the present labour relations dispensation for military personnel, there is still a need for representation on pay and conditions of service. The need for some form of group representation, is central to the current labour relations debate within the SANDF.

The desire to have an organisation to represent their interests¹⁰ is precisely because most sources of grievances cannot be readily addressed within the chain of command. The required decisions are often beyond the legal competence of the officer commanding or the internal authority structure of the military, but lie with external role players or political decision-makers.

employees are to be sought and retains the discretion to decide the final outcome without subjecting it to joint agreement with employees or their representatives (Salamon, 1987:243).*

The reason why professional associations and not trade unions are admissible relates to their *modus operandi*. Professional associations aim to represent the professional interests of their members by projecting an image of professionalism and by enhancing the status of their occupation in the eyes of the employers, government and the public (Salamon, 1987:129). However, as the Belgium experience indicates, this does not preclude professional associations from adopting or behaving like trade unions if their aspirations are not met by more moderate means.

10.2.4.2 Scope of activities

As previously indicated, it is not the freedom of association to belong to a trade union that poses any potential threat to organisational or combat effectiveness, or civilian control over the military, but the activities traditionally associated with trade union activity. The next question that arises, is what restrictions can be placed on the activities of organisations representing military personnel?

Unions or associations, representing military personnel may need to conform to certain criteria if they are to have any *locus standi* within the SANDF. As one of the concerns is that unions will politicise the armed forces, restrictions could be placed on the right of such organisations to be formed along party political lines, to join political parties or partake in their activities. Such a restriction is justifiable as the principle of political impartiality of the armed forces is constitutionally entrenched.¹⁵ The suggestion was also previously made¹⁶ that should an organisation be formed to represent military personnel, it would be less inclined towards radical political activities under the current political dispensation, given the shift towards strategic unionism.

Another concern is whether organisations representing military personnel will divide the military along racial lines. This too could be justifiably curtailed, as the principle of *equality of rights*¹⁷ in the constitution specifically states that racial exclusivity as criteria for membership is not acceptable. A possible problem, however, is if these organisations are formed along the classical division that already exists in the military, namely between officers and non-commissioned officers. The officer corps of the SANDF is still

15. Section 226 (6) of the Interim Constitution states that: "No member of the permanent force shall hold office in any political party or political organisation". This clause has been expanded in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill, 1996, Section 199 (7) to: "Neither the security service, nor any of their members, may, in the performance of their functions - (a) prejudice a political party interest that is legitimate in terms of the Constitution; or (b) further, in a partisan manner, nay interest of a political party".

16. See Section 9.2.2 for a discussion on the shift from social movement unionism to strategic unionism in the post 1994 era.

predominantly white, while the opposite holds for non-commissioned officers, who are mainly Black. Although European experience does not indicate that officers and non-commissioned officers are organised as opposing groups, the racial, cultural and political divisions are not as acute in these countries, as in South Africa.

Besides the need for organisations representing military personnel to concede to the above-mentioned constitutional principles, restrictions could be placed on the activities that may be detrimental to organisational or combat effectiveness. For example, limitations could be placed on the right to intervene in the chain of command and authority structure, that threaten to divide the loyalty of the member between the unit and the union/professional organisation. Activities that may undermine discipline or combat readiness too could be constrained. As the collective resistance against authority is considered an act of mutiny, limitations could justifiably be placed on the right to strike or demonstrate. Provision could be made for the entire representation process to be suspended during times of national emergencies or war. Similar regulations have been imposed on military unions and professional associations in advanced democracies.

If these restrictions are accepted by military associations or unions, and are enshrined in legislation, it removes many of the potential fears that group representation may hold for the SANDF. Under such conditions, some form of group representation for military personnel could be permissible, and may even contribute towards morale and loyalty. The present dissatisfaction with the ranks of the SANDF is not as a result of union involvement, but due the lack of effective grievance and representative structures. As Cortright (1977:231) aptly states "*... unions do not create employee grievances, they simply try to deal with them and erase their causes. The tensions that threaten military reliability cannot be traced to unionisation. They depend on military mission and on command ability to meet rank and file needs. Internal effectiveness hinges on the decisions of commanders, not labour leaders*". The solution lies with the military leadership's ability to resolve disputes.

The question that remains, is what will be the role and function of an organisation representing military personnel, given the restrictions placed on their activities? Even negotiations over pay and conditions of service is in most cases removed from the scope of bargaining, as benefits gained from negotiated settlements by the public service unions, are extended to uniformed personnel. A shortcoming, is that there is

17. See Section 8 (2) of the Interim Constitution states that "*No person shall be unfairly discriminated against, directly or indirectly, and without derogating from the generality of this provision, on one or more of the following grounds in particular: race, gender, sex ...*". Section 9 (3-4) of the 1996 Constitution includes a similar provision.

no organisation or institutionalised mechanism whereby uniformed members can participate in the formulation of policy, or where they can lobby, bargain or negotiate for their unique institutional requirements.

10.2.4.3 Process of representation and joint consultation

The form of group representation that may be permitted in the SANDF, would in all probability not resemble trade unions in the classic sense, but be closer in definition and behaviour to that of a professional association. Based on the premise that members of the SANDF may be permitted some form of group representation, the following process of representation and joint consultation could be considered (see Diagram 10.1).




Diagram 10.1: Institutionalised process of joint consultation

Those organisations approved by the Minister to represent the collective interests of military personnel could upon prior agreement hold regular informal and formal discussions with the Ministry of Defence (MoD), on matters that affect their service dispensation and employment in the SANDF. The scope of such discussions needs to be specified, but would typically include issues affecting human resource policy.

After holding informal discussions with the associations, the MoD confers with the relevant role players such as Chief of the Defence Staff of the SANDF and designated staff officers, representatives of the Defence Secretariat and Public Service Commission (representing the State as employer). The Minister may also consult other external role players, such as the MO, should this be deemed necessary.

Hereafter, the MoD holds formal discussions with the associations. After considering the recommendations of the various organisations representing military personnel, the Minister makes a final decision. Should the Minister turn down recommendations by the respective associations, the reasons for doing so needs to be motivated. However, to give this process legitimacy, any matter falling within the jurisdiction of discussion on which the associations have *not* been consulted, has no judicial validity.

The Minister of Defence could refer matters that may have political repercussions, to the Joint Standing Committee or the Portfolio Committees of Defence for deliberation. Should the decisions made by these committees require a revision of policy, this can then be referred to the Defence Secretariat whose task it is to formulate human resource policy. The input of the SANDF is secured through the Council on Defence,¹⁸ which is the forum for institutional decision-making affecting the entire DoD. Once policy has been formulated the MoD can once again consult the association for their final comment. This process may ensure that organisations representing military personnel are not placed in a position of confrontation with the SANDF. At the same time, the associations have an opportunity to influence any draft agreement, decree or directive, affecting their service conditions, before being promulgated.

Even in the absence of any representative organisation, this structure could be of value. As in the case of Germany, "*trustmen*" are selected to represent and serve on a council at the level of the MoD, representatives of the forum structure from the various regional commands, could similarly represent and inform the MoD of problems and grievances within the ranks, or offer advice to the Minister.

While the above process could ensure some form of participation in policy formation, there is still a need for a mechanism where uniformed personnel can negotiate or lobby for their unique service requirements. In the Co-ordinating Bargaining Council of the Public Service, the Public Service Commission represents the State as collective employer, versus the trade unions and personnel associations, who represent the interests of the public servants as employees. As uniformed personnel are excluded from the Labour Relations Act, the military *per se* is not represented on this forum. Even though pay and conditions of service negotiated for the broader public service is extended to military personnel, (effectively removing a potential area of conflict from the military arena) the unique institutional requirements of the military cannot be negotiated on this forum. An alternative mechanism, through which the interests of the military could be accommodated, outside the bargaining structures that are in place for the rest of the Public Service, is required.

A means to accommodate the interests of military personnel, under the current dispensation, is to create a special mechanism, such as a Defence Service Review Board (DSRB), for military personnel. Typically, representatives of the various organisations representing military personnel, representatives of the DoD, and the Public Service Commission, would serve on the DSRB, with possibly the MO as chairman. This would not be a collective bargaining forum, but a mechanism for joint consultation and recommendation. As previously mentioned, salaries are negotiated by the broader public service and extended to military personnel. This forum serves only to address the unique service conditions of uniformed members that need to be reviewed by the Public Service Commission. Should there be fundamental areas of conflict between the parties concerned, these could be referred to the Minister of Defence and ultimately to the President, as Commander in Chief of the SANDF, for final determination.

An area of concern, is how much pressure will be brought on political authorities by organisations representing military personnel. One of the main reasons why military personnel, elsewhere, have formed collective organisations, is precisely because interest groups are more effective in persuading the political authorities to accept participation in those areas of decision-making that affect them. These include cuts in military budgets, possible amendments in military benefits, and to the system of military justice. What remains uncertain, is what form of pressure, and what the powers of such organisations will be. A principle of military professionalism is after all, the acceptance of constraints on the institutional autonomy of the military by civil authorities.

Should such associations press to be the ultimate judge on all matters affecting the armed forces, this could seriously disturb the current delicate balance of civilian control over the SANDF. Harries-Jenkins (1977:61) warns, that where the military has suffered an undue amount of deprivation, pressure groups are often formed to re-establish formerly held privileges. Strong professional associations, lobbying for the institutional interests of the military could pose a threat to civil-military relations, especially where the interests of such organisations run counter to public interest.

Given the constraints that could reasonably and justifiably be placed on organisations representing military personnel, it is unlikely that trade unions as found in the civilian sector could be compatible with military service. The challenge is to create acceptable alternatives. Whatever organisational form a military union may take, the scope of bargaining would need to be clearly defined.

18. The Council on Defence consists of the Minister, the Deputy Minister, the CNDP and the Defence Secretary.

10.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Since 1994, the DoD has faced increasing pressure to extend labour rights to uniformed military personnel. This pressure has come about largely as a result of the inefficient labour dispensation for uniformed personnel, and an increasing need for some form of representation and channel, whereby uniformed members can lobby, bargain or negotiate for their unique institutional dispensation.

Much of the present frustration within the chain of command can be attributed to the inefficiency of present labour relation mechanisms, particularly the lack of any dispute resolution mechanism for either disputes of right or interest for military personnel. A possible solution is the institutionalisation of a structure, similar to the CCMA that would enable soldiers to resolve disputes at both local and central level. In the case of fundamental disagreement, and in the absence of a Labour Court, such matters of dispute could be referred to a MO for investigation and recommendation, and if necessary, final adjudication by the President as Commander in Chief of the SANDF.

The appointment of an independent MO within the office of the Public Protector, may be a very valuable institution. Not only could the MO address complaints by the public and military personnel but could investigate irregularities in the military justice system, hereby rendering the disciplinary procedure more congenial. The mere presence of an independent and impartial MO, who reports to Parliament, could have a healthy effect on the whole organisation.

While an upgrading of the present individual and collective grievance structures and the appointment of a MO could improve the efficiency of present labour relations mechanisms, this may not preclude the need for some form of group representation, or institutionalised mechanism, whereby uniformed personnel can exert some influence over their service conditions. Should members express the desire to have their interests advanced through some kind of collective organisation, restrictions will in all likelihood be placed on the activities that constitute a clear danger to organisational or combat effectiveness of the armed forces.

The main utility of an organisation representing military personnel in the SANDF could be to advance and represent the interests of their members on professional or institutional matters that affect their conditions of service. A possible means whereby this could be achieved is through an institutionalised process of joint consultation with the Ministry of Defence and Parliamentary Defence Committees. The creation of a

body, such as a Defence Services Review Board, outside the dispensation that exists for the broader Public Service, could also serve as a means whereby the DoD, the organisations representing military personnel and the Public Service Commission can review the institutional service dispensation for military personnel.

However, the pressure on the SANDF to adopt a more pluralist approach to labour relations is apparent. Mechanisms should be created to accommodate the needs of soldiers as employees. Experience in both the private and public sector demonstrates that if the need to unionise exists, no law or legislation will prevent it. The challenge is to balance the needs of the soldier, in a free democratic society, versus the needs of the military to have an effective organisation, bound by professional principles, and subordinate to the needs of society.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

11.1 Findings on professionalism and unitarist labour relations practices

An analysis of the military profession reveals that it is indeed a unique profession that requires a high degree of personal dedication from members to the goals of the organisation. Loyalty and commitment to the service and to the nation are considered to be the most desirable qualities in individuals who are recruited to the officer corps. Because of the unique social function the military is expected to fulfil and the control members of the armed forces exercise over the means of organised violence, society and the military demand a greater degree of personal commitment from their members. All in the service of the armed forces are required to demonstrate high standards of patriotism, discipline, courage and self-sacrifice in the course of their duties, and to demonstrate a responsibility to use their skill in the interests of society.

Consequently, employment in the armed forces has been structurally very different from civilian industrial organisation. As a professional, the soldier is seen to be responsible to a client, society (the sense of professional "calling"), while as a bureaucrat, the soldier is responsible to serve the government. In both cases the modern soldier is corporate (exclusive), bureaucratic (hierarchical), and professional (mission-oriented). The commitment to professional values coupled to the uniqueness of the military function, has also meant that traditionally, labour relations practices have diverged sharply from the civilian sector, not only as a result of function of military labour, but due to the normative constraints placed upon the profession.

The emergence of trade unions or even professional associations is viewed as a direct threat to the professionalism of the armed forces. This is especially so, where the activities of such organisations are seen to weaken professional military values, such as member's commitment to the professional social ethic associated with selfless service, the corporatism of the military, subservience to civil authority and political impartiality. Consequently, armed forces have approached the management of labour relations from a typically unitarist perspective, actively opposing any attempts at unionisation and collective bargaining by members of the armed forces.

With reference to the South African situation, the same principles of professionalism have applied. A high priority is placed on need for a disciplined force, loyalty and commitment to the service and to the nation. Members of the SANDF are expected to submit to the basic ethics of soldiering, not act in self-interest and at all times fulfil their duty in a politically non-partisan way. Compliance with these normative considerations have meant that labour relations has been managed from a unitarist perspective, which implies that every attempt has been made to prevent unionisation and to apply punitive sanctions to those who have been involved in such activities. Any grievances are to be addressed strictly in accordance with the internal command channels and deviation from these formalised structures is a punishable offence. A legal prohibition was placed on trade union activity, strikes or actions of public protest, with participation in such activities being declared a criminal offence.

The main motivation for restricting the labour rights of soldiers, in the case of South Africa, as elsewhere, is the belief that trade union activity could undermine the professionalism of the SANDF and divide the ranks along racial and institutional lines. The concern is that unionisation will undermine the authority of military commanders, dividing the loyalty of members between the unit and the union. An additional concern, given the integration of seven different armed forces in 1994 to form the SANDF, is that unionisation could politicise the armed forces. Such activity, it is held will erode command authority and lead to the decline not only in organisational, but the combat effectiveness of the SANDF.

11.2 Findings on occupationalism and pluralist labour relations practices

Despite the requirement for members of the armed forces to be committed to the principles of military professionalism, there has been a progressive weakening of these traditional professional values since after World War 11, but particularly after the Vietnam war. With the fragmentation of the military profession into many specialities, the military profession has experienced a degree of de-professionalisation, which has been associated with a shift towards occupationalism. Occupationalism does not imply a decline in professional competency, but a modification in traditional professional values and attitudes towards military service.

Whereas the professional/institutional military is legitimated in terms of values, norms and purposes that transcend self-interest, the more occupational the military, the more military service is seen in terms of marketplace criteria. The ascendancy of occupationalism is associated with changes taking place in both the nature of military service, and the nature of military organisation. The civilianisation of military work,

the shift to an all volunteer force, the change in recruitment from elites to the broader population, as well as the erosion of the unique institutional compensation system of the military, all contribute towards the ascendancy of occupationalism within armed forces.

One of the potential outcomes of occupationalism, is that military service is no longer viewed as a calling, but as a job like any other. Associated with this trend, is the requirement for greater say in the determination of salary and working conditions. Particularly where institutional goals are no longer seen to be totally compatible with the individual's needs, the demand for a pluralist labour relations dispensation is increased. One of the potential outcomes, is unionisation.

With reference to the South African case study, it is clear that there has been a weakening of traditional institutional values associated with a rapid ascendancy in occupationalism, with respect to both the nature of military service and the nature of military organisation. Two surveys conducted at the SA Military Academy, one in 1989, just before the withdrawal from Namibia, and the other, just after the formation of the SANDF in 1995 reveal that the already visible drift towards occupationalism increased in the latter period. An analysis of the variables listed by Moskos as I/O indicators also demonstrates that the SANDF is experiencing a distinct drift towards occupationalism, especially with respect to those variables linked to compensation, the system of evaluation and the military legal system.

Recent structural changes within the SANDF have tended to reinforce this trend. The emphases on the collateral utility of military and civilian skills have strengthened the horizontal comparisons between civilian and military employment. The recent shift to an all-volunteer force too has also meant that the SANDF is obliged to take marketplace criteria into consideration if quality personnel are to be recruited, and retained. Many members currently joining the SANDF under the volunteer system do so not out of patriotism, but for the material benefits such employment brings. The present erosion of service benefits and job security, coupled to the inability of the military leadership to prevent the erosion of service benefits and tenure, underlies much of the present felt need for some lobbying or bargaining structure in the SANDF, whether this be a union or a professional association.

However, research indicates that an increase in occupationalism does not necessarily lead to unionism or even some mild form of group representation. Some highly institutional militaries accept military unions, while some occupational militaries reject any form of group representation. The reason for this is that the driving forces for military unionisation are in most cases linked to broader societal factors.

Specifically within the South African context, these societal forces may be *the* decisive factors that determine whether labour rights can be extended to the military personnel serving in the SANDF. The current lichpin around which the military union debate in South Africa hinges, is whether the SANDF can prove that it is reasonable and justifiable to limit the labour rights of military personnel on the basis that trade unionism and collective bargaining will be detrimental to national defence capability.

11.4 Findings on the European experience with military unionism

Many of the arguments put forward in this dissertation are based on the European experience of unionisation, particularly the Northern European countries that have accommodated some form of group representation. The experience of these countries clearly demonstrate that the origins, structure and function of the type of group representation found in a particular country is reflective of the history and societal context within which the military functions. The multiple systems of group representation that have emerged are a direct result of these differences.

Although this complicates cross-cultural comparison, certain universal trends do exist which may be of comparative value. The dominant model of group representation within the armed forces are the professional associations, which can be differentiated into those who represent all ranks (Germany) to those who represent a particular rank group or military speciality (Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark). With the exception of Germany, different provisions apply to conscripts.

The aims of the professional associations are to protect the professional interests of service members. In most instances, the unions and professional associations do not have collective bargaining rights, only consultative rights. As military pay is normally kept in accord with public sector wage trends, negotiations over wages are generally removed from the military arena. Nonetheless the influence of these professional associations and trade unions have resulted in a definite improvement in the conditions of service of military personnel. Operational matters affecting military command and discipline are generally excluded from consultation and no country, except Sweden, has granted their soldiers the right to strike.

In an attempt to enhance participation in decision-making, most countries have created representative committees to supplement the formal grievance and disciplinary procedures within the chain of command. In addition, the establishment of a parliamentary military ombudsman to investigate the complaints lodged

11.3 Findings on the impact of societal forces on the management of labour relations

In this regard, the single most important societal factor influencing the emergence of unions is where union membership carries with it the constitutionally protected right of freedom of association. Many argue, that it is "*socially unjust*" or "*undemocratic*" for members of the armed forces to be denied the freedom of association to join or form organisations that can protect or advance their interests. The counter argument is that the rights of the individual must yield to the rights of society to have an effective military organisation, subordinate to the needs of society.

Where labour rights have been extended to soldiers, this has most frequently occurred under social democratic governments, where there is a strong link with the civilian trade union movement. Where there is a dominant and strong trade union culture, and where other public servants particularly the police, have these rights, the inclination to extend labour rights to soldiers is increased. Another factor influencing the inclination towards unionisation, is where the military as institution has experienced a relative decline in their conditions of service and status compared to other groups in society.

Under such circumstances, trade unions or professional organisations are often formed to act as pressure groups, which can influence those areas of decision-making that effect the armed forces. This role is enhanced where soldiers perceive an anti-military environment to exist, and where government is seen to have divested itself from its paternal obligation to the military. It is this role which has raised the most concern, given the potential impact unions may have upon the political control of the armed forces.

With reference to the South African situation, a decisive factor is whether the labour rights enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, can be reasonably and justifiably curtailed for members of the SANDF. Given the established trade union culture in South Africa, there appears to be relative support for the right of soldiers to belong to trade unions, by both the public (other than whites), and by members serving in the SANDF (including white officers). The pressure to extend labour rights to uniformed personnel in the SANDF is enhanced by the fact that other employees, including the police and civilian employees serving in the Department of Defence have labour rights. The perception that the government has divested itself from its paternal obligation to the military, with the shift in government priority to social upliftment, reinforces the need for some form of group representation.

by soldiers serve as an alternative channel through which soldiers can voice their individual or collective grievances.

11.5 Findings on the compatibility of labour rights with military service

It appears as if the different forms of group representation implemented have been accommodated without any apparent adverse effects on military readiness, efficiency or discipline. There has been some concern that the restrictions on overtime have had a negative impact on training, and that the time spent on consultation with the representative associations have slowed down decision-making and reduced management flexibility. On the other hand, communication, general working and living conditions of military personnel and labour relations practices have improved. Many have even suggested, that the creation of representative structures has created a more enlightened and democratic dispensation and enhanced military leadership and dedication to the mission of the military, rather than, undermine discipline and loyalty to the chain of command.

The issue of whether group representation has negatively affected organisational or combat effectiveness is difficult to verify. Especially concerning combat effectiveness, the absence of any empirical evidence means that conclusions on this aspect of military functioning are speculative, as there is no experience of possible differences between unionised or non-unionised forces in actual combat situations.

The image of a military union acting as a *praetorian guard*, has not been a feature of the European experience. This could possibly be ascribed to the strict controls imposed upon the issues subject to negotiation and the activities of these unions and associations, both within the chain of command, and in their relations with the Ministries of Defence. The European experience conclusively demonstrates, that the type of group representation that emerges is reflective of the societal context in which the military is immersed. Furthermore that the extension of labour rights to the armed forces is only compatible with military service if subject to a certain constraints. Consequently, very few countries have permitted their professional associations or trade unions to have full collective bargaining rights, or the right to strike. Thirdly, that where the military organisations and unions operate under certain constraints, no adverse consequences have been reported for organisational effectiveness or civilian control.

Turning to the South African situation, the Department of Defence is facing increasing pressure to extend labour rights to uniformed military personnel. This mood is enhanced by the ineffective labour relations

dispensation for military personnel and the inability of the military leadership to prevent a deterioration of the present institutional service dispensation of uniformed personnel. The cuts in the military budget and the pending rationalisation are all contributing factors over which the military leadership has little control. The interest in unionisation could not have come at a worse time in the history of the South African armed forces, but is a possibility, or even reality that cannot be ignored if one looks at the forces that drive military unionism.

Much debate currently focuses on how to accommodate the increasing demand for labour rights by military personnel, and what structures or mechanisms can be created that will be compatible with the unique nature of military service in South Africa. Some suggestions are made in this regard. The first is to address the need for a more effective and impartial grievance and dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve potential areas of discontent. A suggestion is made that the institutionalisation of a mechanism similar to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) for military personnel could render present procedures more effective. Should such a mechanism be introduced, a dispute could be channelled through the chain of command via the communication forum structure to the military CCMA. Where matters cannot be resolved, such cases may be referred to a Military Ombudsperson (MO) for investigation and recommendation; and in instances of fundamental disagreement, to the President, as Commander in Chief of the SANDF.

The appointment of an independent MO within the office of the Public Protector, could be a very valuable institution to address complaints by members of the SANDF and by the public, investigate irregularities in the military justice system and conduct tours of inspection. The mere presence of an independent and impartial MO, who reports to Parliament, may ensure sufficient oversight and commitment to fair labour practices within the SANDF.

While an upgrading of the present individual and collective grievance structures and the appointment of a MO could improve the efficiency of present labour relations mechanisms, this may not preclude the drive for some form of group representation. There is still the need for some kind of institutionalised mechanism whereby uniformed personnel can exert some influence over their service conditions. The main utility of an organisation representing military personnel in the SANDF, would be to advance and represent the interests of their members on professional or institutional matters that affect their conditions of service. A possible means whereby this could be achieved is through an institutionalised process of joint consultation with the Ministry of Defence and Parliamentary Defence Committees. The creation of a body, such as a

Defence Services Review Board, outside the dispensation that exists for the broader Public Service, could also serve as a means whereby the Department of Defence could review the institutional service dispensation for military personnel.

Should the extension of labour rights to members of the armed forces result in a constitutional battle in South Africa, the SANDF will have to prove conclusively that the activities of unions, including collective bargaining and the right to strike, will be detrimental to military effectiveness and national interest. If this means that restrictions will be placed on the rights of soldiers to belong to trade unions for the purpose of collective bargaining, effective alternatives need to be provided. As no right may be negated by such limitations, the SANDF is obliged to create appropriate labour relations mechanisms that are compatible with the unique nature of military service.

11.6 Concluding remarks

The challenge is to balance the needs of the soldier, in a free democratic society to have labour rights, versus needs of the military to have an effective organisation, bound by professional principles, and subordinate to the needs of society. Each of these areas require some careful thinking, if a rational balance is to be found between the needs of the *"soldier as an employee"* within the unique environment of national security.

The conclusion is reached that institutionalised mechanisms have to be implemented through which potential areas of conflict can be resolved, and through which the soldier can exert some influence over their conditions of employment. It would be far better to do so, than to be forced to concede to demands by disgruntled soldiers - at gun point. This may be a small concession in *"industrial democracy"*, for *"defence of democracy"*, in South Africa.

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labour relations issues have often proved ineffective and have eventually led to the acceptance of unionism.

The inclination of military personnel to form or join a union is enhanced where the military institution, and the military profession, has suffered a significant loss of privilege in society. This perception was verified by a survey conducted among a select group of officers, many of whom felt that military service is considered less important, and that society no longer respects their profession and the unique function they fulfil. These responses could be attributed to government priority with social upliftment, rather than security in the absence on any external threat.

To conclude, it was proposed that the entire industrial relations force field needs to be taken into consideration in the debate on whether military personnel will be likely to join, or form unions, or whether labour rights can be extended to military personnel. Ultimately, as the experience of the public sector and the police indicates, it may be better to create the necessary structures whereby soldiers can negotiate their conditions of service, than for the state to be forced to cope with non-institutionalised labour unrest by "armed" soldiers.

DOD STRENGTH PER RANK, RACE AND GENDER AS AT 15 NOVEMBER 1996

RANK	WHITE			COLOURED			ASIAN			BLACK			UNKNOWN			TOTAL		
	M	F	TOTAL	M	F	TOTAL	M	F	TOTAL	M	F	TOTAL	M	F	TOTAL	M	F	TOTAL
GEN	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
LT GEN	9	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	11	0	11
MAJ GEN	39	0	39	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	7	0	0	0	46	0	46
BRIG	131	4	135	1	0	1	0	0	0	25	1	26	0	0	0	157	5	162
COL	680	25	705	2	0	2	0	0	0	59	0	59	0	0	0	741	25	766
LT COL	1443	204	1647	24	0	24	4	2	6	130	9	139	0	0	0	1601	215	1816
MAJ	1205	386	1591	58	0	58	4	3	7	375	36	411	0	0	0	1642	425	2067
CAPT	1169	611	1780	115	25	140	8	7	15	539	133	672	0	0	0	1831	776	2607
LT	1338	409	1747	142	31	173	10	9	19	806	132	938	0	0	0	2296	581	2877
2LT	219	105	324	22	1	23	3	2	5	51	3	54	0	0	0	295	111	406
CPLN	100	1	101	8	0	8	1	0	1	33	1	34	0	0	0	142	2	144
WO1	1692	165	1857	106	0	106	4	0	4	89	2	91	0	0	0	1891	167	2058
WO2	1613	430	2043	263	2	265	24	0	24	307	3	310	0	0	0	2207	435	2642
SSGT	2805	833	3638	738	8	746	152	2	154	739	42	781	0	0	0	4434	885	5319
SGT	3524	983	4507	1013	51	1064	193	12	205	1992	204	2196	0	0	0	6722	1250	7972
CPL	2116	548	2664	1309	161	1470	214	8	222	4740	342	5082	1	0	1	8380	1059	9439
L/CPL	1152	316	1468	950	132	1082	106	20	126	5443	362	5805	9	0	9	7660	830	8490
PTE	1206	481	1687	1829	92	1921	73	20	93	25790	1108	26898	10	0	10	28908	1701	30609
TOTAL	20442	5501	25943	6580	503	7083	796	85	881	41127	2378	43505	20	0	20	68965	8467	77432
AUX SERV	80	1	81	58	0	58	0	0	0	342	1	343	0	0	0	480	2	482
CIV	1143	4939	6082	3387	1398	4785	37	40	77	8929	3275	12204	3	1	4	13499	9653	23152
TOTAL	21665	10441	32106	10025	1901	11926	833	125	958	50398	5654	56052	23	1	24	82944	18122	101066

PERSOL BREAKDOWN OF FORMER FORCES PER RANK
AS AT 15 NOVEMBER 1996 (FULL TIME FORCES)

RANK	BADF			TRANSKEI			DOPHUTHATSWANA			VENDA			CIBKEI			APLA			MK			BANDF			KZBPF			TOTAL		
	S	T	TOT	S	T	TOT	S	T	TOT	S	T	TOT	S	T	TOT	S	T	TOT	S	T	TOT	S	T	TOT	S	T	TOT	S	T	TOT
GEN	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
LT GEN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	0	11
MAJ GEN	30	0	30	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	48	0	48
BRIG	134	1	135	8	0	8	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	18	2	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	159	3	162
COL	700	1	701	11	0	11	6	0	6	0	0	0	5	0	5	8	2	10	30	3	33	0	0	0	0	0	0	760	6	766
LT COL	1661	3	1664	17	0	17	13	1	14	1	0	1	1	0	1	17	0	17	99	2	101	1	0	1	0	0	0	1810	6	1816
MAJ	1820	24	1844	81	0	81	43	6	49	11	0	11	20	0	20	48	0	48	223	0	223	10	0	10	1	0	1	2037	30	2067
CAPT	1890	20	1910	79	0	79	78	2	81	21	2	23	35	0	35	67	0	67	334	1	335	77	0	77	0	0	0	2582	25	2607
LT	1965	17	1982	57	0	57	147	3	150	23	0	23	23	0	23	141	0	141	343	0	343	156	1	157	1	0	1	2856	21	2877
2LT	221	38	259	0	0	0	4	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	5	0	5	135	1	136	3	0	3	369	37	406
COPLN	112	0	112	3	0	3	8	0	8	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	5	0	5	13	0	13	0	0	0	144	0	144
WO1	1973	0	1973	34	0	34	12	0	12	0	0	0	6	0	6	4	0	4	28	0	28	0	0	0	0	0	0	2058	0	2058
WO2	2387	5	2392	74	0	74	84	1	85	7	0	7	35	0	35	8	0	8	63	0	63	0	0	0	0	0	0	2638	6	2644
SSGT	4847	71	4918	152	0	152	124	5	129	28	0	28	65	0	65	47	0	47	175	1	176	3	0	3	0	0	0	5242	77	5319
SGT	6273	60	6333	404	1	405	270	12	282	87	3	90	200	0	200	132	0	132	488	0	488	33	0	33	1	0	1	7896	78	7974
CPL	6409	4	6413	603	0	603	465	1	466	237	2	239	273	1	274	368	0	368	817	0	817	251	0	251	8	0	8	9431	8	9439
LOPL	3612	12	3624	1178	2	1180	370	2	372	145	0	145	238	0	238	310	0	310	1155	0	1155	1358	6	1364	103	0	103	8486	22	8508
PTE	12817	162	12979	770	1	771	1771	0	1771	568	1	569	567	2	569	2563	0	2563	8010	0	8010	3033	2	3035	324	0	324	30441	168	30609
TOTAL	48450	416	48866	3448	4	3452	3398	33	3431	1128	8	1136	1471	3	1474	3733	2	3735	11008	9	11017	5070	10	5080	441	0	441	70047	485	70532
AUX SERVICE	478	3	481	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	478	3	481
CIVILIANS	21315	0	21315	418	0	418	282	0	282	128	0	128	242	0	242	0	0	0	11	0	11	758	0	758	0	0	0	23152	0	23152
GRAND TOTAL	69244	418	69662	3684	4	3688	3680	33	3713	1256	8	1264	1713	3	1716	3733	2	3735	11819	9	11828	5826	10	5836	441	0	441	100378	488	100866

NOTE:

1. S = SUBSTANTIVE RANKS

2. T = TEMPORARY RANKS

DOD PERSONNEL STRENGTH AS AT 15 NOVEMBER 1996

SERVICE SYSTEM	SA ARMY	SA AIR FORCE	SA NAVY	SA MED SERVICE	SERVICE CORPS	STAFF DIVISIONS	MINISTRY/ SEC OF DEF	HQ FAULT	TOTAL
LTS	28791	7433	3543	4928	43	1732	34	12	46516
MTS	1293	717	748	465	8	46	2	25	3304
STS	23176	2389	1161	713	3	150	2	18	27612
AUX	356	15	31	60		20			482
CIVILIAN	12317	3419	3536	2753	6	1038	42	41	23152
TOTAL	65933	13973	9019	8919	60	2986	80	96	101066

DOD STRENGTH AS AT 15 NOVEMBER 1996

% = % OF TOTAL COMPONENT

COMPONENT	WHITE			COLOURED			ASIAN			BLACK			UNKNOWN			TOTAL		
	M	F	TOTAL	M	F	TOTAL	M	F	TOTAL	M	F	TOTAL	M	F	TOTAL	M	F	TOTAL
LTS	16730	4671	21401	3350	270	3620	553	37	590	19891	1014	20905	0	0	0	40524	5992	46516
	35.97%	10.04%	46.01%	7.20%	0.58%	7.78%	1.19%	0.08%	1.27%	42.76%	2.18%	44.94%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	87.12%	12.88%	100.00%
MTS	1142	205	1347	346	37	383	118	14	132	1297	145	1442	0	0	0	2903	401	3304
	34.56%	6.20%	40.77%	10.47%	1.12%	11.59%	3.57%	0.42%	4.00%	39.26%	4.39%	43.64%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	87.86%	12.14%	100.00%
STS	2570	625	3195	2884	196	3080	125	34	159	19939	1219	21158	20	0	20	25538	2074	27612
	9.31%	2.26%	11.57%	10.44%	0.71%	11.15%	0.45%	0.12%	0.58%	72.21%	4.41%	76.63%	0.07%	0.00%	0.07%	92.49%	7.51%	100.00%
AUX	80	1	81	58	0	58	0	0	0	342	1	343	0	0	0	480	2	482
	16.60%	0.21%	16.80%	12.03%	0.00%	12.03%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	70.95%	0.21%	71.16%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	99.59%	0.41%	100.00%
CIV	1143	4939	6082	3387	1398	4785	37	40	77	8929	3275	12204	3	1	4	13499	9653	23152
	4.94%	21.33%	26.27%	14.63%	6.04%	20.67%	0.16%	0.17%	0.33%	38.57%	14.15%	52.71%	0.01%	0.00%	0.02%	58.31%	41.69%	100.00%
TOTAL FTF	21665	10441	32106	10025	1901	11926	833	125	958	50398	5654	56052	23	1	24	82944	18122	101066
	21.44%	10.33%	31.77%	9.92%	1.88%	11.80%	0.82%	0.12%	0.95%	49.87%	5.59%	55.46%	0.02%	0.00%	0.02%	82.07%	17.93%	100.00%

NOTE 1 : THE ABOVE CAREER DIAGRAM MUST BE READ WITH THE SA ARMY CAREER PLANNING POLICY

LEIERSKAPONTWIKKELINGSPROGRAM (LOP)
LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (LDP)

VRAELYS : PROFESSIONALISME
QUESTIONNAIRE : PROFESSIONALISM

Die vraelys is opgestel om informasie oor u sieninge van bepaalde aspekte rakende 'n loopbaan as 'n militêre offisier te bekom

This questionnaire was compiled to obtain information on your views regarding certain aspects of a career as a military officer.

U naam moet nêrens op die vraelys aangebring word nie. U bly dus so vermoontlik anoniem. Alle informasie wat u verskaf sal as vertroulik beskou word.

Your name is not to appear anywhere on the questionnaire. In other words, you remain anonymous as far as possible and your response will be treated confidentially.

Beantwoord die vrae deur die items wat u kies met 'n X te merk.
Answer the questions by marking the items selected with a X.

AFDELING A : PERSOONLIKE BESONDERHEDE
SECTION A : PERSONAL DATA

1. Studierigting/Field of Study

Natuurwetenskappe Natural Sciences	Handelwetenskappe Commercial Sciences	Geesteswetenskappe Human Sciences
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2. Weermagsdeel/Arm of the Service

Leër Army	Lugmag Air Force	Vloot Navy	SAGD SAMS
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3. Rang/Rank

KO/CO Adb/Mid	2 Lt Vdg/Esn	Lt Olt/S Lt	Kapt/Capt Lt (SAV/SAN)	Maj Lt Cdr
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4. Jaargroep/Year Group

MA95	MA96	MA97
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5. Huwelikstatus/Marital State

Getroud Married	Ongetroud Unmarried
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AFDELING B : VRAELYS

SECTION B : QUESTIONNAIRE

Dui asseblief aan of u met die volgende sewe stellings saamstem [1] of verskil [2].

Please indicate whether you agree [1] of disagree [2] with each of the following seven statements.

1. Alle lede van 'n eenheid/HK behoort ter bevordering van eenheidsgees in 'n militêre basis te woon.

[1] [2]

In the interest of esprit d'corps all members of a unit/HQ should live in a military base.

2. Die skeiding tussen offisiere en adjudant- en onderoffisiere is uitgedien en behoort afgeskaf te word.

[1] [2]

The seperation between officers and NCO's is obsolete and should be abolished.

3. Die Weermag verwag van my om aan te veel aktiwiteite deel te neem wat niks met my werk te make het nie.

[1] [2]

The Defence Force requires me to participate in too many activities that are not related to my job.

4. Ek wens dat meer offisiere werklik besorg was oor nasionale veiligheid.

[1] [2]

I wish that more officers had a genuine concern for national security.

5. Dissipline is heeltemal te laks in die Weermag van vandag.

[1] [2]

Discipline is much too lenient in todays Defence Force.

6. Meer toesig oor lede se werk en gedrag is nodig op laer vlakke in die Weermag.

[1] [2]

More supervision of members' work and behaviour is needed at lower levels within the Defence Force.

7. 'n Mens kry billiker behandeling in 'n burgerlike werk as in die Weermag.

[1] [2]

One will get a better deal in a civilian job than in the Defence Force.

As u aan die tipe werk dink wat u graag sou wou hê, is die volgende stellings belangrik [1] of onbelangrik [2]?

In thinking about the kind of job you would like to do, are the following statements important [1] or unimportant [2]?

8. 'n Werk wat my die geleentheid bied om my land te dien.

[1] [2]

A job that gives me a chance to serve my country.

9. 'n Werk wat my die geleentheid bied om van die wêreld 'n beter plek te maak om in te woon (bv deur terrorisme uit te skakel).

[1] [2]

A job that gives me a chance to make the world a better place to live in (ie stamp out terrorism).

10. 'n Werk wat goeie sekuriteit bied; geen moontlikheid van summiere ontslag nie.

[1] [2]

A steady job with good security; no chance of summary dismissal.

11. 'n Werk met 'n goeie salaris.

[1] [2]

A job with a good salary.

12. 'n Werk wat goeie byvoordele het.

[1] [2]

A job with good fringe benefits.

Dui asseblief aan of elk van die volgende belangrik [1] of onbelangrik [2] vir u besluit was om by die Staande Mag aan te sluit.

Please indicate whether each of the following was important [1] or unimportant [2] in your decision to join the Permanent Force.

13. Diens in die Weermag is vir my 'n roeping; ek sou geen ander werk wou doen nie.

[1] [2]

To me service in the Defence Force is a calling; I would not like to do any other work.

14. Ek hou van dissipline, ordelikheid, struktuur, uniformiteit, samehorigheid, eenheidstrots ...

[1] [2]

I like discipline, orderliness, structure, uniformity, cohesiveness, unit pride ...

15. Ek wou 'n familietradisie van militêre diens voortsit.

[1] [2]

I wanted to continue a family tradition of military service.

16. Ek het 'n voorliefde vir die Weermag : wapenstelsels, skepe, vliegtuie, militêre operasies, ens fassineer my.

[1] [2]

I have a special liking for the military : weapon systems, ships, aircraft, military operations, etc fascinate me.

17. Ek is in my wese 'n militarist; ek glo dat 'n nasie se grootheid deur militêre mag bepaal word en daarom moet die Weermag so sterk as moontlik wees.

[1] [2]

I am a militarist at heart; I believe that a nation's greatness is determined by military power and therefore the Defence Force must be as strong as possible.

18. Ek kon nie/sou nie kon aanpas in 'n burgerlike beroep nie.

[1] [2]

I could not adapt/would not be able to adapt to a civilian career.

19. Ek wou 'n werk gehad het wat sekuriteit, bevorderings=moontlikhede en gunstige aftreevoorwaardes bied.

[1] [2]

I wanted a secure job with promotion and favourable retirement benefits.

20. Beroepsmoontlikhede het beter gelyk in die Weermag as in die burgerlike lewe.

[1] [2]

Job opportunities looked better in the Defence Force than in civilian life.

Dui asseblief aan of u met elk van die volgende stellings saamstem [1] of nie saamstem nie [2].

Please indicate whether you agree [1] or disagree [2] with each of the following statements.

21. Van geen weermagslid behoort verwag te word om 'n verplasing te aanvaar wat hom of haar nie pas nie.

[1] [2]

No Defence Force member should be required to take a transfer he or she does not want.

22. Alle militêre personeel moet hulle operasionele diens verrig ongeag die gevolge wat dit vir hulleself of hulle families mag inhou.

[1] [2]

All military personnel should perform their operational duty regardless of personal and family consequences.

23. Persoonlike belange en voorkeure is altyd ondergeskik aan die Weermag se belange.

[1] [2]

Personal interests and wishes must always take second place to the interests and requirements of the Defence Force.

24. Wat 'n lid na-ure doen het niks met die Weermag te doen nie.

[1] [2]

What a member does after hours is none of the Defence Force's business.

25. Rangverskille behoort nie 'n rol te speel in lede se sosiale verkeer na-ure nie.

[1] [2]

Differences in rank should not be important in members' social life after hours.

26. 'n Lid se private lewe is sy eie saak; bevelvoerders behoort geen belang daarby te hê nie.

[1] [2]

What a member does in his private life should be of no concern to his officer commanding.

27. Die konsep dat 'n offisier 24 uur per dag aan diens is, is nie vandag meer geldig nie.

[1] [2]

The concept of an officer being on duty 24 hours a day is no longer valid.

28. Lede van my weermagsdeel moet meer daarin belang stel om die taak op hande af te handel as in hul persoonlike belange.

[1] [2]

Members of my arm of the service should take more interest in getting the job done and less interest in their personal concerns.

29. Weermagslede het mense nodig wat hulle saak oor soldy- of bevorderingskwessies direk op die hoogste vlak kan stel.

[1] [2]

Defence Force members need people to represent their views on pay and promotion issues directly at the highest level.

30. Weermagslede het 'n vaste regsverteenwoordiger nodig wat hul soldykwessies hof toe kan neem indien nodig.

[1] [2]

Defence Force members need a legal representative to take their pay problems to court if necessary.

31. Indien dit nie dissipline sal benadeel nie, is 'n onafhanklike vereniging (nie 'n vakbond nie) wat na lede se belange kan omsien 'n goeie idee.

[1] [2]

As long as it does not harm discipline an independent representative association (not a trade union) would be a good idea.

32. Ek is nie ten gunste van 'n vereniging wat die erkende bevelskanaal omseil om onderhandelings in my belang te voer nie.

[1] [2]

I am opposed to the idea of a representative association bypassing the existing chain of command to negotiate on my behalf.

33. Die onderskeie hoofkwartiere en stafafdelings sien goed om na die belange van individuele weermagslede.

[1] [2]

The interests of the individual members of the Defence Force are well looked after by the respective headquarters and staff divisions.

34. Vergoeding moet volgens 'n lid se bekwaamhede en kwalifikasies vasgestel word en nie volgens posvlak, rang of senioriteit nie.

[1] [2]

Compensation should be based on one's skills and qualifications and not on post level, rank and seniority.

35. Ek dink normaalweg aan myself as 'n persoon met spesiale opleiding en ervaring wat vir die weermag werk, eerder as 'n militêre beroepsoffisier.

[1] [2]

I normally think of myself as a person with special training and experience working for the Defence Force rather than as a military career officer.

36. My posisie in die Weermag word eerstens bepaal deur my militêre opleiding, kwalifikasies, kundigheid en ondervinding en daarom is dit belangriker as my offisierskap.

[1] [2]

My standing in the Defence Force is basically determined by my military training, qualifications, expertise and experience and it is therefore more important than my officership.

37. Ek sou verkies dat die geldwaarde van my diensvoordele (toelaes, gratis mediese sorg, ens) by my soldy gevoeg word en dat daardie "voordele" afgeskaf word.

[1] [2]

I would prefer that the money value of my service benefits (allowances, free medical care, etc) be added to my pay and these "benefits" dropped.

38. 'n Offisier se eggenote behoort te voel dat sy net so 'n deel van die eenheid as haar man is.

[1] [2]

An officer's wife ought to feel as much a part of the unit as her husband.

39. As ek onverwags ryk sou word (bv deur 'n erflating te ontvang of 'n groot prys te wen) sou ek nogtans met my militêre loopbaan voortgaan tot aftree ouderdom.

[1] [2]

If I suddenly become rich (due to an inheritance, winning a big prize, etc) I would continue my military career until retirement.

40. In die tegnologies gevorderde weermag van vandag het ons regtig nie meer soveel tradisies en seremonies (parades, ens) nodig as in die ou tyd nie.

[1] [2]

In the technological advanced Defence Force of today, we really do not need so many traditions and ceremonies (parades, etc) as in times past.

41. Terwyl ek aan die Militêre Akademie studeer is ek in die eerste instansie student en dan offisier.

[1] [2]

While studying at the Military Academy I am a student first and an officer second.

42. Ek is eerstens 'n offisier met 'n kommissierang in die Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag, tweedens 'n Leëroffisier/lugmag=offisier/vlootoffisier/SAGD-offisier en derdens 'n vlieënier/personeelpraktisyn/logistikus/valskermsoldaat ...

[1] [2]

I am firstly a commissioned officer in the SA/Defence Force, secondly an army officer/ air force officer/naval officer/ SAMS officer and thirdly a pilot/personnel practitioner/ logistician/paratrooper ...

43. Indien u nie met die laaste stelling saamstem nie, dui
asseblief aan wat die volgorde behoort te wees.

[1] [2]

If you disagree with the last statement, please indicate what
the sequence should be.

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

I/O TRENDS BY QUESTION

S/No	% Institutional	% Occupational	Missing
01	8.2	91.8	1
02	78.7	21.3	1
03	43.2	56.8	1
04	69.8	30.2	2
05	61.0	39.0	2
06	41.2	58.8	2
07	22.2	77.8	4
08	56.8	43.2	1
09	71.6	28.4	1
10	14.8	85.2	1
11	3.3	96.7	1
12	5.5	94.5	1
13	25.3	74.7	2
14	78.7	21.3	1
15	14.2	85.8	1
16	60.7	39.3	1
17	32.2	67.8	1
18	8.2	91.8	2
19	21.3	78.7	1
20	35.0	65.0	1
21	33.0	67.0	2
22	45.4	54.6	1
23	32.0	68.0	3
24	20.2	79.8	1
25	33.3	66.7	1
26	21.3	78.7	1
27	41.5	58.5	1
28	62.8	37.2	4
29	6.6	93.4	2
30	17.7	82.3	3
31	8.8	91.2	3
32	35.9	64.1	3
33	16.1	83.9	4
34	22.8	77.2	4
35	28.7	71.3	3
36	28.9	71.1	4
37	61.1	38.9	4
38	59.1	40.9	3
39	32.6	67.4	6
40	54.7	45.3	5
41	45.67	54.4	4
42 *	75.2	24.8	19
TOTAL	37 %	63 %	
TOTAL	1535.2	2664.8	

* This means that questions 42 and 43 were combined to give the answer(s).

I/O TRENDS BY ARM OF SERVICE

Ques No	AIR FORCE		ARMY		NAVY		SAMS	
	Inst	Occ	Inst	Occ	Inst	Occ	Inst	Occ
01	11.5	88.5	2.4	97.6	0	100	7.7	92.3
02	78.8	21.2	76.2	23.8	71.4	28.6	100	0
03	47.8	52.2	33.3	66.7	50.0	50.0	23.1	76.9
04	72.6	27.4	63.4	36.6	71.4	28.6	61.5	38.5
05	66.1	33.9	40.5	59.5	57.1	42.9	84.6	15.4
06	43.4	56.6	39.0	61.0	28.6	71.4	38.5	61.5
07	25.5	74.5	19.0	81.0	7.1	92.9	23.1	76.9
08	61.9	38.1	42.9	57.1	57.1	42.9	61.5	38.5
09	76.1	23.9	61.9	38.1	85.7	14.3	53.8	46.2
10	14.2	85.8	16.7	83.3	0	100.0	35.7	64.3
11	2.7	97.3	0	100.0	14.3	85.7	7.7	92.3
12	6.2	93.8	0	100.0	14.3	85.7	0	100.0
13	11.5	88.5	14.6	85.4	21.4	78.6	15.4	84.6
14	84.1	15.9	66.7	33.3	71.4	28.6	76.6	23.4
15	17.7	82.3	2.4	97.6	14.3	85.7	0	100.0
16	64.6	35.4	59.5	40.5	64.3	35.7	30.8	69.2
17	36.3	63.7	23.5	76.5	35.7	64.3	30.8	69.2
18	8.9	91.1	7.1	92.9	7.1	92.9	7.7	92.3
19	20.4	79.6	21.4	78.6	28.6	71.4	23.1	76.9
20	40.7	59.3	21.4	78.6	14.3	85.7	46.2	53.8
21	34.8	65.2	28.6	71.4	35.7	64.3	30.8	69.2
22	44.2	55.8	47.6	52.4	57.1	42.9	38.5	61.5
23	42.3	57.7	11.9	88.1	28.6	71.4	15.4	84.6
24	23.9	76.1	9.5	90.5	14.3	85.7	28.6	71.4
25	34.5	65.5	23.8	76.2	28.6	71.4	65.5	34.5
26	24.8	75.2	7.1	92.9	35.7	64.3	23.1	76.9
27	44.2	55.8	28.6	71.4	42.9	57.1	53.8	46.2
28	63.1	36.9	51.2	48.8	85.7	14.3	69.2	30.8
29	7.1	92.9	2.4	97.6	14.3	85.7	7.7	92.3
30	17.0	83.0	11.9	88.1	30.8	69.2	30.8	69.2
31	9.0	91.0	2.4	97.6	7.1	92.9	23.1	76.9
32	41.4	58.6	26.2	73.8	28.6	71.4	23.1	76.9
33	19.6	80.4	12.5	81.5	7.1	92.9	7.7	92.3
34	30.6	69.4	9.8	90.2	7.1	92.9	15.4	84.6
35	32.1	67.9	9.8	90.2	50.0	50.0	30.8	69.2
36	30.6	69.4	22.0	78.0	35.7	64.3	30.8	69.2
37	63.1	36.9	58.5	41.5	64.3	35.7	46.2	53.8
38	62.5	37.5	48.8	51.2	50.0	50.0	69.2	30.8
39	38.5	61.5	22.0	78.0	28.6	71.4	15.4	84.6
40	64.5	35.5	24.4	75.6	71.4	28.6	46.2	53.8
41	38.4	61.6	50.0	50.0	64.3	35.7	69.2	30.8
42	0.9	99.1	0	100.0	0	100	0	100
TOTAL	37 %	63 %	26 %	74 %	36 %	64 %	35 %	65 %
TOTAL	1558.1	2641.9	1108.9	3091.1	1502.0	2698.0	1468.3	2731.7

**QUESTIONNAIRE ON VIEWS ON PRESENT EXPERIENCES IN SANDF
VRAELYS OOR HUIDIGE ERVARINGS IN DIE SANW****NATURE / AARD**

- The *aim* of the questionnaire is to obtain your views on aspects of your experience as officer.
 - Your name must not appear anywhere on the questionnaire. In other words, you remain *anonymous* as far as possible. Your individual responses will be treated as confidential.
 - *Mark* the items you select with an X.
-
- Die *doel* van die vraelys is om u sienings te bekom oor aspekte van u ervaring as offisier.
 - U naam moet nêrens op die vraelys verskyn nie. Met ander woorde, u bly *anoniem* so ver as moontlik. U individuele antwoorde sal as vertroulik hanteer word.
 - *Merk* die items wat u kies met 'n X.

PERSONAL DATA / PERSOONLIKE BESONDERHEDE

1. Arm of Service / Weermagsdeel

Army / Leër	Air Force / Lugmag	Navy / Vloot	SAMS / SAGD
-------------	--------------------	--------------	-------------

2. Mustering / Indeling / Korps

--

3. Rank / Rang

Lt S Lt / Lt	Capt / Kapt Lt (SAN)	Maj Lt Cdr	Lt Col / Lt kol Cdr / Kdr	Col Kol	Brig Cdre / Kdoor
-----------------	-------------------------	---------------	------------------------------	------------	----------------------

4. Course / Kursus

--

5. Racial group : How would I describe myself?
-
- Rassegroep : Hoe sal ek myself beskryf?

African, Black Afrikaan, Swart	Coloured Kleurling	Indian, Asian Indiër, Asiër	White Blank
-----------------------------------	-----------------------	--------------------------------	----------------

6. Home Language : Which language do I speak most often at home?
-
- Huistaal : Watter taal praat ek meestal by die huis?

--

7. Marital State / Huwelikstatus

Unmarried / Ongetroud	Married / Getroud
-----------------------	-------------------

8. Highest Academic Qualification / Hoogste Akademiese Kwalifikasie

St 10	Diploma	B	Honn	M	D
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QUESTIONS / VRAE

Please indicate whether you agree [1] or disagree [2] with each of the following statements related to your present experiences of the SANDF.

Dui asseblief aan of u saamstem [1] of nie saamstem nie [2] met elkeen van die volgende stellings oor u huidige ervarings van die SANW.

1. As long as it does not harm discipline an *independent representative association* (not a trade union) would be a good idea. [1] [2]
Indien dit nie dissipline sal benadeel nie, is 'n *onafhanklike verteenwoordigende vereniging* (nie 'n vakbond nie) 'n goeie idee.
2. The SANDF needs more effective *employee structures* (even perhaps a military trade union) to protect the interests of uniform members. [1] [2]
Die SANW het meer effektiewe *werknemerstrukture* nodig (miskien selfs 'n militêre vakbond) om die belange van uniformlede te beskerm.
3. *Women* should be allowed to do combat duty in the front line. [1] [2]
Vrouens behoort toegelaat te word om vegdiens in die frontlinie te verrig.
4. The SANDF is more *legitimate* (trusted by the broader population) than a few years ago. [1] [2]
Die SANW is meer *legitiem* (vertrou deur die breër bevolking) as 'n paar jaar gelede.
5. South African society views *military service* as less important than a few years ago. [1] [2]
Die Suid-Afrikaanse samelewing beskou *militêre diens* as minder belangrik as 'n paar jaar gelede.
6. Because of the present absence of an external threat, South African society must not emphasise *military* issues. [1] [2]
Weens die huidige afwesigheid van 'n eksterne bedreiging, moet die Suid-Afrikaanse samelewing nie *militêre* kwessies beklemtoon nie.
7. *Operationally* the South African armed forces were more competent a few years ago than today. [1] [2]
Operasioneel was die Suid-Afrikaanse gewapende magte meer bekwaam 'n paar jaar gelede.

VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL

(Wanneer ingevul/When completed)

**SANW / SANDF****BEVOEGDHEIDSBEOORDELING / EFFICIENCY ASSESSMENT**

Wrn/Lwn/See tot Maj/Lt Kdr	Pte/Lwn/Sea to Maj/Lt Cdr
----------------------------	---------------------------

VERSLAGJAAR / ASSESSMENT YEAR

1 Jul 95 tot 30 Jun 96	1 Jul 95 to 30 Jun 96
------------------------	-----------------------

PERSOONLIKE EN DIENSBESONDERHEDE / PERSONAL AND SERVICE PARTICULARS

Van / Surname	
Voorletters / Initials	
Geboorte Datum / Date of Birth	
Magsnommer / Force Number	
Kommunikasietaal / Communication Language	
Beroepsklas / Occupational Class	
Militêre Rang en Datum / Military Rank and Date/...../.....
Aanstelling (Posnaam) / Appointment (Post Name)	
Korps (Indeling) / Corps (Mustering)	

BEOORDELAAR SE BESONDERHEDE / RATER'S PARTICULARS

Van / Surname	
Voorletters / Initials	
Rang / Rank	
Magsnommer / Force Number	
Handtekening / Signature	

VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL

P-2

VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL

(Wanneer ingevul/When completed)

BEOORDELINGSBLAD / ASSESSMENT SHEET**PUNTE VIR TOEKENNING / MARKS FOR ALLOCATION**

1 = Onaanvaarbaar / Unacceptable	4 = Aanvaarbaar / Acceptable	7 = Bogemiddeld / Above Average
2 = Swak / Weak	5 = Bevredigend / Satisfactory	8 = Uitstekend / Excellent
3 = Ondergemiddeld / Below Average	6 = Goed / Good	9 = Uitstaande / Outstanding

KOLOMME / COLUMNS

A - Beoordelaar / Rater

B - Eenheidskomitee / Unit Committee

FAKTOR 1: BESTUURSVERMOË / FACTOR 1: MANAGERIAL ABILITY

Reeks Serial	Element	A	B
1	Beheer oor die vloeï van werk Control of the flow of work		
2	Gehalte van ondergeskiktes se werk Standard of subordinates' work		
3	Vermoë om werksprioriteite te bepaal Ability in determining job priorities		
4	Vermoë om doelstellings/doelwitte te bepaal Ability in determining objectives/goals		
5	Handhaving van standaarde Upholding of standards		
6	Voorsiening vir probleme wat mag opduik Providing against difficulties that may occur		
7	Vermoë om tydige besluite te neem Ability to take timeous decisions		
8	Selfvertroue Self-confidence		
9	Oordeelsvermoë Judgement		
10	Hantering van noodopdragte Handling of emergency assignments		
Subtotaal Kolom B / Sub-total Column B			

VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL

VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL

(Wanneer ingevul/When completed)

FAKTOR 2: WERKVERMOËN / FACTOR 2: JOB ABILITY

Reeks Serial	Element	A	B
1	Bereidwilligheid om op eie inisiatief voort te gaan Willingness to proceed at own initiative		
2	Nakoming van tydskedules Compliance with time tables		
3	Gehalte van werk Standard of work		
4	Bereidwilligheid om verantwoordelikheid te aanvaar Willingness to accept responsibility		
5	Bydrae tot die verbetering van werksmetodes Contribution to improve work methods		
6	Deursettingsvermoë tydens lang en moeilike take Perseverance in long and difficult tasks		
7	Vermoë om verskeie take baas te raak Ability to cope with various assignments		
8	Eier om take te onderneem Eagerness to undertake assignments		
9	Vermoë om van een taak na die volgende om te swaai Ability to switch from one task to another		
10	Kennis van die detail van huidige werk Knowledge of the detail of present work		

Subtotaal Kolom B / Sub-total Column B

VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL

VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL

(Wanneer ingevul/When completed)

FAKTOR 3: AANPASSINGSVERMOË / FACTOR 3: ADAPTABILITY

Reeks Serial	Element	A	B
1	Reaksie op voorstelle en kritiek Reaction to suggestions and criticism		
2	Samewerking Co-operation		
3	Hoflikheid en takt Tactfulness and courtesy		
4	Vermoë om by nuwe metodes/prosedures aan te pas Ability to adapt to new methods/procedures		
5	Beheer oor humeur onder normale omstandighede Control of temper under normal circumstances		
6	Handhawing van dissipline Maintenance of discipline		
7	Gesindheid teenoor die SANW Disposition towards the SANDF		
8	Bereidwilligheid om met onaangename take te help Willingness to share in unpleasant tasks		
9	Selfbeheersing onder moeilike omstandighede Self-control under difficult circumstances		
10	Houding, netheid en algemene gedrag Attitude, neatness and general behaviour		
Subtotaal Kolom B / Sub-total Column B			

KOMMENTAAR DEUR DIE BEOORDELAAR / COMMENTS BY THE RATER

Beoordeling breedvoerig met lid bespreek / nie bespreek. Assessment discussed in detail with member / not discussed.

VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL

VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL

(Wanneer ingevul/When completed)

ERKENNING DEUR LID / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY MEMBER

Ek neem kennis en aanvaar / aanvaar nie die beoordeling.
 I take cognisance and accept / do not accept the assessment.

HANDTEKENING/SIGNATURE

DATUM/DATE

KOMMENTAAR DEUR DIE BEOORDEELDE LID / COMMENTS BY THE ASSESSED MEMBER

EENHEIDSKOMITEE / UNIT COMMITTEE

Lede / Members	Voorletters en Van / Initials and Surname	Rang / Rank	Handtekening / Signature
Voorsitter / Chairperson			
Sekretaris/Secretary			
Lede / Members	1. _____	_____	_____
	2. _____	_____	_____

BLOK 1 / BLOCK 1

Potensiaal / Potential: A / B / C / D / E

Opleiding / Training: U / K / O

VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL

VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL

(Wanneer ingevul/When completed)

KOMMENTAAR DEUR DIE EENHEIDSKOMITEE / COMMENTS BY THE UNIT COMMITTEE

OPMERKINGS DEUR BEVELVOERDER/DIREKTEUR / REMARKS BY OFFICER COMMANDING/DIRECTOR

Die beoordeling is betroubaar / nie betroubaar nie. The assessment is reliable / not reliable.	
Kommentaar / Comments:	
<u>HANDTEKENING/SIGNATURE</u>	<u>DATUM/DATE</u>
<u>MAGSNOMMER/FORCE NUMBER</u>	<u>RANG/RANK</u>

BLOK 2 / BLOCK 2

Toekomstige aanwending (Slegs Maj/Lt Edr) / Future utilization (Only Maj/Lt Cdr): N / S / P Potensiaal / Potential: A / B / C / D / E Onderskrywing / Confirmation: Ja / Nee Yes / No

VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL

VERTROULIK/CONFIDENTIAL

(Wanneer ingevul/When completed)

FINALE BEREKENING / FINAL CALCULATION

Faktor Factor	Subtotaal Kolom B / Sub-total Column B
1	
2	
3	
Totaal Total	

BEREKENING / CALCULATION

.....	÷	=	_____
(Totaal / Total)		(Aantal elemente beoordeel / Number of elements assessed)		Gemiddelde Punt / Average Mark

KOMMENTAAR DEUR FUNKSIONELE DIREKTEUR BY WEERMAGSDEELHOOPKWARTIER
COMMENTS BY FUNCTIONAL DIRECTOR AT ARM OF THE SERVICE HEADQUARTER

Toekomstige aanwending (Slegs Maj/Lt Kdr) / Future utilization (Only Maj/Lt Cdr):		N / S / P
Kommentaar / Comments:		
<hr/>		
<hr/>		
<hr/>		
HANDTEKENING / SIGNATURE		DATUM / DATE
Aanstelling / Appointment: _____		

RESTRICTED

APPENDIX G
TO CSP/DPU/R/105/2

MANUAL: COMPLETION OF THE SANDF EFFICIENCY ASSESSMENT FORM: PTE/AMN/SEA TO MAJ/LT CDR

INTRODUCTION

1. This manual is divided into steps.
2. Efficiency assessment must be done annually, before 31 July, for the assessment year 1 Jul to 30 Jun.
3. The assessment form must be completed with a black ball point pen throughout.

PROCESS FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE ASSESSMENT FORM

STEP I: PERSONAL AND SERVICE PARTICULARS

4. The personnel office completes the personal and service particulars of the member to be assessed on page 1 of the assessment form.
5. The member to be assessed must ensure that the information, as completed on page 1, is correct.

STEP II: PARTICULARS OF THE RATER

6. The rater must complete his/her personal particulars on page 1 of the assessment form.
7. The rater must preferably be an Officer or Warrant Officer but, in any case, no lower than Sgt/PO. The rater must stand in a supervisory relationship towards the assessed member in the functional line. This applies also to civilian raters.

STEP III: ASSESSMENT

8. The rater gives his/her assessment in column A on pages 2, 3 and 4, and adds comments on page 4.

STEP IV: ASSESSED MEMBER TAKES COGNISANCE OF THE ASSESSMENT

9. The assessed member will now take cognisance of the assessment, and will indicate on page 5 acceptance/not acceptance thereof.
10. If the assessed member does not accept the assessment, he/she must state

RESTRICTED

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reasons therefore on page 5.

11. The assessed member must be allowed reasonable time to study the assessment results, discuss it with his/her supervisor and if necessary with the unit committee.

STEP V: UNIT COMMITTEE

12. The particulars of the unit committee must be completed on page 5 of the assessment form, and the committee shall be composed as follows:

- a. A chairperson, who must be the officer commanding or his representative.
- b. Two members, of which the first member must be the rater and the second member must be in the same corps/mustering and have at least the same rank as the assessed member.
- c. A secretary. (Any rotation of secretary during a series of assessments must preferably be avoided.)

13. The unit committee gives its assessment in column B on pages 2, 3 and 4, completes block 1 on page 5 and adds comments on page 6.

14. The unit committee must calculate the final percentage on page 7.

STEP VI: OFFICER COMMANDING/DIRECTOR

15. The officer Commanding/Director of the assessed member concerned will indicate on page 6 if the assessment is reliable, adds his/her comments and completes block 2.

GENERAL

16. Members Recently Transferred. Where the unit committee is not in a position to authoritatively assess a member who was recently transferred, the member's previous supervisor must be involved.

17. Elements in Block 1 and 2. Symbols under training, future employment, potential and confirmation in block 1 and 2, are explained as follows:

- a. Training:
 - i. U = Training can be managed by the unit.
 - ii. K = The member should attend a formal course.

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iii. O = Further training would be fruitless.

b. Future Employment:

i. N = Not to be employed in a staff post.

ii. S = To be employed in a staff post only.

iii. P = Can be employed in any post.

c. Potential:

i. A = Warrants accelerated promotion. (Should be allocated only in the exceptional case of a member whose performance is so outstanding that it warrants promotion to the next higher rank, even if the member does not fully comply with the promotion requirements.)

ii. B = Warrants normal promotion.

iii. C = Does not yet warrant promotion. (Should be allocated to members who will not yet be able to meet the demands of the next higher rank but have the potential to do so if given guidance and experience.)

iv. D = Does not warrant any further promotion.

v. E = Does not merit present rank. (Remedial action is called for whether in the form of training or transfer to a more suitable post or, at need, dismissal.)

d. Confirmation:

i. Yes = I confirm the assessment.

ii. No = I do not agree with the assessment.

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